# EvilAI fake AI/productivity apps with AI-generated code

- ID: evilai-trendmicro-fake-ai-apps-2025
- Reported: 2025-09-01
- Researcher: Trend Micro
- Organization: Trend Micro
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/evilai-trendmicro-fake-ai-apps-2025/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/evilai-trendmicro-fake-ai-apps-2025.json
- Browse title: EvilAI: fake AI apps steal browser data
- Editorial summary: Signed, working productivity apps hide browser-data theft and other malicious behavior. Researchers described the code as AI-generated-looking; that does not independently establish AI authorship.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/evilai-trendmicro-fake-ai-apps-2025.json

## Technique
Operators distribute fake AI/productivity apps (PDF editors, browsers, recipe tools, etc.) with realistic UIs, working features, and code-signing. Steal browser data, fingerprint systems, disable some security tools, AES-encrypted C2. Trend notes AI-generated-looking clean code aiding evasion. Names include App Suite, Epi Browser, JustAskJacky, Tampered Chef, et al.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
No reviewed selection-to-victim-condition mapping is available for this entry.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Users install fake AI/productivity apps

## AI tooling and models
- Fake AI-branded applications
- AI-assisted clean code (Trend assessment)

## Other tooling
- AES C2
- code signing abuse

## Victims and sectors
Global organizations (Trend: far-reaching)

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
unknown

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: User installs a productivity app [access]
Realistic AI and productivity applications offer working-looking interfaces.
Evidence: https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/i/evilai.html

### step-2: AI-themed functionality lends credibility [ai]
The research also notes code characteristics consistent with AI assistance.
Evidence: https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/i/evilai.html

### step-3: Application performs hidden actions [execution]
The installed app fingerprints the host and communicates with encrypted C2.
Evidence: https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/i/evilai.html

### step-4: Browser data theft [impact]
The reported operation steals information and attempts to disable some security tools.
Evidence: https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/i/evilai.html

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Unapproved Windows program execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-install.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-install.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation; Download provenance and file hashes; File certificate information and application-control audit / block events
- Investigate: Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
- Investigate: Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
- Limitation: Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.
- Conditional MagicSword policy: Use MagicSword to audit the actual executable's signer, publisher or hash, then enforce a policy that denies unapproved code on managed Windows hosts.
- Policy scope: Windows payloads when the policy denies their signer or hash. A valid signature alone does not establish that an app is approved.
- Policy limitation: Policy opportunity, not tested incident coverage. Requires enrolled Windows devices, a policy covering the actual executable, and enforcement. Audit mode records decisions without blocking; allowed tools and in-process / cloud actions can remain reachable.
- Policy reference: https://www.magicsword.io/use-cases/application-control?utm_source=openattacks&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=stage-control

### step-2: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- Qualification: Review the delivery chain and program provenance. Code style or apparent AI functionality does not establish maliciousness or AI authorship.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- Qualification: Investigate browser-store reads, token use and egress; investigate security-tool changes separately with product-specific logs.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
Allowlist apps; block unexpected signed-but-unknown publishers; MagicSword default-deny

## Sources
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/i/evilai.html
