# Claude-orchestrated influence-as-a-service bot network

- ID: anthropic-influence-as-a-service-2025-03
- Reported: 2025-04-23
- Researcher: Anthropic Threat Intelligence
- Organization: Anthropic
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/anthropic-influence-as-a-service-2025-03/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/anthropic-influence-as-a-service-2025-03.json
- Browse title: Claude-orchestrated influence-as-a-service bot network
- Editorial summary: A provider report describes an operation using Claude to coordinate over 100 social bot accounts and generate responses. The source does not confirm state affiliation.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Provider report
- Source-stated target environments: Provider-side
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/anthropic-influence-as-a-service-2025-03.json

## Technique
Financially motivated influence-as-a-service used Claude not only for content but to decide when 100+ social bot accounts should like, share, comment, or ignore posts based on client political personas. Also generated multilingual responses and image-gen prompts.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: attacker\_tool\_only. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
The named AI product is used by the attacker. No reviewed mapping from owning that product to the reported victim conditions is available.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
n/a (influence ops on social platforms)

## AI tooling and models
- [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview)
- image-generation tools (prompts only)

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
Tens of thousands of authentic social accounts engaged; clients outside US with varied political narratives; state-affiliated style not confirmed

## Target geography
- Multiple regions
The source identifies clients in multiple countries outside the United States; individual target countries are not disclosed.

## Attribution
unknown commercially motivated operator; state affiliation not confirmed

## Scale and metrics
100+ bot accounts on X/Facebook; tens of thousands of engagements; no viral hits noted

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Operator defines political personas [access]
Commercial clients supply narratives and personas for social accounts.
Evidence: https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025

### step-2: Claude plans account activity [ai]
Claude helps decide when more than 100 bot accounts should engage or ignore posts.
Evidence: https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025

### step-3: Accounts distribute content [execution]
The operation uses multilingual responses and generated image prompts.
Evidence: https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025

### step-4: Coordinated influence [impact]
Authentic social accounts encounter the coordinated engagement; state affiliation is unconfirmed.
Evidence: https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Provider-side abuse investigation
- Visibility: Provider / operator records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/provider.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/provider.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/provider.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
- Required telemetry: Provider-owned account / request audit; Abuse-review findings and linked-account context; Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
- Investigate: Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- Investigate: For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
- Limitation: Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
- Qualification: Persona preparation is visible in provider/operator records, rather than victim endpoint logs.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Provider-side abuse investigation
- Visibility: Provider / operator records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/provider.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/provider.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/provider.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
- Required telemetry: Provider-owned account / request audit; Abuse-review findings and linked-account context; Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
- Investigate: Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- Investigate: For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
- Limitation: Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Coordinated messaging / propagation
- Visibility: Platform / application records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/social.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/social.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/social.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.
- Required telemetry: Platform account and posting audit; Agent session and message-provenance records; Rate, recipient and content-similarity features
- Investigate: Group actions by linked account, session, recipient and time rather than judging writing style.
- Investigate: Compare propagation with legitimate campaigns and preserve whether the source describes a lab demonstration or observed abuse.
- Limitation: Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Coordinated messaging / propagation
- Visibility: Platform / application records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/social.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/social.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/social.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.
- Required telemetry: Platform account and posting audit; Agent session and message-provenance records; Rate, recipient and content-similarity features
- Investigate: Group actions by linked account, session, recipient and time rather than judging writing style.
- Investigate: Compare propagation with legitimate campaigns and preserve whether the source describes a lab demonstration or observed abuse.
- Limitation: Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.
- Qualification: Review linked posting and engagement on the platform; coordinated activity does not establish state affiliation.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — The supplied source explicitly describes generative-model tooling assisting the reported activity; this mapping does not establish additional autonomy or victim impact.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025

## Defensive notes
Platform bot detection; model-provider abuse monitoring (Anthropic banned accounts)

## Sources
- https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025
