# QUIETVAULT AI-assisted credential stealer

- ID: quietvault-gtig-2025
- Reported: 2025-11-05
- Researcher: Google Threat Intelligence Group
- Organization: Google GTIG
- AI role: ai_credential_theft (AI credential theft)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/quietvault-gtig-2025/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/quietvault-gtig-2025.json
- Browse title: QUIETVAULT AI-assisted credential stealer
- Editorial summary: A JavaScript stealer takes GitHub and npm tokens and uses AI CLIs installed on the host to hunt for more secrets. Industry reports link it to s1ngularity-style npm attacks.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Malware analysis
- Source-stated target environments: Developer workflows
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/quietvault-gtig-2025.json

## Technique
JavaScript stealer targeting GitHub and npm tokens; exfils via creating public GitHub repos. Also leverages AI prompts and installed AI CLI tools to search for other secrets on the host. Observed in operations; linked in industry reporting to Nx/s1ngularity-style supply-chain delivery.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Review suspicious npm installs, token use and AI CLI process trees; rotate confirmed exposed secrets.
- Relationship: workflow; tools: npm-pypi; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: The stealer reaches developer hosts through trojanized npm packages and can abuse installed AI CLIs.
  Condition to check: Confirm a trojanized package ran; the catalog does not identify a specific affected AI CLI product.
  Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/ ; https://research.splunk.com/stories/quietvault/
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Trojanized npm packages (industry linkage to UNC6426 / s1ngularity-style campaigns)

## AI tooling and models
- On-host AI CLI tools
- crafted AI prompts for secret discovery

## Other tooling
- GitHub API for exfil repos
- npm token theft

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
GTIG QUIETVAULT; industry links to UNC6426 / s1ngularity cluster

## Scale and metrics
Observed in operations 2025

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Trojanized npm package is installed [access]
Industry reporting links the delivery to supply-chain campaigns.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/ ; https://research.splunk.com/stories/quietvault/

### step-2: JavaScript stealer searches for tokens [execution]
GitHub and npm credentials are primary targets.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/ ; https://research.splunk.com/stories/quietvault/

### step-3: Installed AI CLIs help find more secrets [ai]
Prompts and local model tools extend host-side secret discovery.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/ ; https://research.splunk.com/stories/quietvault/

### step-4: Secrets are posted to public repositories [impact]
The malware creates public GitHub repositories to exfiltrate collected data.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/ ; https://research.splunk.com/stories/quietvault/

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Dependency / CI trust boundary
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/package.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/package.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/package.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
- Required telemetry: Package-manager and CI job logs; Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs; Runner process trees, secret access and egress
- Investigate: Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
- Investigate: Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
- Limitation: Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Private access → public repository artifact
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/repository.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/repository.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/repository.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
- Required telemetry: Git-provider organization / enterprise audit; Repository and token permission inventory; Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
- Investigate: Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Investigate: Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
- Limitation: Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — The stealer uses local AI tools to search for additional secrets.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/ ; https://research.splunk.com/stories/quietvault/

## Defensive notes
Disable or gate AI CLIs in CI; rotate GitHub/npm tokens; hunt public s1ngularity-style repos

## Sources
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/
- https://research.splunk.com/stories/quietvault/
