{
  "id": "invariant-github-mcp-private-repo-2025-05",
  "name": "GitHub MCP indirect prompt injection → private repo exfil",
  "date_reported": "2025-05-26",
  "researcher": "Invariant Labs",
  "org": "Invariant Labs",
  "sources": [
    {
      "url": "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability"
    }
  ],
  "magicsword_coverage": [],
  "borderline": false,
  "borderline_note": null,
  "ai_role": "ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target",
  "ai_role_secondary": null,
  "ai_role_detail": null,
  "technique_summary": "Malicious GitHub issue content can indirectly prompt-inject an agent using the official GitHub MCP server. When a user asks the agent to inspect public issues, the agent can be coerced to read private repositories and leak contents via public PR/issue. Architectural trust issue (broad agent permissions + untrusted GitHub content), not a simple GitHub MCP code bug.",
  "initial_access": "User asks agent with GitHub MCP to process attacker-controlled public issue",
  "ai_tooling_and_models": [
    "GitHub MCP server",
    "coding agents"
  ],
  "other_tooling": [],
  "victims_and_sectors": "unknown",
  "regions": [
    "unknown"
  ],
  "attribution_or_cluster": "unknown",
  "scale_and_metrics": "unknown",
  "prevention_angle": "Scope MCP tokens per-repo; block cross-repo actions; treat issues as untrusted input",
  "related_magicsword_projects": [],
  "source_notes": null,
  "last_reviewed": "2026-10-20",
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Agent reads an attacker issue",
        "description": "A user asks an agent with GitHub MCP access to inspect public issues.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Issue instructions override the task",
        "description": "Indirect prompt injection redirects the model through untrusted issue content.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Agent accesses private repositories",
        "description": "Broad tool permissions let the agent retrieve private data.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Private content becomes public",
        "description": "The demonstrated chain leaks content through a public pull request or issue.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "atlas_techniques": [
    {
      "id": "AML.T0051.001",
      "rationale": "Public GitHub issue content indirectly injects the agent.",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0086",
      "rationale": "GitHub write tools publish private repository content.",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "category": "attacks-on-ai",
  "ai_involvement_confidence": "confirmed",
  "detections": [
    {
      "name": "Review attack-specific indicators",
      "format": "guidance",
      "notes": "Monitor for the techniques described in GitHub MCP indirect prompt injection → private repo exfil. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs."
    }
  ]
}