# FBI FLASH FaceStealer uses stolen webcam video and BlueNoroff deepfakes

- ID: fbi-facestealer-bluenoroff-deepfake-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-12
- Researcher: FBI
- Organization: FBI
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-15
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/fbi-facestealer-bluenoroff-deepfake-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/fbi-facestealer-bluenoroff-deepfake-2026-11.json
- Browse title: FBI FLASH FaceStealer uses stolen webcam video and BlueNoroff deepfakes
- Editorial summary: FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS (Nov 12, 2026) describes FaceStealer, attributed to Sapphire Sleet / BlueNoroff / APT38 / UNC1069. The operators take over a victim's Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, or Discord account,…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/fbi-facestealer-bluenoroff-deepfake-2026-11.json

## Technique
FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS (Nov 12, 2026) describes FaceStealer, attributed to Sapphire Sleet / BlueNoroff / APT38 / UNC1069. The operators take over a victim's Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, or Discord account, read the chat history, and message contacts to catch up or talk investment. A Calendly invite sets the time. Shortly before the call, the link points at a typosquat such as uu01webzoom.us or teams.livemeet.us. The copycat Zoom or Teams page plays the trusted contact's stolen webcam recording, often next to other participants. A chat message says the target cannot be heard and walks them through an update, script, or terminal paste that installs a cookie harvester, keyloggers, a screen capturer, and a backdoor. The target's webcam is recorded from the moment the link opens and feeds the next round. The FBI says the group has begun using what it calls super intelligence to make deepfakes of crypto and web3 figures alongside stolen footage. Earlier in 2026 a maintainer of a widely downloaded JavaScript library ran the fix during a fake Teams call, and the operators then published malicious dependencies that were caught quickly. The FBI has also seen attempts against npm maintainers and, recently, Rust crate maintainers. Arctic Wolf's Nov 12 paper adds lures that end in a ClickFix command: NovaStream Player at vip.novaplayer.online (HTML SHA-256 ca14040cc48fbc3b00ea5f74e891266128f7bb3058be400782c5b08436f7668a), a Chrome PDF Viewer kit at chromeupdate.docdock.online and calendly.docdock.online, and calendly.idcheck.watch. The macOS idcheck command is curl piped to osacompile. The Windows cradle is curl piped to powershell -c with \[Console\]::In.ReadToEnd()\|iex. Hosting includes Hostwinds 104.168.149.21, 104.168.149.182, and 104.168.149.230, and Petrosky 83.136.210.38 for docdock.online. Arctic Wolf's appendix lists 98 high-confidence domains. The domains below are that table plus the FBI examples and the lure hosts named in the paper. Link bluenoroff-uses-deepfaked-executives-fake-zoom-2025-06 and unc1069-gemini-deepfake-crypto-2025.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Hijacked messenger accounts, then a typosquat Zoom or Teams page and a ClickFix paste

## AI tooling and models
- [Grok](https://x.ai/grok) Imagine
- Google Generative AI
- Wondershare AIGC
- GPT-4o and GPT Image
- BytePlus ModelArk

## Other tooling
- Stolen webcam recordings
- ClickFix terminal paste
- NovaStream Player lure

## Victims and sectors
Cryptocurrency and web3 individuals and companies, plus open-source maintainers. The FBI says the group stole more than $400 million in 18 months.

## Target geography
- Multiple regions
North Korea is the actor origin from the FBI, not a victim region. Arctic Wolf's target countries are not listed as a closed set, so the entry uses Multiple regions.

## Attribution
Sapphire Sleet, BlueNoroff, APT38, UNC1069, Dangerous Password, CryptoCore, Stardust Chollima. FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS. Arctic Wolf independently attributes the activity to BlueNoroff.

## Scale and metrics
More than $400 million stolen in 18 months, per the FBI. Arctic Wolf: 122 AI-generated assets from seven generators, and 98 high-confidence domains on the Hostwinds cluster.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### account: Hijacked messenger account [access]
A prior victim's Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, or Discord account messages contacts and sends a Calendly invite.
Evidence: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf

### meeting: Typosquat meeting page [execution]
The link, such as uu01webzoom.us or teams.livemeet.us, plays stolen webcam video and starts recording the new target.
Evidence: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf

### deepfake: Generator-tagged deepfakes [ai]
Arctic Wolf found 122 assets from seven generators, identified by embedded tags and C2PA rather than appearance. Stolen footage is still most of the scheme.
Evidence: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf ; https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf

### clickfix: ClickFix paste [execution]
Windows uses curl piped to powershell ReadToEnd\|iex. macOS uses curl piped to osacompile.
Evidence: https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf

Connections:
- account -> meeting
- meeting -> deepfake
- meeting -> clickfix

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### account: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### meeting: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### deepfake: Untrusted content enters an agent session
- Visibility: Application / agent audit records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-input.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-input.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.
- Required telemetry: Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier; Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved; Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions
- Investigate: Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
- Investigate: Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
- Limitation: Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### clickfix: macOS download → shell execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/mac-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
- Required telemetry: macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security); Browser download and proxy records; LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes
- Investigate: Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.
- Investigate: Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session.
- Limitation: Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0088: Generate Deepfakes — The FBI says the operators generate deepfake video of crypto and web3 figures from public images, and Arctic Wolf ties 122 assets to generator tags and C2PA data.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0088
  Evidence: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf ; https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — Arctic Wolf attributes the generated media to Grok Imagine, Google Generative AI, Wondershare AIGC, GPT-4o, GPT Image, and BytePlus ModelArk.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf
- AML.T0052: Phishing — Hijacked accounts and typosquat Zoom and Teams pages deliver the lure.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0052
  Evidence: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf

## Defensive notes
Treat a meeting link that arrives in chat just before the call as hostile until the domain is the vendor's. Do not paste a command from a call. On Windows, hunt curl.exe piped into powershell with ReadToEnd and iex. On macOS, hunt curl and osacompile in the same command line. Block the domains and the four IPs below.

## Sources
- https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf — FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS: FaceStealer
- https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/still-in-the-meeting-bluenoroff-six-months-on/ — Still in the Meeting: BlueNoroff Six Months On
- https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf — Still in the Meeting: BlueNoroff Six Months On (white paper)
- https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/bluenoroff-uses-clickfix-fileless-powershell-and-ai-generated-zoom-meetings-to-target-web3-sector/ — BlueNoroff uses ClickFix, fileless PowerShell, and AI-generated Zoom meetings
- https://www.jumpsec.com/guides/inside-a-dprk-bluenoroff-clickfix-kit/ — Inside a DPRK BlueNoroff ClickFix kit
- https://therecord.media/stolen-binance-crypto-recovered-doj-facestealer-disrupted — Coverage of the FaceStealer disruption
- https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/13/fbi-north-korean-fake-zoom-calls/ — FBI warns of North Korean fake Zoom calls

## Source notes
The takeover loop, the two example typosquats, the deepfake statement, and the maintainer supply-chain note are from the FBI PDF. Generator counts, the ClickFix command lines, the Hostwinds and Petrosky addresses, the NovaStream hash, and the high-confidence domain table are from the Arctic Wolf white paper. The Sigma IEX rules require a space in '\| iex' or 'iex ', and the published cradle is ReadToEnd()\|iex with no space, so those rules are not cited. The osacompile run-only rule requires -x and -e, and the idcheck command uses osacompile -o, so that rule is not cited either. There is no attacker GitHub repository.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "02live.com.co",
    "02live.us.com",
    "05live.us.com",
    "live-teams.com.co",
    "me-0live.com",
    "me-live.it.com",
    "me-live.online",
    "me-live.xyz",
    "microso1t.com",
    "ms-live.cc",
    "ms-live.co.com",
    "ms-live.online",
    "ms-meet.store",
    "ms-meeting.co",
    "ms-meeting.com.co",
    "ms-meeting.live",
    "ms-room.online",
    "ms-teams.co",
    "ms-teams.in",
    "protected-view.online",
    "teams-live.cam",
    "teams-live.com.co",
    "teams-live.com.im",
    "teams-live.eu.com",
    "teams-live.it.com",
    "teams-live.vip",
    "teams-live.work",
    "teams-meet.cc",
    "teams-meet.cloud",
    "teams-meet.co",
    "teams-meet.com.co",
    "teams-meet.in",
    "teams-meeting.co",
    "teams-meeting.in",
    "teams-meets.cc",
    "teams-meets.com",
    "teams-meets.in",
    "teams-meets.online",
    "teams-meets.us.com",
    "teams-room.us",
    "teams02live.com",
    "teams02live.us",
    "teams02live.us.com",
    "teams05live.com",
    "teams05live.us.com",
    "teams06live.com",
    "teams07live.com",
    "teams0live.com",
    "teamscloud.us.com",
    "teamslive.cloud",
    "teamslive.us.com",
    "us02live.co",
    "us05cloud.co",
    "us05cloud.com",
    "us05cloud.live",
    "us09live.us",
    "web-live.com.co",
    "web-live.us",
    "call-in.co",
    "call-in.online",
    "call-live.com",
    "call-on.online",
    "call-room.online",
    "meet-in.co",
    "meet-on.online",
    "meet-room.online",
    "meet-room.xyz",
    "meeting-on.online",
    "room-live.com",
    "room-meet.us",
    "room-meet.xyz",
    "room-on.online",
    "room-on.xyz",
    "team-meet.xyz",
    "web-meet.us",
    "web-teams.us",
    "novaplayer.online",
    "novaplayer.xyz",
    "videolan.online",
    "videolan.store",
    "videoviewer.online",
    "instantsecscan.online",
    "instantsecscan.xyz",
    "ipblock.watch",
    "scanmypc.online",
    "scanmypc.xyz",
    "securealliance.xyz",
    "securemypc.life",
    "securemypc.xyz",
    "ashnote.blog",
    "cloud-docs.online",
    "cobolabs.cloud",
    "docsend.space",
    "notionshare.online",
    "agenda.pw",
    "idcheck.watch",
    "ipcheck.watch",
    "sealteam911.online",
    "theworldofluck.online",
    "uu01webzoom.us",
    "teams.livemeet.us",
    "docdock.online",
    "vip.novaplayer.online",
    "updatesdk.novaplayer.online",
    "chromeupdate.docdock.online",
    "calendly.docdock.online",
    "calendly.idcheck.watch",
    "updatesdk.ashnote.blog",
    "updatesdk.teams-meeting.co",
    "updatesdk.ms-teams.co",
    "updatesdk.ms-teams.in",
    "updatesdk.me-live.online",
    "updatesdk.ms-meet.store"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "104.168.149.21",
    "104.168.149.182",
    "104.168.149.230",
    "83.136.210.38"
  ],
  "hashes": [
    "ca14040cc48fbc3b00ea5f74e891266128f7bb3058be400782c5b08436f7668a"
  ],
  "urls": []
}
```
