# Fake AI tools campaign cluster (ANY.RUN)

- ID: anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-14
- Researcher: ANY.RUN researchers
- Organization: ANY.RUN
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10.json
- Browse title: Fake AI tools campaign cluster (ANY.RUN)
- Editorial summary: 1,258 sandbox runs tied to fake Claude, ChatGPT and other AI lures delivered stealers through paste-in commands, ClickFix, shared AI chats, trojanized installers and fake browser ads.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Windows
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10.json

## Technique
1,258 public sandbox runs (Apr 15–Oct 5 2026) tied to lures as Claude, ChatGPT, Copilot, Gemini, Ollama, OpenClaw, Manus. Patterns: InstallFix one-liner domain swap; ClickFix Download Claude via mshta; shared claude.ai/chatgpt.com chats; trojanized Claude\_x64-setup.exe with mseupdate headless Edge cookie grab; BiTB fake AI ads for marketers.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Verify download provenance and inspect copied commands; review suspicious script / installer execution.
- Relationship: lure; tools: claude, chatgpt, github-copilot, gemini; OS scope: windows; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: The campaign uses impersonated AI brands and shared chats to persuade users to run commands or installers.
  Condition to check: The AI product is a lure; the reported execution path requires the user to follow the malicious content.
  Condition to check: The sandbox sample count is not a count of confirmed victims.
  Evidence: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/fake-ai-tools-us-companies/
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Search/malvertising/shared AI chats → paste command or run installer

## AI tooling and models
- Impersonated [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview), [ChatGPT](https://chatgpt.com/), Copilot, [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/), [Ollama](https://github.com/ollama/ollama), OpenClaw, Manus, Codex, Perplexity

## Other tooling
- mshta
- [PowerShell](https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell) irm\|iex
- msiexec
- msedge --remote-debugging-port=9222
- MacSync / Aura Stealer / HijackLoader

## Victims and sectors
Developers, marketers, general users; US second-largest submitter country (16%), first in Download Claude and ChatGPT chains; tech/telecom/education heavy

## Target geography
- Multiple regions
The seed describes a global campaign cluster. India and United States percentages refer to sandbox submitters, not confirmed victim locations, and are excluded from country counts.

## Attribution
Multiple overlapping kits (InstallFix, ClickFix Claude, trojanized installer, AI Ads BiTB)

## Scale and metrics
1,258 analyses; Claude 48%; ≥45% end in paste-and-run

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: AI-themed lures reach users [access]
Search ads, shared AI chats and fake downloads promote familiar AI brands.
Evidence: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/fake-ai-tools-us-companies/

### step-2: Trusted brands frame the lure [ai]
Claude, ChatGPT, Copilot and other product names provide social-engineering context.
Evidence: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/fake-ai-tools-us-companies/

### step-3: Commands or installers run [execution]
Reported branches use pasted commands, trojanized installers or browser-in-the-browser pages.
Evidence: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/fake-ai-tools-us-companies/

### step-4: Malware and cookie theft [impact]
The cluster includes malware delivery and a headless-browser cookie-grabbing chain.
Evidence: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/fake-ai-tools-us-companies/

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- Qualification: Correlate the branded lure with its download destination and subsequent activity; product names alone are not indicators.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Suspicious Windows script execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents; PowerShell script-block logging when enabled; Download / network and installer events
- Investigate: Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Investigate: Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
- Limitation: Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
- Conditional MagicSword policy: Use MagicSword to review and enforce a policy restricting unneeded Windows script hosts, shells or installer utilities identified in this branch.
- Policy scope: Windows mshta / wscript branches only; other reported delivery paths require separate controls.
- Policy limitation: Policy opportunity, not tested incident coverage. Requires enrolled Windows devices, a policy covering the actual executable, and enforcement. Audit mode records decisions without blocking; allowed tools and in-process / cloud actions can remain reachable.
- Policy reference: https://www.magicsword.io/use-cases/application-control?utm_source=openattacks&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=stage-control

### step-4: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
Approved AI catalog; take paste-and-run from standard users; prevent mshta/wscript/unsigned scripts

## Sources
- https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/fake-ai-tools-us-companies/
