# Adception fake Claude Mac InstallFix

- ID: adception-claude-mac-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-09
- Researcher: Luke Jennings
- Organization: Push Security
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-10
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/adception-claude-mac-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/adception-claude-mac-2026-10.json
- Browse title: Adception fake Claude for Mac InstallFix malvertising
- Editorial summary: A Google ad for 'claude mac' leads to a fake Claude download page whose Copy button swaps the real install command for one that pipes an attacker URL into zsh.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: macOS
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/adception-claude-mac-2026-10.json

## Technique
Google ad for claude mac lists bing.com, Bing click-tracking redirects through compromised retailer to fake Claude download. Page shows real Anthropic install command; Copy button swaps clipboard to decode lake-90.com URL and pipe into zsh (InstallFix). Dual cloaking on referrer. Mate Research (Nadav Lorber) documents full attack chain - clipboard swap Copy button triggers base64 curl pipe to zsh, AES-CTR zsh stager, beacon to /api/metrics/run?event=pasted\|stager, AMOS infostealer exfiltration to 152.42.143.45, root backdoor via LaunchDaemons com.apple.accountsd.helper and com.apple.metadata.mds.worker. Signed DMG served from claude-desktop.com as Claude.dmg with Developer ID OSMAN ASTUR; jsDelivr note points to anchorpost13.com. Google Ads campaign 24303764142 served via claude-desk-code.com, promotion-chatgpt.com, lake-90.com. PasteSwitch toolkit family, unattributed.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Use official download channels and inspect pasted install commands before running them in Terminal.
- Relationship: lure; tools: claude; OS scope: macos; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: The source describes a fake Claude-for-Mac download that swaps the copied install command.
  Condition to check: The user must follow the malicious advertisement / download path and run the substituted command.
  Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Malvertising + clipboard swap / paste into Terminal

## AI tooling and models
- Fake [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) download / InstallFix lure

## Other tooling
- Google Ads campaign 24303764142
- Bing ck/a redirect
- zsh/curl pipe with base64 encoding
- AES-CTR zsh stager
- AMOS infostealer
- LaunchDaemons persistence (com.apple.accountsd.helper, com.apple.metadata.mds.worker)
- Signed DMG (Developer ID OSMAN ASTUR)
- PasteSwitch toolkit

## Victims and sectors
macOS users searching for Claude

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
Push AcSig ClickFix toolkit family

## Scale and metrics
unknown

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Search ad redirects [access]
An ad for Claude on Mac redirects through tracking and a compromised retailer to a fake download page.
Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results

### step-2: Claude branding earns trust [ai]
The page displays a real-looking Anthropic installation command.
Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results

### step-3: Clipboard command is swapped [execution]
The Copy button substitutes a command that decodes a different download URL and pipes content to zsh.
Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results

### step-4: Victim runs attacker content [impact]
Pasting the copied command into Terminal runs attacker-supplied content.
Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- Qualification: Use delivery provenance and the subsequent pasted command; Claude branding alone is not a detection signal.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: macOS download → shell execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
- Required telemetry: macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security); Browser download and proxy records; LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes
- Investigate: Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.
- Investigate: Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session.
- Limitation: Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: macOS download → shell execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
- Required telemetry: macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security); Browser download and proxy records; LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes
- Investigate: Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.
- Investigate: Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session.
- Limitation: Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0073: Impersonation — A fake Claude download impersonates a trusted AI vendor.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0073
  Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results
- AML.T0052: Phishing — Google Ads malvertising campaign delivers AMOS via fake Claude installer
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0052
  Evidence: https://mate.security/labs/fake-claude-code-ads-are-installing-amos-on-macs
- AML.T0074: Masquerading — Clipboard swap technique delivers malicious payload via user paste action
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0074
  Evidence: https://mate.security/labs/fake-claude-code-ads-are-installing-amos-on-macs
- AML.T0011: User Execution — AMOS infostealer establishes persistence via LaunchDaemons
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0011
  Evidence: https://mate.security/labs/fake-claude-code-ads-are-installing-amos-on-macs

## Defensive notes
Check pasted commands; do not pipe remote scripts into shell

## Sources
- https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results — Push Security: Adception Malvertising - Another Search Engine's Search Results
- https://mate.security/labs/fake-claude-code-ads-are-installing-amos-on-macs — Mate Research: Fake Claude Code Ads are Installing AMOS on Macs

## Source notes
Push Security initial disclosure (Oct 9); Mate Research comprehensive analysis adds AMOS payload details, LaunchDaemons persistence, signed DMG distribution, Google Ads campaign ID, full IOC set

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "claude-desktop.com",
    "anchorpost13.com",
    "claude-desk-code.com",
    "promotion-chatgpt.com",
    "lake-90.com"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "152.42.143.45"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
