{
  "id": "eye-security-artex-gitops-2026-11",
  "name": "Eye Security ARTEX intrusion from a PHP webshell to GitOps and CI runners",
  "date_reported": "2026-11-12",
  "researcher": "Bas van den Berg",
  "org": "Eye Security",
  "sources": [
    {
      "url": "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/",
      "title": "Machine speed: how we defended against an AI-driven attack",
      "publisher": "Eye Security"
    }
  ],
  "magicsword_coverage": [],
  "borderline": false,
  "borderline_note": null,
  "ai_role": "attacker_uses_ai_as_operator",
  "ai_role_secondary": null,
  "ai_role_detail": "Eye Security recovered ARTEX markers in pod names, files, data probes, and user agents during a multi-day incident at a payment and gift-card company. The agents adapted a rate-limit bypass in about three minutes.",
  "technique_summary": "Eye Security (Bas van den Berg, Nov 12, 2026) describes a multi-day ARTEX intrusion that started at a vulnerable custom PHP upload function. Uploads were extension-fuzzed (.phtml, .php5, .php7, .phar, .inc, .PHP) into webshells such as artx_s5.php and zzartx0000.php. The shell accepted header X-ARTX-KEY or parameter k, used key k=x9f3c2b7e, and returned ### ARTX-AGENT. Environment variables on the pod leaked API keys, and the first call with a stolen key landed within minutes. When a rate limiter engaged, the agents rewrote their client in about three minutes to rotate a spoofed client-IP header and peaked at over 9,000 requests a minute. After that path was blocked they used a pool of more than 17,000 residential proxies. They pulled Neo-reGeorg (https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg) and changed it to keep state in the internal cache so it worked across load-balanced pods. Its default user agent is Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/38.0. With an engineer's Git hosting identity they changed the deployment repo so GitOps deployed attacker pods, including artx-pod and a privileged pod on a staging host. Deleting the pod brought it back within a second. From the privileged pod they broke out to the node with nsenter. Separately, Eye counted thirteen logins in under three minutes, one socket per login, asking a file-transfer server to forward Docker, containerd, CRI-O, lightweight Kubernetes, the system bus, the PHP worker pool, the process supervisor, and sshd. The server refused every one of those forwards. A CI app key from the secret store was used to register self-hosted GitHub runners named sink-*, re-registered about every eight minutes through the night. Backdoor admins looked like QA or audit accounts (qa_probe_*, qa.audit29a). In phpMyAdmin they used LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE into databases named artx_* and INTO OUTFILE write tests at /tmp/x.php5. The operators went after gift-card codes. Eye also publishes OSINT infrastructure from similar ARTEX activity: 207.5.195.93, artex.lol, staging.artex.lol, artex.tokena2b.top, artex.ok7777.eu.cc, artex.noog2infra.site, images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex, and callbacks on dnslog.cn, oast.me, and webhook.site. Data markers include ARTEX_WRITE_PROBE, ARTEX-PROBE-0001, ARTX_PERSIST_OK, and artex_control_marker_zz9q. Link srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11, datadog-artex-aws-cognito-2026-11, arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11, microsoft-artex-github-secrets-keyvault-2026-11, and badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11.",
  "initial_access": "Vulnerable custom PHP upload function, then extension-fuzzed webshells",
  "ai_tooling_and_models": [
    "ARTEX (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)"
  ],
  "other_tooling": [
    "Neo-reGeorg (https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg)",
    "nsenter container breakout",
    "Self-hosted GitHub Actions runners"
  ],
  "victims_and_sectors": "A company running payment and gift-card services. Eye did not name the company.",
  "regions": [
    "unknown"
  ],
  "attribution_or_cluster": "Unnamed. Eye ties one address to public ARTEX reporting on payment-API abuse. No country is given.",
  "scale_and_metrics": "Peak over 9,000 requests a minute. More than 17,000 residential proxy addresses. Thirteen socket-forward logins in under three minutes, all refused by the server. GitOps recreated a deleted attacker pod within a second. Runners were re-registered about every eight minutes.",
  "prevention_angle": "Block the published webshell names and the X-ARTX-KEY header. Alert on php-fpm or the web server spawning a shell, nsenter into the host PID namespace, a privileged pod, and a new self-hosted GitHub runner such as sink-*. Treat GitOps reconciliation as a persistence path: a deleted artx-pod that returns immediately is the deployment repo, not a restart.",
  "related_magicsword_projects": [
    "LOTTunnels"
  ],
  "source_notes": "File names, the shell key, the request peak, the proxy count, the GitHub runner names, and the nsenter breakout are from the Eye Security incident write-up. 207.5.195.93 and the artex.* domains are in Eye's OSINT infrastructure list for similar ARTEX activity, not described as addresses observed inside this victim. Neo-reGeorg is tracked by LOTTunnels at https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/neo-regeorg/. The Sigma ReGeorg web-log rule requires a null user agent, and this tunnel used Firefox/38.0, so that rule is not cited.",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-11-15",
  "region_notes": "Eye did not name the victim's country. Infrastructure countries are not recorded as victim regions.",
  "iocs": {
    "domains": [
      "artex.lol",
      "staging.artex.lol",
      "artex.tokena2b.top",
      "artex.ok7777.eu.cc",
      "artex.noog2infra.site",
      "webhook.site"
    ],
    "ips": [
      "207.5.195.93"
    ],
    "hashes": [],
    "urls": []
  },
  "atlas_techniques": [
    {
      "id": "AML.T0016",
      "rationale": "The operators deployed the ARTEX agent framework and Neo-reGeorg.",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0049",
      "rationale": "Initial access was a vulnerable PHP upload function turned into webshells.",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0055",
      "rationale": "Pod environment variables and the cloud secret store exposed API keys and a CI app key.",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0012",
      "rationale": "Stolen keys and an engineer's Git hosting identity were reused for API calls, GitOps, and runner registration.",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "upload",
        "title": "PHP upload becomes a webshell",
        "description": "Extension-fuzzed uploads such as artx_s5.php and zzartx0000.php accept X-ARTX-KEY and return ### ARTX-AGENT.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "secrets",
        "title": "Pod secrets used within minutes",
        "description": "Environment variables and the secret store yield API keys. A rate limiter is bypassed in about three minutes.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "tunnel",
        "title": "Neo-reGeorg across pods",
        "description": "Neo-reGeorg is modified to keep state in the internal cache so the tunnel survives load-balanced pods.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "gitops",
        "title": "GitOps restores the attacker pod",
        "description": "A deployment-repo change creates artx-pod. Deleting it brings the pod back within a second.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "escape",
        "title": "Privileged pod to the node",
        "description": "A privileged staging pod is used with nsenter to reach the host node.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "runner",
        "title": "Self-hosted runners named sink-*",
        "description": "A CI app key registers self-hosted GitHub runners that are re-registered through the night.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "upload",
        "target": "secrets"
      },
      {
        "source": "secrets",
        "target": "tunnel"
      },
      {
        "source": "secrets",
        "target": "gitops"
      },
      {
        "source": "gitops",
        "target": "escape"
      },
      {
        "source": "secrets",
        "target": "runner"
      }
    ]
  },
  "category": "adversary-use-of-ai",
  "attribution": {
    "actor_name": "Unnamed ARTEX operators",
    "country": "Unknown",
    "motivation": "financially-motivated",
    "attributed_by": "Eye Security",
    "confidence": "medium"
  },
  "ai_involvement_confidence": "confirmed",
  "detections": [
    {
      "name": "Linux Webshell Indicators",
      "format": "sigma",
      "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_webshell_detection.yml",
      "notes": "Linux process creation. A web server parent spawning a shell utility. Parent images in the rule include httpd, nginx, and apache2. php-fpm is not in that parent list, so a shell whose parent is only php-fpm will not match."
    },
    {
      "name": "Potential Docker Escape via Nsenter",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/privilege_escalation_docker_escape_via_nsenter.toml",
      "notes": "Linux endpoint. nsenter changing into another namespace, including the host breakout Eye saw from the privileged pod."
    },
    {
      "name": "Kubernetes Privileged Pod Created",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/kubernetes/privilege_escalation_privileged_pod_created.toml",
      "notes": "Kubernetes audit. Creation of a privileged pod. Matches the staging pod used before nsenter."
    },
    {
      "name": "Remote GitHub Actions Runner Registration",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/cross-platform/execution_register_github_actions_runner.toml",
      "notes": "Endpoint, cross-platform. Runner.Listener registering a self-hosted runner. Matches the sink-* runners."
    },
    {
      "name": "New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/github/initial_access_github_register_self_hosted_runner.toml",
      "notes": "GitHub audit log. A new self-hosted runner registered on a repository."
    },
    {
      "name": "ARTEX shell key and Neo-reGeorg user agent",
      "format": "guidance",
      "notes": "No cited rule contains X-ARTX-KEY, k=x9f3c2b7e, ### ARTX-AGENT, artx_s5.php, or the Firefox/38.0 Neo-reGeorg agent. The Sigma ReGeorg web-log rule requires a null user agent, so it misses this tunnel."
    }
  ],
  "timeline": {
    "first_seen": "2026-11-12",
    "last_updated": "2026-11-12",
    "updates": [
      {
        "date": "2026-11-12",
        "source": "Eye Security",
        "summary": "Eye publishes the incident: PHP webshells, a three-minute rate-limit bypass, Neo-reGeorg, GitOps pod restoration, nsenter, and sink-* GitHub runners."
      }
    ]
  }
}