# Eye Security ARTEX intrusion from a PHP webshell to GitOps and CI runners

- ID: eye-security-artex-gitops-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-12
- Researcher: Bas van den Berg
- Organization: Eye Security
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-15
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/eye-security-artex-gitops-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/eye-security-artex-gitops-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Eye Security ARTEX intrusion from a PHP webshell to GitOps and CI runners
- Editorial summary: Eye Security (Bas van den Berg, Nov 12, 2026) describes a multi-day ARTEX intrusion that started at a vulnerable custom PHP upload function. Uploads were extension-fuzzed (.phtml, .php5, .php7, .phar, .inc,…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/eye-security-artex-gitops-2026-11.json

## Technique
Eye Security (Bas van den Berg, Nov 12, 2026) describes a multi-day ARTEX intrusion that started at a vulnerable custom PHP upload function. Uploads were extension-fuzzed (.phtml, .php5, .php7, .phar, .inc, .PHP) into webshells such as artx\_s5.php and zzartx0000.php. The shell accepted header X-ARTX-KEY or parameter k, used key k=x9f3c2b7e, and returned \#\#\# ARTX-AGENT. Environment variables on the pod leaked API keys, and the first call with a stolen key landed within minutes. When a rate limiter engaged, the agents rewrote their client in about three minutes to rotate a spoofed client-IP header and peaked at over 9,000 requests a minute. After that path was blocked they used a pool of more than 17,000 residential proxies. They pulled Neo-reGeorg (https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg) and changed it to keep state in the internal cache so it worked across load-balanced pods. Its default user agent is Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/38.0. With an engineer's Git hosting identity they changed the deployment repo so GitOps deployed attacker pods, including artx-pod and a privileged pod on a staging host. Deleting the pod brought it back within a second. From the privileged pod they broke out to the node with nsenter. Separately, Eye counted thirteen logins in under three minutes, one socket per login, asking a file-transfer server to forward Docker, containerd, CRI-O, lightweight Kubernetes, the system bus, the PHP worker pool, the process supervisor, and sshd. The server refused every one of those forwards. A CI app key from the secret store was used to register self-hosted GitHub runners named sink-\*, re-registered about every eight minutes through the night. Backdoor admins looked like QA or audit accounts (qa\_probe\_\*, qa.audit29a). In phpMyAdmin they used LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE into databases named artx\_\* and INTO OUTFILE write tests at /tmp/x.php5. The operators went after gift-card codes. Eye also publishes OSINT infrastructure from similar ARTEX activity: 207.5.195.93, artex.lol, staging.artex.lol, artex.tokena2b.top, artex.ok7777.eu.cc, artex.noog2infra.site, images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex, and callbacks on dnslog.cn, oast.me, and webhook.site. Data markers include ARTEX\_WRITE\_PROBE, ARTEX-PROBE-0001, ARTX\_PERSIST\_OK, and artex\_control\_marker\_zz9q. Link srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11, datadog-artex-aws-cognito-2026-11, arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11, microsoft-artex-github-secrets-keyvault-2026-11, and badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Vulnerable custom PHP upload function, then extension-fuzzed webshells

## AI tooling and models
- [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.

## Other tooling
- Neo-reGeorg (https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg)
- nsenter container breakout
- Self-hosted [GitHub Actions](https://github.com/features/actions) runners

## Victims and sectors
A company running payment and gift-card services. Eye did not name the company.

## Target geography
- unknown
Eye did not name the victim's country. Infrastructure countries are not recorded as victim regions.

## Attribution
Unnamed. Eye ties one address to public ARTEX reporting on payment-API abuse. No country is given.

## Scale and metrics
Peak over 9,000 requests a minute. More than 17,000 residential proxy addresses. Thirteen socket-forward logins in under three minutes, all refused by the server. GitOps recreated a deleted attacker pod within a second. Runners were re-registered about every eight minutes.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### upload: PHP upload becomes a webshell [access]
Extension-fuzzed uploads such as artx\_s5.php and zzartx0000.php accept X-ARTX-KEY and return \#\#\# ARTX-AGENT.
Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/

### secrets: Pod secrets used within minutes [execution]
Environment variables and the secret store yield API keys. A rate limiter is bypassed in about three minutes.
Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/

### tunnel: Neo-reGeorg across pods [execution]
Neo-reGeorg is modified to keep state in the internal cache so the tunnel survives load-balanced pods.
Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/

### gitops: GitOps restores the attacker pod [impact]
A deployment-repo change creates artx-pod. Deleting it brings the pod back within a second.
Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/

### escape: Privileged pod to the node [execution]
A privileged staging pod is used with nsenter to reach the host node.
Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/

### runner: Self-hosted runners named sink-\* [impact]
A CI app key registers self-hosted GitHub runners that are re-registered through the night.
Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/

Connections:
- upload -> secrets
- secrets -> tunnel
- secrets -> gitops
- gitops -> escape
- secrets -> runner

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### upload: Linux web worker → shell / interpreter
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/linux-webshell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/linux-webshell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/linux-webshell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.
- Required telemetry: Linux process creation (EDR / auditd normalized to process fields); PHP / web access logs; File changes to web roots and PHP configuration
- Investigate: Trace the worker's children and correlate them with inbound requests.
- Investigate: Review auto\_prepend\_file, .bashrc changes, /dev/shm execution, and outbound tunnels where the report describes them.
- Limitation: Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### secrets: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### tunnel: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### gitops: Private access → public repository artifact
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/repository.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/repository.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/repository.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
- Required telemetry: Git-provider organization / enterprise audit; Repository and token permission inventory; Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
- Investigate: Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Investigate: Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
- Limitation: Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### escape: Privileged container or pod with host access
- Visibility: Container orchestration and runtime audit logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/privileged-container.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/privileged-container.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/privileged-container.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.
- Required telemetry: Kubernetes API audit or Docker daemon events; Container runtime process and mount telemetry; Cloud control-plane identity and admission-controller decisions
- Investigate: Identify the creating principal, image digest, namespace, security context, host mounts, and admission result.
- Investigate: Compare with approved workloads, then inspect node-level file access, processes, and credentials.
- Limitation: Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### runner: Private access → public repository artifact
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/repository.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/repository.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/repository.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
- Required telemetry: Git-provider organization / enterprise audit; Repository and token permission inventory; Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
- Investigate: Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Investigate: Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
- Limitation: Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016: Obtain Capabilities — The operators deployed the ARTEX agent framework and Neo-reGeorg.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016
  Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/
- AML.T0049: Exploit Public-Facing Application — Initial access was a vulnerable PHP upload function turned into webshells.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0049
  Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — Pod environment variables and the cloud secret store exposed API keys and a CI app key.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — Stolen keys and an engineer's Git hosting identity were reused for API calls, GitOps, and runner registration.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/

## Defensive notes
Block the published webshell names and the X-ARTX-KEY header. Alert on php-fpm or the web server spawning a shell, nsenter into the host PID namespace, a privileged pod, and a new self-hosted GitHub runner such as sink-\*. Treat GitOps reconciliation as a persistence path: a deleted artx-pod that returns immediately is the deployment repo, not a restart.

## Sources
- https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/ — Machine speed: how we defended against an AI-driven attack

## Source notes
File names, the shell key, the request peak, the proxy count, the GitHub runner names, and the nsenter breakout are from the Eye Security incident write-up. 207.5.195.93 and the artex.\* domains are in Eye's OSINT infrastructure list for similar ARTEX activity, not described as addresses observed inside this victim. Neo-reGeorg is tracked by LOTTunnels at https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/neo-regeorg/. The Sigma ReGeorg web-log rule requires a null user agent, and this tunnel used Firefox/38.0, so that rule is not cited.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "artex.lol",
    "staging.artex.lol",
    "artex.tokena2b.top",
    "artex.ok7777.eu.cc",
    "artex.noog2infra.site",
    "webhook.site"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "207.5.195.93"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
