{
  "id": "gtig-llmjacking-unc6993-2026-11",
  "name": "GTIG LLMJacking - UNC6993, Jet Night, D1337-KAIROS monetize cloud models",
  "date_reported": "2026-11-02",
  "researcher": "Christopher Romano, Codi Starks, Garrett Mahoney, John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, K Singh, Mathew Potaczek, Mike Lombardi, Rik Dolfing",
  "org": "Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG)",
  "sources": [
    {
      "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models",
      "title": "The Rise of LLMJacking - How Threat Actors Monetize Compromised Cloud and Model Resources",
      "publisher": "Google Threat Intelligence Group"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident-update",
      "title": "Fireworks AI: October 2026 Security Incident Update",
      "publisher": "Fireworks AI"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident",
      "title": "Fireworks AI: October 2026 Security Incident",
      "publisher": "Fireworks AI"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://www.notion.com/security/advisories/security-incident-involving-a-third-party-ai-vendor",
      "title": "Security incident involving a third-party AI vendor",
      "publisher": "Notion"
    }
  ],
  "borderline": false,
  "borderline_note": null,
  "ai_role": "ai_infra_as_c2",
  "ai_role_secondary": "ai_credential_theft",
  "ai_role_detail": "Threat actors hijack enterprise LLM access, generate $100K-$1M USD fraudulent charges, monetize via LLM Mixers (illicit routing gateways), deploy agentic workloads with Manus framework",
  "technique_summary": "Multiple threat clusters (UNC6993, Jet Night operators, D1337-KAIROS) hijack enterprise access to LLMs across AWS Bedrock, Azure, GCP. Initial access via exposed cloud identity tokens (IAM, Service Account keys, GitHub PATs, session tokens), stolen LLM API keys from public GitHub, exploited web app vulnerabilities, LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (/key/regenerate endpoint rebind). UNC6993 used session hijacking page masquerading as app portal to steal JSON payloads with active access tokens. Threat actors enable LLM services, create API keys, provision GPUs, subscribe Pay-As-You-Go, deploy LiteLLM/new-api/gcli2api gateways, host Manus agent framework with SearXNG metasearch. Monetize via LLM Mixers (Jet Night at jet-night.com $60/month unlimited, ai-relay on lookalike domains, newapi.pro). Stealthy credential validation sweeps with max_tokens=1. Fraudulent charges $100K in single day, cumulative $1M per org. Division of labor between initial access and downstream monetization. Fireworks AI (Nov 9, 2026) reports Oct 23 third-party cloud provider hosting Fireworks R&D breached; Oct 24 attacker entered via provider, ran unauthorized workload; reached account/billing data and, for some customers, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights. Fireworks attributes to financially motivated LLMjacking group selling access to illicit routing gateways; GTIG/Mandiant report referenced; Unit 42 forensics. Notion, a Fireworks customer, published a downstream notice: Fireworks told Notion on Nov 2 that a small dataset of Notion AI synthetic test data was accessed; Notion disconnected and deleted Fireworks data by the morning of Nov 3; on Nov 6 Fireworks said customer data may have been accessed; on Nov 8 Fireworks confirmed the final dataset; on Nov 9 Notion contacted affected customers. The exposed data is Notion AI Insights chat transcripts for under 1 percent of workspaces, mostly unattributable (no user or workspace labels, and no tool-call results). No other Notion features were affected. Notion told affected customers to treat the transcripts as exposed and to rotate secrets pasted into Notion AI. On Nov 11 Notion revoked exposed Notion API keys found in affected user messages.",
  "initial_access": "Misconfigured Service Account keys; session hijacking page masquerading as LLM portal; stolen GitHub PATs + web app vulnerability exploitation; compromised IAM credentials with cloud federation tokens; harvested exposed LLM API keys from public GitHub; LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (user ID rebind vulnerability in /key/regenerate endpoint)",
  "ai_tooling_and_models": [
    "AWS Bedrock",
    "Azure Cognitive Services",
    "GCP Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform",
    "LiteLLM gateway",
    "new-api (centralized model hub and gateway)",
    "gcli2api (API proxy tool)",
    "Manus agent framework",
    "SearXNG metasearch",
    "agent-infra/sandbox execution environments"
  ],
  "other_tooling": [
    "Jet Night reseller (jet-night.com)",
    "D1337-KAIROS persona",
    "ai-relay custom proxy infrastructure",
    "newapi.pro resale ecosystem",
    "Node.js proxy bundles",
    "Burn and rotate service account strategy"
  ],
  "victims_and_sectors": "Organizations in North America, South America, Asia Pacific across financial services, retail, technology, transportation sectors; Fireworks AI customers (account/billing data, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights for some customers); Notion workspaces using Fireworks for Notion AI Insights (under 1 percent, chat transcripts)",
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "South America",
    "Asia"
  ],
  "attribution_or_cluster": "UNC6993 (Mandiant); Jet Night operators; D1337-KAIROS persona; multiple financially motivated threat clusters operating globally; division of labor between initial access operators and LLM Mixer monetization operators",
  "scale_and_metrics": "Multiple incidents in 2026; fraudulent charges exceeding $100K USD in single day; cumulative charges at some orgs reaching $1M USD; Jet Night passed nearly $1M in token costs to victim org; one actor made ~800K Bedrock calls over 30 hours (90% success), another 1.7M calls over 13 hours (1M+ success); 500K+ LLM API calls in <8 hours; Jet Night offers unlimited tokens $60/month (typical market $100-$250/month)",
  "prevention_angle": "IAM least privilege; centralized secrets management; code monitoring for API keys; routine config audits; rate limiting via Cloud Armor; network allow listing; budget alerts and API quotas; phishing-resistant MFA; shadow LLM discovery; granular API key scopes; validation sweep monitoring (max_tokens=1); vulnerability/ML supply chain patching; gateway patch management (LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217); sandboxed execution; vetted model repositories; graph-based exposure modeling",
  "related_magicsword_projects": [],
  "source_notes": "GTIG (Google Threat Intelligence Group) responded to multiple 2026 incidents; building on previous underground LLM credential market reporting; observed division of labor between access and monetization; LLM Mixers as illicit routing gateways; 'burn and rotate' service account strategy; Jet Night advertised outages on Telegram likely due to revoked stolen keys",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-11-04",
  "iocs": {
    "domains": [
      "jet-night.com",
      "newapi.pro"
    ],
    "ips": [
      "23.106.46.239",
      "38.246.114.118",
      "104.243.32.50",
      "31.57.201.201"
    ],
    "hashes": [],
    "urls": []
  },
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "initial-access",
        "title": "Compromised cloud identity and LLM API keys",
        "description": "Misconfigured Service Account keys; session hijacking page for LLM portal JSON payloads; stolen GitHub PATs + web app vuln; compromised IAM with federation tokens; exposed LLM API keys harvested from public GitHub; stealthy validation sweeps with max_tokens=1",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "lateral-persistence",
        "title": "Privilege escalation and persistence",
        "description": "Enumerated cloud services/repos/data stores; cloned codebases for secrets; queried data warehouse metadata; exploited LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (/key/regenerate rebind) to elevate Virtual Keys to PROXY_ADMIN; created unauthorized IAM/service accounts; injected SSH keys; attached admin policies; created backdoor accounts disguised as billing utilities",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "llm-abuse",
        "title": "LLM resource hijacking",
        "description": "Enabled managed generative platforms; created additional API keys; subscribed Pay-As-You-Go; selected premium models; launched high-volume inference; 'burn and rotate' short-lived service accounts; provisioned GPU instances; requested quota increases; deployed LiteLLM gateways; hosted Manus agent framework with SearXNG metasearch and sandbox execution",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "monetization",
        "title": "LLM Mixer resale",
        "description": "UNC6993 deployed new-api and gcli2api to aggregate stolen keys and balance loads; Jet Night (jet-night.com) $60/month unlimited token plan powered by stolen keys, passed ~$1M costs to victim; ai-relay on lookalike domains siphons access to newapi.pro resale ecosystem; D1337-KAIROS persona with Node.js proxy bundles; division of labor between access and monetization operators",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "charges",
        "title": "Fraudulent billing",
        "description": "UNC6993 accumulated $100K+ charges quickly; cumulative charges at orgs reaching $1M; one actor 800K Bedrock calls over 30 hours (Opus 75% of calls), another 1.7M calls over 13 hours; token usage profile resembles resold coding-agent traffic with prompt caching; $100K+ estimated usage at list price for two documented cases",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "initial-access",
        "target": "lateral-persistence"
      },
      {
        "source": "lateral-persistence",
        "target": "llm-abuse"
      },
      {
        "source": "llm-abuse",
        "target": "monetization"
      },
      {
        "source": "llm-abuse",
        "target": "charges"
      },
      {
        "source": "monetization",
        "target": "charges"
      }
    ]
  },
  "category": "adversary-use-of-ai",
  "attribution": {
    "actor_name": "UNC6993, Jet Night operators, D1337-KAIROS",
    "country": "Global",
    "motivation": "financially-motivated",
    "attributed_by": "Google Threat Intelligence Group, Fireworks AI",
    "confidence": "high"
  },
  "ai_involvement_confidence": "confirmed",
  "detections": [
    {
      "name": "Cloud LLM resource abuse monitoring",
      "format": "guidance",
      "notes": "Implement budget alerts and API quotas; monitor for validation sweeps (max_tokens=1); detect rapid GPU provisioning; alert on Pay-As-You-Go subscriptions from service accounts; monitor LiteLLM/new-api/gcli2api gateway deployments; detect Manus agent framework and SearXNG installations; flag burn-and-rotate service account patterns; monitor Jet Night, ai-relay, newapi.pro resale infrastructure connections"
    },
    {
      "name": "Third-party cloud provider security",
      "format": "guidance",
      "notes": "For Fireworks AI incident: audit third-party cloud provider access; implement least-privilege for R&D environments; monitor unauthorized workload execution; detect account/billing data access anomalies; alert on secrets, datasets, model weight access; implement cloud provider security controls. Notion downstream notice has no endpoint or CloudTrail pattern: the exposed objects are Notion AI Insights chat transcripts held by the vendor. Affected customers should treat those transcripts as exposed and rotate secrets pasted into Notion AI."
    }
  ],
  "atlas_techniques": [
    {
      "id": "AML.T0000",
      "rationale": "Threat actors compromise cloud compute credentials and hijack enterprise access to AWS Bedrock, Azure Cognitive Services, and GCP Gemini to fraudulently monetize through illicit gateways and LLM Mixers",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0034",
      "rationale": "Fireworks AI third-party cloud provider breach resulted in unauthorized workload execution and customer data access",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident-update"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0025",
      "rationale": "Attackers exfiltrated account/billing data, secrets, datasets, and partly trained model weights from Fireworks AI",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "timeline": {
    "last_updated": "2026-11-11",
    "updates": [
      {
        "date": "2026-11-02",
        "source": "Google Threat Intelligence Group",
        "summary": "GTIG reports UNC6993, Jet Night, D1337-KAIROS LLMjacking campaigns; fraudulent charges $100K-$1M per org; LLM Mixer resale via jet-night.com, ai-relay, newapi.pro"
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-10-24",
        "source": "Fireworks AI",
        "summary": "Fireworks AI third-party cloud provider breached Oct 23; attacker entered Oct 24, ran unauthorized workload; accessed account/billing data, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights"
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-11-09",
        "source": "Fireworks AI",
        "summary": "Fireworks AI attributes to financially motivated LLMjacking group selling illicit routing gateway access; GTIG/Mandiant report referenced; Unit 42 forensics"
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-11-02",
        "source": "Notion",
        "summary": "Fireworks notified Notion that a small dataset was accessed. Notion found only Notion AI synthetic test data, with no customer data in that first set."
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-11-03",
        "source": "Notion",
        "summary": "Notion disconnected from Fireworks, deleted data held there, and stopped communication with Fireworks."
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-11-06",
        "source": "Notion",
        "summary": "Fireworks told Notion that malicious actors may have accessed customer data. Notion opened a second investigation."
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-11-08",
        "source": "Notion",
        "summary": "Fireworks confirmed the final impacted dataset to Notion."
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-11-09",
        "source": "Notion",
        "summary": "Notion contacted affected customers. The dataset is Notion AI Insights chat transcripts for under 1 percent of workspaces, mostly unattributable, with no tool-call results and no other Notion features affected."
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-11-11",
        "source": "Notion",
        "summary": "Notion revoked exposed Notion API keys found in affected user messages during the investigation."
      }
    ]
  }
}