# Yoba campaign - fake GPT-6/Claude desktop apps via DLL sideloading

- ID: checkpoint-yoba-fake-ai-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-27
- Researcher: Check Point Research
- Organization: Check Point
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/checkpoint-yoba-fake-ai-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/checkpoint-yoba-fake-ai-2026-10.json
- Browse title: Yoba campaign - fake GPT-6/Claude desktop apps via DLL sideloading
- Editorial summary: Campaign creates fake GitHub projects (gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktop, gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io, opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.io) with GitHub.io pages impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, and Claude Opus…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/checkpoint-yoba-fake-ai-2026-10.json

## Technique
Campaign creates fake GitHub projects (gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktop, gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io, opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.io) with GitHub.io pages impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, and Claude Opus desktop apps. ZIP installers contain legitimate signed OpenAI and Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper/YobaLoader DLLs. Uses DLL sideloading (T1574.002) to load malware indirectly from signed binaries. No fake engagement (stars/forks) but ranks highly via SEO poisoning on Google. Malware avoids dedicated C2 infrastructure, uses Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS. Russian-origin indicators; operates UTC-4 time zone. Releases Aug-Sep 2026, low detection rate, no password protection on ZIPs.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
SEO-poisoned search results leading to malicious GitHub repositories and GitHub.io pages; users download fake installer ZIPs from GitHub releases

## AI tooling and models
- GPT-5.6 Sol (fake)
- GPT-6 Astra (fake)
- [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) Opus (fake)

## Other tooling
- YobaDropper
- YobaLoader
- Legitimate signed OpenAI executables
- Legitimate signed Anthropic executables
- DLL sideloading
- Telegram for C2
- Tor
- Catbox
- DNS over HTTPS (DoH)

## Victims and sectors
AI tool users searching for ChatGPT and Claude desktop applications

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
Yoba campaign; Russian-origin indicators (language, time zone); operates primarily UTC-4 time zone; different email addresses per repository suggest OPSEC to obscure true operational timezone

## Scale and metrics
3 fake GitHub repositories created Jul-Sep 2026; first malicious releases uploaded Aug 30, 2026; 3 ZIP installers (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip); low VirusTotal detection rates

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### seo-poison: SEO poisoning and fake repositories [access]
Created fake GitHub repositories impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus; GitHub.io pages with download links; no fake engagement but ranks highly on Google via SEO poisoning
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/

### lure: User downloads fake installer [access]
Victim searches for AI desktop apps, finds malicious GitHub repositories via Google; downloads ZIP from GitHub releases (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip)
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/

### sideload: DLL sideloading from signed binaries [execution]
ZIP contains legitimate signed OpenAI/Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper DLL; when legitimate signed binary runs, it loads malicious DLL via DLL search order hijacking
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/

### dropper: YobaDropper deploys YobaLoader [execution]
YobaDropper executes, deploys YobaLoader component; anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques; no password protection needed due to low detection
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/

### c2: C2 via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DoH [ai]
YobaLoader contacts attacker infrastructure via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS; no dedicated C2 infrastructure for strong OPSEC; fetches final payload
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/

### payload: Final payload execution [impact]
YobaLoader executes final payload on infected system; details of final payload capabilities not disclosed in source
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/

Connections:
- seo-poison -> lure
- lure -> sideload
- sideload -> dropper
- dropper -> c2
- c2 -> payload

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### seo-poison: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### lure: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### sideload: DLL loaded from a user-writable location
- Visibility: Windows image-load telemetry where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.
- Required telemetry: Windows image-load events such as Sysmon Event 7 or EDR equivalents; File provenance, signature, and process ancestry; Subsequent network and payload activity
- Investigate: Verify the executable and DLL signatures, original archive or installer, hashes, and load path.
- Investigate: Compare the DLL name/location with the vendor's expected installation and correlate child activity.
- Limitation: Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### dropper: Unapproved Windows program execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-install.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-install.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation; Download provenance and file hashes; File certificate information and application-control audit / block events
- Investigate: Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
- Investigate: Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
- Limitation: Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### c2: Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payload.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payload.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payload.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific process and file provenance; Signer / hash and software inventory; Per-process network and remote-session records
- Investigate: Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Investigate: Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
- Limitation: A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
- Qualification: Correlate the loader process with Telegram, Tor, Catbox, or DoH activity; those services are not malicious by themselves.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### payload: Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payload.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payload.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payload.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific process and file provenance; Signer / hash and software inventory; Per-process network and remote-session records
- Investigate: Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Investigate: Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
- Limitation: A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
Verify official AI tool sources; DLL sideloading detection; monitor GitHub releases for fake AI projects; SEO poisoning awareness; C2 infrastructure monitoring (Telegram, Tor, DNS over HTTPS)

## Sources
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/ — Tricks from the Past deployed via signed ChatGPT and Claude binaries

## Source notes
Check Point Research tracked campaign over two months; no password protection on ZIPs unlike typical malicious archives; low detection due to anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": [
    "https://github.com/gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktop",
    "https://github.com/gpt-5-6/gpt-5-6.github.io",
    "https://github.com/opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.io",
    "https://github.com/gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io"
  ]
}
```
