# Huntress SCKit installs rogue ScreenConnect clients; RelayTrap source looks LLM-written

- ID: huntress-sckit-screenconnect-llm-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-11
- Researcher: Ben Nahorney, Susannah Matt, Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch
- Organization: Huntress
- AI role: llm_generated_malware (LLM-generated malware)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-15
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/huntress-sckit-screenconnect-llm-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/huntress-sckit-screenconnect-llm-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Huntress SCKit installs rogue ScreenConnect clients; RelayTrap source looks LLM-written
- Editorial summary: Huntress (Ben Nahorney, Susannah Matt, Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch; published Nov 11, 2026, updated Nov 13) observed Run commands on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels installing rogue ScreenConnect clients. On…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/huntress-sckit-screenconnect-llm-2026-11.json

## Technique
Huntress (Ben Nahorney, Susannah Matt, Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch; published Nov 11, 2026, updated Nov 13) observed Run commands on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels installing rogue ScreenConnect clients. On Nov 11, from about 17:47 UTC, at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations were hit in about 90 minutes. ScreenConnect 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 were affected. Huntress ties the activity to the third-party RMM+ extension, versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32: if the access key was never set, the extension accepted a blank key, bypassing ScreenConnect user accounts, roles, and MFA. Commands showed up as RMM+ with no matching login. ConnectWise said it had disabled five extensions (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link) across more than 400 partner environments and had not yet identified an initial access vector when the Nov 11 advisory posted. The Run command, as SYSTEM, downloaded an attacker ScreenConnect installer to C:\\Windows\\TEMP\\sc.msi, installed it silently, and wrote C:\\Windows\\Temp\\sckit-run.bat. The dropper fetches sckit-decoder.ps1 and a kit keyed by the Windows UUID. Components extract to C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap. TrapWatch.ps1 runs as SYSTEM, compiles RelayTrap.cs into a host-specific RelayTrap.exe, and creates a scheduled task named TrapWatch that runs every 10 seconds. The legitimate ScreenConnect client is stopped and set to manual start. Huntress Figure 6 says the RelayTrap C\# source appears to have been generated by an LLM because of detailed source comments explaining intent. A separate path, seen in the kit and not observed succeeding, steals the technician .aspxauth cookie with sqlite3.exe and tries to push WithUninstall.ps1 through the Shared Toolbox. On Nov 13 at 16:12 UTC Huntress saw another spike, 205 hosts across 41 organizations, with the client hosted at 185.241.211.197 and an installer URL ending in c=ExploitedNOTUSA. Huntress also saw c=Exploited529 and c=Exploited809. One incident used a self-hosted RMM+ plugin, a netsh portproxy from 127.0.0.1:88 to 185.241.211.197:80, and a service named Windows Update Agent running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe from C:\\ProgramData\\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\\. ConnectWise also pointed on-premises partners at ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later for CVE-2026-84869, a separate client file-transfer flaw. Huntress does not say this wave exploited that flaw. Blackpoint Cyber (Sam Decker, Nevan Beal) says RelayTrap.cs is compiled on the endpoint by TrapWatch.ps1, not shipped as a precompiled binary. When a technician connects, the replacement Guest sends TransferFilesMessage FileAction.Run after a 2.5 second delay, which is the CVE-2026-84869 file-transfer-back path. Blackpoint's test against a current ScreenConnect Host queued the transfer on the Guest, and the Host did not request or run the payload. They report no successful technician compromise. Primary panel indicators include sc.payproofkit.com (155.94.150.39) and 185.99.255.28.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Blank access key on RMM+ 1.0.31 or 1.0.32, then ScreenConnect Run Command as SYSTEM. ConnectWise had not identified a single initial-access vector in the Nov 11 advisory.

## AI tooling and models
- RelayTrap.cs, which Huntress says appears LLM-generated from its explanatory comments

## Other tooling
- ScreenConnect (LOLRMM), including rogue clients
- RMM+ extension 1.0.31 and 1.0.32
- sqlite3.exe for .aspxauth cookie theft
- msiexec

## Victims and sectors
Organizations using Huntress and ScreenConnect. 48 organizations on Nov 11 and 41 on Nov 13. Sectors were not named.

## Target geography
- unknown
Huntress did not name the countries of the affected organizations.

## Attribution
Unnamed. Huntress and ConnectWise describe the activity. No country is stated. Participant name Addmin and client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091 were published.

## Scale and metrics
Nov 11: at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations in about 90 minutes. Nov 13: 205 hosts across 41 organizations. ConnectWise disabled the listed extensions across more than 400 partner environments. One panel parameter reached Exploited809 (190 downstream clients on one panel).

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### blank-key: Blank RMM+ access key [access]
RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accept an empty access key when none was configured, so Run Command arrives without a ScreenConnect login.
Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect

### install: SYSTEM installs sc.msi and SCKit [execution]
The command writes C:\\Windows\\TEMP\\sc.msi and sckit-run.bat, then downloads a UUID-keyed kit into C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap.
Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect

### relaytrap: LLM-commented RelayTrap [ai]
TrapWatch.ps1 compiles RelayTrap.cs, which Huntress says looks LLM-written, and schedules TrapWatch every 10 seconds.
Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect

### spread: Cookie theft path not seen succeeding [impact]
The kit can read a technician .aspxauth cookie with sqlite3.exe and upload a Shared Toolbox item. Huntress had not seen that jump succeed.
Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect

Connections:
- blank-key -> install
- install -> relaytrap
- relaytrap -> spread

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### blank-key: Credential / session use outside baseline
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/identity.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/identity.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/identity.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: Identity / service authentication logs; Device, source-IP and session context; Resource access and token issuance audit
- Investigate: Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
- Investigate: Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
- Limitation: Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### install: Unapproved Windows program execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-install.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-install.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation; Download provenance and file hashes; File certificate information and application-control audit / block events
- Investigate: Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
- Investigate: Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
- Limitation: Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### relaytrap: Suspicious Windows script execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents; PowerShell script-block logging when enabled; Download / network and installer events
- Investigate: Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Investigate: Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
- Limitation: Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### spread: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — Huntress says the RelayTrap C\# source appears LLM-generated from comments that explain the intended behavior
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect
- AML.T0049: Exploit Public-Facing Application — RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key and exposed Run Command as SYSTEM
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0049
  Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect

## Defensive notes
Disable RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 where the access key was left blank, including on-premises ScreenConnect. Do not triage a suspect host over ScreenConnect. Remove the rogue client service, the TrapWatch task, C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap, and sckit files under %TEMP%. Hunt msiexec installs of ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi or UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi with c=Exploited. Block 185.99.255.28 and 185.241.211.197.

## Sources
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect — SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-worm-like-sckit-malware-targets-msps-in-screenconnect-attacks/ — New worm-like SCKit malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks
- https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ — ScreenConnect attack: SCKit

## Source notes
Counts, the blank-key behavior, Figure 6's LLM comment, paths, and IOCs are from the Huntress article, including the Nov 13 update. BleepingComputer reports the same LLM-looking comments. The console-takeover and Shared Toolbox spread were recovered from the kit and were not seen succeeding. Blackpoint's patched-host test is the source for the 2.5 second TransferFilesMessage and the result that a current Host did not fetch the payload. Additional acknowledged contributors include John Hammond, Tanner Filip, Tyler Marzen, Austin Worline, Ethan Williams, Sharon Martin, Ben Bernstein, Andrew Brandt, Jamie Levy, Max Rogers, Aaron Deal, and Mendy Green. File hashes are weak because scripts are rebuilt per host. ScreenConnect is tracked by LOLRMM at https://lolrmm.io/tools/screenconnect.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "sc.payproofkit.com",
    "newnewnew.gotdns.org",
    "soxnewwork.homedns.org",
    "cdn007-digitaldownloads.com",
    "ns.mo7sen.dev",
    "007.from-ak.com"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "185.99.255.28",
    "155.94.150.39",
    "185.241.211.197"
  ],
  "hashes": [
    "94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11",
    "7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec",
    "3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4",
    "d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a",
    "8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af"
  ],
  "urls": []
}
```
