# ShareLeak Copilot Studio SharePoint form prompt injection (CVE-2026-21520)

- ID: shareleak-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520
- Reported: 2026-01-15
- Researcher: Capsule Security
- Organization: Capsule Security
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/shareleak-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/shareleak-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520.json
- Browse title: ShareLeak: Copilot Studio SharePoint form prompt injection (CVE-2026-21520)
- Editorial summary: Content in SharePoint forms could prompt-inject Copilot Studio agents into leaking SharePoint data. Microsoft patched it on 2026-01-15.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Vulnerability report
- Source-stated target environments: Agents & MCP
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/shareleak-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520.json

## Technique
SharePoint-form content could prompt-inject Copilot Studio agents to override behavior and exfiltrate SharePoint data. Microsoft patched 2026-01-15 as CVE-2026-21520.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Review the vendor fix and restrict the SharePoint data and connectors available to the agent.
- Relationship: target; tools: copilot-studio; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: Copilot Studio agents consuming SharePoint forms are the reported injection surface.
  Condition to check: Confirm that the installed version is affected by the historical report; selecting a product does not establish its version or patch status.
  Condition to check: The agent must consume the attacker-influenced SharePoint form content with access to the data at issue.
  Evidence: https://www.capsulesecurity.io/blog-post/shareleak-taking-the-wheel-of-microsofts-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
unknown

## AI tooling and models
- [Microsoft Copilot Studio](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/copilot/products/copilot-studio)
- SharePoint

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
Patched Jan 15 2026

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Initial delivery details are undisclosed [unknown]
The supplied record identifies form content as the injection channel.
Evidence: https://www.capsulesecurity.io/blog-post/shareleak-taking-the-wheel-of-microsofts-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520

### step-2: SharePoint form carries instructions [access]
Attacker-controlled form content reaches a Copilot Studio agent.
Evidence: https://www.capsulesecurity.io/blog-post/shareleak-taking-the-wheel-of-microsofts-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520

### step-3: Prompt injection redirects the agent [ai]
The agent is induced to override its intended behavior.
Evidence: https://www.capsulesecurity.io/blog-post/shareleak-taking-the-wheel-of-microsofts-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520

### step-4: SharePoint data is exfiltrated [impact]
The reported chain crosses the connector’s data-access boundary.
Evidence: https://www.capsulesecurity.io/blog-post/shareleak-taking-the-wheel-of-microsofts-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- Qualification: The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Sensitive data → unusual destination
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/exfil.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/exfil.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
- Required telemetry: Sensitive resource access / DLP records; Proxy, egress and cloud upload events; Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
- Investigate: Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Investigate: Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
- Limitation: An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0051.001: Indirect — SharePoint form content redirects the agent.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051.001
  Evidence: https://www.capsulesecurity.io/blog-post/shareleak-taking-the-wheel-of-microsofts-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520
- AML.T0057: LLM Data Leakage — The injected behavior leaks SharePoint data.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0057
  Evidence: https://www.capsulesecurity.io/blog-post/shareleak-taking-the-wheel-of-microsofts-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520

## Defensive notes
Patch Copilot Studio; treat SharePoint form fields as untrusted prompt input

## Sources
- https://www.capsulesecurity.io/blog-post/shareleak-taking-the-wheel-of-microsofts-copilot-studio-cve-2026-21520
