# n0n ransomware with OpenCode - 154 models including abliterated

- ID: socradar-n0n-ransomware-ai-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-28
- Researcher: SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU)
- Organization: SOCRadar
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/socradar-n0n-ransomware-ai-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/socradar-n0n-ransomware-ai-2026-10.json
- Browse title: n0n ransomware with OpenCode - 154 models including abliterated
- Editorial summary: n0n ransomware operator exposed staging server at 185.157.161.148 with 1,719 files including 829 scripts, 5 C++ encryptor sources, and OpenCode AI coding agent environment. OpenCode configured with 154…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/socradar-n0n-ransomware-ai-2026-10.json

## Technique
n0n ransomware operator exposed staging server at 185.157.161.148 with 1,719 files including 829 scripts, 5 C++ encryptor sources, and OpenCode AI coding agent environment. OpenCode configured with 154 model entries across 7 providers (Gemini, Mistral, Nemotron, Llama, Claude, GPT-5.x, Grok, Kimi, GLM, DeepSeek, MiniMax, Qwen) including uncensored and abliterated models (safety training removed) plus self-hosted model. Agent wrote and debugged hundreds of attack scripts; gateway spending $7,216 by Oct 22, 2026. Entry via credential stuffing (305 FortiGate SSL-VPN), exposed AWS keys, weak RDP/WinRM, compromised hosting portals. Hijacked Cisco Firepower Management Center to switch all policies to BLOCK. Human-directed operation supported by AI; no fully autonomous attack system. 93 listed victims, $283.7M total ransom demands.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Credential-only access: credential stuffing campaign against 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN devices, exposed AWS keys, weak RDP/WinRM credentials, compromised hosting management portals; no vulnerability exploitation found

## AI tooling and models
- [OpenCode](https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode) (open-source AI coding agent)
- [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/)
- Mistral
- Nemotron
- Llama
- [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview)
- GPT-5.x
- [Grok](https://x.ai/grok)
- Kimi
- GLM
- [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai)
- MiniMax
- Qwen
- Abliterated models (safety training removed)
- Uncensored models
- Self-hosted model

## Other tooling
- n0n ransomware encryptor (5 C++ versions)
- Credential stuffing tools
- Cisco Firepower Management Center (hijacked for policy manipulation)

## Victims and sectors
23 organizations across 14 countries; 93 listed victims as of Oct 19, 2026

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
n0n ransomware group; operations Sep 17 - Oct 22, 2026

## Scale and metrics
Exposed workspace with 1,719 files (829 scripts, 5 encryptor sources); 154 model entries across 7 providers; $7,216 in AI gateway spending by Oct 22; 93 victims listed with $283.7M total ransom demands; 23 intrusion attempts across 14 countries

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### credential-access: Credential-only initial access [access]
Credential stuffing against 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN devices; exposed AWS keys; weak RDP/WinRM credentials; compromised hosting management portals; no vulnerability exploitation
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/

### ai-tooling: OpenCode with 154 models [ai]
Configured OpenCode coding agent with 154 model entries across 7 providers: Gemini, Mistral, Nemotron, Llama, Claude, GPT-5.x, Grok, Kimi, GLM, DeepSeek, MiniMax, Qwen; includes abliterated (safety training removed) and uncensored models plus self-hosted model; $7,216 gateway spending
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/

### script-generation: AI-generated attack scripts [execution]
OpenCode wrote and debugged hundreds of attack scripts; human-directed operation with AI support; agent kept encryption keys in memory file
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/

### fmc-hijack: Cisco FMC policy manipulation [impact]
Hijacked Cisco Firepower Management Center instances; switched all access policies to BLOCK; claimed widespread service disruption
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/

### ransomware: Encryption and extortion [impact]
Deployed n0n ransomware (5 C++ encryptor versions); stole and encrypted files; deleted data and backups; extortion; 93 victims listed with $283.7M total ransom demands
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/

Connections:
- credential-access -> ai-tooling
- ai-tooling -> script-generation
- script-generation -> fmc-hijack
- script-generation -> ransomware

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### credential-access: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### ai-tooling: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### script-generation: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### fmc-hijack: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### ransomware: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — Operator uses OpenCode AI coding agent with 154 models to generate and debug attack scripts, demonstrating attacker use of AI for offensive operations
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/

## Defensive notes
Strong credential policies; MFA for VPN/RDP/WinRM; AWS key rotation and monitoring; hosting portal security; Cisco FMC access control; monitor OpenCode/AI coding agent usage; gateway spending anomalies; exposed file servers

## Sources
- https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/ — n0n Ransomware: Inside an AI-Assisted Extortion Operation

## Source notes
SOCRadar STRU discovered exposed staging server in Sweden on port 8877; snapshots Sep 25-26, 2026; first documented criminal use of abliterated models; human-directed operation, not fully autonomous; SOCRadar access to blog post may be restricted (403 observed)

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [
    "185.157.161.148"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
