# Datadog - ARTEX agents read anonymous S3, trawl CloudWatch, and self-sign-up to Cognito

- ID: datadog-artex-aws-cognito-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-09
- Researcher: Julie Agnes Sparks
- Organization: Datadog Security Labs
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Offensive frameworks: artex
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-12
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/datadog-artex-aws-cognito-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/datadog-artex-aws-cognito-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Datadog - ARTEX agents read anonymous S3, trawl CloudWatch, and self-sign-up to Cognito
- Editorial summary: Datadog Security Labs (Julie Agnes Sparks, Nov 9, 2026) saw ARTEX activity against several AWS environments in October 2026, focused on financial data. Every session opened with unauthenticated S3 reads…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/datadog-artex-aws-cognito-2026-11.json

## Technique
Datadog Security Labs (Julie Agnes Sparks, Nov 9, 2026) saw ARTEX activity against several AWS environments in October 2026, focused on financial data. Every session opened with unauthenticated S3 reads (userIdentity.type AWSAccount, accountId anonymous, GetObject and ListObjects). The agent read front-end build manifests and runtime configs from S3-hosted web apps. Before each guessing burst it requested a placeholder key that should not exist (zzz\_nonexistent\_abc.txt, Notexist-xyz), the same habit Wiz described with /zzz-nonexistent-xyz123. With leaked long-term IAM keys, ARTEX ran repeated FilterLogEvents over CloudWatch, always with limit 1000, searching for crypto firms, hedge funds, and names like Fund, Invoice, Billing, and LLC. On October 20 a later session from 103.54.154.40 (zeofast.cn) searched for s3://, presigned, .pdf, .xlsx, .csv, rawData\_, transformedData\_, and the terms mongo, password, and AKIA. On October 26-27, from 154.64.252.77, ARTEX called Cognito SignUp with user agents such as Mozilla/5.0 ARTeX, iterated against a PreSignUp Lambda tenant-domain check (errors include artex-hqheizfk.invalid and custom:isAdmin), then ran InitiateAuth, RespondToAuthChallenge, GetUser, and GetTokensFromRefreshToken, swapped tokens for CognitoIdentityCredentials, and tried ListBuckets, ListSecrets, DescribeParameters, ListTopics, DescribeLogGroups, GetRestApis, DescribeRepositories, and ListFunctions20150331. Exposed consoles used titles ARTEX autonomous pentest console, ScopeWeaver Autonomous Penetration Testing Console, LUCK autonomous asset console, and Guanlan SEC pentest platform, with API routes including /tasks, /exploration, /llm/pool, /intercept, /mcp, /skills, and /agents, and a default blocklist of .gov, .gov.cn, .edu, and .edu.cn. 154.64.252.77 is also listed in the WorkOS bulletin. Hunting references named by Datadog: Stratus Red Team https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team and TrailDiscover https://github.com/adanalvarez/TrailDiscover. ARTEX fork https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Unauthenticated S3 reads, leaked long-term IAM keys, and public Cognito user pools that allow SignUp

## AI tooling and models
- [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) autonomous pentest console (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- Related console titles ScopeWeaver, LUCK, and Guanlan SEC

## Other tooling
- AWS CloudTrail APIs: FilterLogEvents, Cognito SignUp, InitiateAuth, ListBuckets, ListSecrets
- Stratus Red Team (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team)
- TrailDiscover (https://github.com/adanalvarez/TrailDiscover)

## Victims and sectors
AWS environments holding financial data, including names consistent with funds, invoices, and billing

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unattributed ARTEX operators. Consoles are mostly in Mandarin and hosted with providers including locations in Singapore and Hong Kong. Datadog attributes the activity to ARTEX usage.

## Scale and metrics
Several AWS environments in October 2026. Hundreds of exposed consoles under several titles.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### anon-s3: Anonymous S3 reads [access]
Sessions start with unauthenticated GetObject and ListObjects, including placeholder keys zzz\_nonexistent\_abc.txt and Notexist-xyz.
Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/

### cloudwatch: CloudWatch log trawl [execution]
Leaked IAM keys run FilterLogEvents with limit 1000, searching for funds, invoices, file extensions, and AKIA.
Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/

### cognito: Cognito self-sign-up [ai]
From 154.64.252.77 the agent calls SignUp, fights a PreSignUp Lambda, then exchanges tokens and lists AWS resources.
Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/

### enumerate: Cross-service enumeration [impact]
Cognito identity credentials are used for ListBuckets, ListSecrets, DescribeParameters, and related discovery calls.
Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/

Connections:
- anon-s3 -> cloudwatch
- anon-s3 -> cognito
- cognito -> enumerate

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### anon-s3: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### cloudwatch: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### cognito: Credential / session use outside baseline
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/identity.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/identity.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/identity.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: Identity / service authentication logs; Device, source-IP and session context; Resource access and token issuance audit
- Investigate: Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
- Investigate: Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
- Limitation: Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### enumerate: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — Leaked long-term IAM keys were used for CloudWatch and later API calls
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/
- AML.T0021: Establish Accounts — ARTEX called Cognito SignUp and iterated against a PreSignUp tenant check
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0021
  Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — FilterLogEvents searches looked for AKIA keys, passwords, and financial file names
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/
- AML.T0016: Obtain Capabilities — The activity is tied to the ARTEX agent framework and exposed operator consoles
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016
  Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/

## Defensive notes
Block public access on S3 buckets that hold front-end configs. Alert on anonymous GetObject and on placeholder keys such as zzz\_nonexistent\_abc.txt. Alert on high-volume FilterLogEvents with limit 1000. Disable self-sign-up on Cognito user pools that are not meant to be public, and review PreSignUp Lambda failures for artex and .invalid tenant domains. Tie the listed user agents and source IPs to CloudTrail.

## Sources
- https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/artex-agentic-attacks-aws-environments/ — On the hunt for ARTEX: understanding agentic attacks in AWS environments

## Source notes
IPs, user agents, API names, placeholder keys, and console titles are from the Datadog article. GetSecretValue is not claimed here; the Cognito path tried ListSecrets and other List/Describe calls. 154.64.252.77 also appears in the WorkOS bulletin covered by workos-artex-unintended-agent-escape-2026-10. Link microsoft-artex-github-secrets-keyvault-2026-11, unit42-artex-api-recon-2026-10, crowdstrike-artex-sk-finance-2026-10, and the Check Point, S-RM, and Storm-3358 ARTEX entries.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "zeofast.cn",
    "artex-hqheizfk.invalid"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "169.128.55.214",
    "154.64.252.77",
    "154.36.136.197",
    "154.36.136.23",
    "102.216.154.102",
    "82.158.88.233",
    "88.229.22.232",
    "103.54.154.40",
    "103.54.154.32",
    "45.145.228.25"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
