# InstallFix fake Claude Code installation pages

- ID: installfix-fake-claude-pages-2026-03
- Reported: 2026-03-06
- Researcher: Push Security Research
- Organization: Push Security
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/installfix-fake-claude-pages-2026-03/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/installfix-fake-claude-pages-2026-03.json
- Browse title: InstallFix fake Claude Code installation pages
- Editorial summary: Mar 6, 2026: Push Security identified 'InstallFix' campaign: 120+ fake websites impersonating official Claude Code installation pages (claude-code-download\[.\]com, get-claude-code\[.\]net, etc.). Sites rank…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/installfix-fake-claude-pages-2026-03.json

## Technique
Mar 6, 2026: Push Security identified 'InstallFix' campaign: 120+ fake websites impersonating official Claude Code installation pages (claude-code-download\[.\]com, get-claude-code\[.\]net, etc.). Sites rank highly in search results via SEO poisoning (typosquat domains, keyword stuffing, fake reviews). Offer trojanized Claude Code installers for Windows/macOS/Linux. Windows: NSIS installer bundles Claude Code with AMOS infostealer. macOS: DMG contains Claude Code.app + hidden LaunchAgent installing Atomic Stealer. Linux: .deb/.rpm with postinstall script deploying XMRig miner + credential harvester. All variants harvest: Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, crypto wallets, browser cookies, SSH keys. Push Security tracked 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026. Average user dwell time before detection: 23 days. Detection: verify Claude Code install source (official anthropic.com only); check installer signatures; monitor for unexpected LaunchAgents (macOS) or startup tasks (Windows); scan for AMOS/Atomic Stealer/XMRig indicators.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
User searches 'download Claude Code', finds fake site via SEO poisoning, downloads trojanized installer

## AI tooling and models
- [Claude Code](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code) (impersonated)
- Anthropic [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) API
- OpenAI API

## Other tooling
- AMOS infostealer (Windows)
- Atomic Stealer (macOS)
- XMRig cryptocurrency miner (Linux)
- Credential harvesters
- SEO poisoning and typosquat domains

## Victims and sectors
8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026; AI developers, data scientists, software engineers seeking Claude Code

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unknown actor; 'InstallFix' campaign; sophisticated SEO manipulation and multi-platform malware development

## Scale and metrics
120+ fake installation websites, 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026; avg 23-day dwell time before detection

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### seo-poisoning: Create fake install sites with SEO [access]
Adversary creates 120+ fake Claude Code installation websites (claude-code-download\[.\]com, get-claude-code\[.\]net, etc.); uses SEO poisoning (typosquats, keyword stuffing, fake reviews) to rank highly in search results for 'download Claude Code'
Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/installfix/

### user-downloads: User downloads trojanized installer [ai]
User searches for Claude Code, finds fake site, downloads installer; sites appear legitimate with screenshots, documentation, fake testimonials; multi-platform support (Windows NSIS, macOS DMG, Linux deb/rpm)
Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/installfix/

### install-malware: Install malware with legitimate app [execution]
Installer deploys functional Claude Code plus malware: Windows (AMOS infostealer), macOS (LaunchAgent → Atomic Stealer), Linux (postinstall → XMRig + harvester). Malware harvests Anthropic keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, AWS creds, crypto wallets, SSH keys
Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/installfix/

### exfiltrate-mine: Credential theft and crypto mining [impact]
Malware exfiltrates credentials to attacker C2; XMRig mines Monero on Linux systems; persistence via LaunchAgents/startup tasks; 8,900+ affected installations Mar-May 2026; avg 23-day dwell time
Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/installfix/

Connections:
- seo-poisoning -> user-downloads
- user-downloads -> install-malware
- install-malware -> exfiltrate-mine

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### seo-poisoning: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### user-downloads: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### install-malware: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exfiltrate-mine: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0000: Search Open Technical Databases — Adversary uses SEO poisoning and fake installation pages to distribute trojanized AI coding assistant installers stealing credentials
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0000
  Evidence: https://pushsecurity.com/blog/installfix/

## Defensive notes
Only download Claude Code from official anthropic.com; verify installer signatures; check domain spelling before download; use bookmark for official site; educate users on SEO poisoning risks; implement endpoint security detecting AMOS/Atomic/XMRig; monitor for unexpected startup persistence mechanisms

## Sources
- https://pushsecurity.com/blog/installfix/ — Push Security: InstallFix Campaign - Fake Claude Code Installation Pages

## Source notes
Push Security analysis. InstallFix represents evolution of software supply chain attacks: instead of compromising legitimate distribution, adversary creates parallel fake distribution network optimized for search discovery. Detection: alert on Claude Code installs from domains other than anthropic.com, scan for AMOS/Atomic Stealer/XMRig, monitor LaunchAgents and startup tasks created during install, check installer code signing (unsigned/wrong signature = malicious).

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "claude-code-download.com",
    "get-claude-code.net"
  ],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
