# Chrome AI extensions deliver info-stealers (broad campaign)

- ID: malwarebytes-chrome-ai-extensions-2025-01
- Reported: 2025-01-15
- Researcher: Malwarebytes
- Organization: Malwarebytes
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/malwarebytes-chrome-ai-extensions-2025-01/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/malwarebytes-chrome-ai-extensions-2025-01.json
- Browse title: Chrome AI extensions deliver info-stealers
- Editorial summary: Compromised or malicious AI- and VPN-themed Chrome extensions pushed info-stealers through updates, reportedly affecting about 2.6 million users.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Browser extensions
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/malwarebytes-chrome-ai-extensions-2025-01.json

## Technique
Compromised or malicious Chrome AI/VPN-themed extensions delivered info-stealing malware via malicious updates; campaign reportedly affected on the order of 2.6 million users.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Inventory browser extensions and audit unexpected updates, publisher changes and broad permissions.
- Relationship: workflow; tools: ai-extensions; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: The reported delivery path uses malicious or compromised AI- and VPN-themed Chrome extensions.
  Condition to check: Confirm the affected extension IDs / versions and update history against the source.
  Evidence: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2025/01/google-chrome-ai-extensions-deliver-info-stealing-malware-in-broad-attack
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Chrome extension install / poisoned update

## AI tooling and models
- unknown

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
~2.6 million users cited

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: AI-themed browser extension is installed [access]
A malicious or compromised extension reaches Chrome users.
Evidence: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2025/01/google-chrome-ai-extensions-deliver-info-stealing-malware-in-broad-attack

### step-2: AI features frame the product [ai]
AI or VPN functionality provides the installation pretext.
Evidence: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2025/01/google-chrome-ai-extensions-deliver-info-stealing-malware-in-broad-attack

### step-3: Malicious extension update runs [execution]
A poisoned update delivers the information-stealing component.
Evidence: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2025/01/google-chrome-ai-extensions-deliver-info-stealing-malware-in-broad-attack

### step-4: User information is exposed [impact]
The report describes a broad campaign affecting a large extension user base.
Evidence: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2025/01/google-chrome-ai-extensions-deliver-info-stealing-malware-in-broad-attack

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Browser extension change / data access
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/extension.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/extension.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/extension.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
- Required telemetry: Managed-browser extension inventory and update history; Extension ID, permissions and provenance; Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
- Investigate: Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Investigate: Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
- Limitation: Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Browser extension change / data access
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/extension.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/extension.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/extension.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
- Required telemetry: Managed-browser extension inventory and update history; Extension ID, permissions and provenance; Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
- Investigate: Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Investigate: Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
- Limitation: Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
- Qualification: Review extension ID, update origin and permission changes; advertised AI or VPN functionality alone is not a signal.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Browser extension change / data access
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/extension.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/extension.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/extension.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
- Required telemetry: Managed-browser extension inventory and update history; Extension ID, permissions and provenance; Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
- Investigate: Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Investigate: Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
- Limitation: Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
Extension inventory and allowlisting; detect unexpected update publishers

## Sources
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2025/01/google-chrome-ai-extensions-deliver-info-stealing-malware-in-broad-attack
