# Cursor CurXecute (CVE-2025-54135)

- ID: cursor-curxecute-cve-2025-54135
- Reported: 2025-08-01
- Researcher: Tenable / Check Point (paired disclosure)
- Organization: Tenable / Check Point
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/cursor-curxecute-cve-2025-54135/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/cursor-curxecute-cve-2025-54135.json
- Browse title: Cursor CurXecute code execution (CVE-2025-54135)
- Editorial summary: A Cursor IDE flaw in AI and MCP handling enabled code execution. It was fixed alongside MCPoison in the Cursor 1.3.x line.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Vulnerability report
- Source-stated target environments: Agents & MCP
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/cursor-curxecute-cve-2025-54135.json

## Technique
Cursor IDE vulnerability tracked as CurXecute (CVE-2025-54135) enabling code execution paths via AI IDE/MCP handling; fixed alongside MCPoison in Cursor 1.3.x line. Public FAQ groups it with MCP trust issues in Cursor.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Check the vendor advisory and review which project content and MCP configurations the IDE trusts.
- Relationship: target; tools: cursor; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: true.
  Relevance: The report concerns code execution in Cursor AI / MCP handling.
  Condition to check: Confirm that the installed version is affected by the historical report; selecting a product does not establish its version or patch status.
  Condition to check: Review the source for the affected AI / MCP handling path; ordinary product use alone does not establish exposure.
  Evidence: https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
unknown

## AI tooling and models
- [Cursor IDE](https://cursor.com/)

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
Fixed Cursor 1.3.9 / 1.3 per Tenable FAQ

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Trigger details are not in the seed [unknown]
The supplied record does not describe a complete exploit delivery chain.
Evidence: https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison

### step-2: Cursor AI / MCP handling is affected [ai]
CurXecute concerns an execution path in the AI IDE and MCP handling.
Evidence: https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison

### step-3: Code-execution vulnerability reported [impact]
CVE-2025-54135 was addressed in the Cursor 1.3.x release line.
Evidence: https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- Qualification: The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Agent trust / configuration changes
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
- Required telemetry: File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration; Repository audit / pull-request history; Agent startup and tool-invocation logs
- Investigate: Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.
- Investigate: Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant.
- Limitation: A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- Qualification: The seed does not supply a full trigger chain; child-process review is a broad hunt, not a CVE-specific signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
Upgrade Cursor; least privilege for IDE agent tools

## Sources
- https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison
