# GTIG AI Threat Tracker: distillation attacks, Gemini-calling HONESTCUE malware and AI-built phishing kits

- ID: gtig-ai-threat-tracker-distillation-attacks-2026-02
- Reported: 2026-02-12
- Researcher: unknown
- Organization: Google Threat Intelligence Group
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: not assessed
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-distillation-attacks-2026-02/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-distillation-attacks-2026-02.json
- Browse title: GTIG AI Threat Tracker: distillation attacks, Gemini-calling HONESTCUE malware and AI-built phishing kits
- Editorial summary: Google's Q4 2025 tracker reports rising model-extraction attempts on Gemini, state actors using Gemini across the kill chain and first malware that fetches code from the Gemini API.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-distillation-attacks-2026-02.json

## Technique
Google's Q4 2025 tracker reports rising model-extraction attempts on Gemini, state actors using Gemini across the kill chain and first malware that fetches code from the Gemini API.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
unknown

## AI tooling and models
- [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/), [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/) API, Lovable, shared-chat features of [ChatGPT](https://chatgpt.com/), Copilot, [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai), [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/) and [Grok](https://x.ai/grok)
- One API and New API gateways

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
Government; Defense; Finance; Technology and AI companies; Multiple sectors

## Target geography
- unknown
Target geography was not captured by the Notion feed. Actor attribution is not used as a victim location.

## Attribution
APT31, UNC795, APT41, APT42, UNC2970, UNC6418, Temp.HEX, UNC5356, IO actors; private-sector distillers

## Scale and metrics
unknown

## Attack flow
Summary diagram derived from entry fields; a detailed sequence has not been supplied.
### entry: Reported initial access [unknown]
unknown
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/distillation-experimentation-integration-ai-adversarial-use ; https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/infrastructure-and-cloud/google-cloud/gtig-report-ai-cyber-attacks-feb-2026/ ; https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-says-hackers-are-abusing-gemini-ai-for-all-attacks-stages/

### activity: Reported activity [execution]
Google's Q4 2025 tracker reports rising model-extraction attempts on Gemini, state actors using Gemini across the kill chain and first malware that fetches code from the Gemini API.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/distillation-experimentation-integration-ai-adversarial-use ; https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/infrastructure-and-cloud/google-cloud/gtig-report-ai-cyber-attacks-feb-2026/ ; https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-says-hackers-are-abusing-gemini-ai-for-all-attacks-stages/

### ai: AI involvement [ai]
Gemini, Gemini API, Lovable, shared-chat features of ChatGPT, Copilot, DeepSeek, Gemini and Grok · One API and New API gateways
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/distillation-experimentation-integration-ai-adversarial-use ; https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/infrastructure-and-cloud/google-cloud/gtig-report-ai-cyber-attacks-feb-2026/ ; https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-says-hackers-are-abusing-gemini-ai-for-all-attacks-stages/

Connections:
- entry -> activity
- ai -> activity (AI context)

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### entry: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### activity: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### ai: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
unknown

## Sources
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/distillation-experimentation-integration-ai-adversarial-use
- https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/infrastructure-and-cloud/google-cloud/gtig-report-ai-cyber-attacks-feb-2026/
- https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-says-hackers-are-abusing-gemini-ai-for-all-attacks-stages/

## Source notes
Imported from the AI Threat Watch Notion feed (an automated daily scan); not yet editorially reviewed. Feed severity: High. Feed novelty: Evolution.
