# SOCRadar XaocMail ClickFix delivers Phantom53 and HavoX, built with Claude Code

- ID: socradar-xaocmail-phantom53-claude-code-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-13
- Researcher: SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU)
- Organization: SOCRadar
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-15
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/socradar-xaocmail-phantom53-claude-code-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/socradar-xaocmail-phantom53-claude-code-2026-11.json
- Browse title: SOCRadar XaocMail ClickFix delivers Phantom53 and HavoX, built with Claude Code
- Editorial summary: SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (published Nov 13, 2026) describes a Russian-speaking operator chaining XaocMail, Phantom53, and HavoX (Havoc Demon). Preparation began in October 2025. Phishing tests and…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/socradar-xaocmail-phantom53-claude-code-2026-11.json

## Technique
SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (published Nov 13, 2026) describes a Russian-speaking operator chaining XaocMail, Phantom53, and HavoX (Havoc Demon). Preparation began in October 2025. Phishing tests and framework development continued in early 2026. The operation launched in August 2026 and was still active at publication. XaocMail, on 185.224.132.148:8585, builds per-victim document-sharing lures (Google Docs, Adobe Acrobat, Office365, SecuredDocs) and stores landing JSON in Cloudflare KV. Emails point at hxxps://securedoc.\[subdomain\].workers.dev/?id=\{linkId\}. The ClickFix page offers three Win+R paths: a PowerShell DownloadString cradle, mshta against /h?id=X (an earlier ZIP of GUP.exe sideloading libcurl.dll), and msiexec /i .../m?id=X /qn, which SOCRadar calls the active path. The MSI impersonates names such as Visual Studio Tools, Python, or Node.js and drops Python 3.11 under a random directory in AppData or LocalAppData. A pythonw scheduled task runs the beacon every 12 minutes. A second task runs the watcher every 3 minutes. The beacon is a .pyd named like a real package (cv2.pyd, with PyInit\_cv2, and the same pattern for numpy, PIL, and lxml). It beacons over DNS-over-HTTPS to Cloudflare, Google, and ControlD, encoding commands in AAAA records, with UDP/53 as a fallback, and a week-keyed SHA256 DGA on .xyz. CMD\_WAKE writes an IPC file so the watcher reflectively loads an AES-GCM HavoX blob in memory. If the MSI is not elevated it can show a UAC prompt for a product-named task, and a separate payload uses fodhelper.exe registry hijacking. Payload aliases include a Level RMM drop from downloads.level.io and an AI-secret stealer covering Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Windsurf, and other AI tools, plus password-manager, browser, SSH, git, wallet, and messaging collection. SOCRadar's AI evidence is on the operator side: .claude/settings.json, 143 numbered NNN-task-name.md files across adminka (25), implant\_v3 (31), and implant\_v4 (87), a 117 KB implant\_v4/arch.md, and implant\_v4/.tasks/prompts/noav-beacon-test.md, a Russian prompt for a claudeg5f-tmux Claude wrapper that tells the agent to install a test MSI on a VM named NoAV under an authorized red-team framing. HavoX's login panel and an exfiltration path are on 145.63.138.67. Almost a thousand personalized pages were identified. Named target countries are Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia, and Spain, across technology, finance, education, government, logistics, and manufacturing. SOCRadar did not confirm attacker intent beyond the footholds.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Spearphishing links from XaocMail to Cloudflare Worker ClickFix pages that ask the user to run msiexec, mshta, or a PowerShell cradle

## AI tooling and models
- [Claude Code](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code) (.claude/settings.json, numbered task files, claudeg5f-tmux prompt wrapper)
- AI-secret stealer aimed at [Claude Code](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code), Codex, [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli), [Cursor](https://cursor.com/), and Windsurf

## Other tooling
- XaocMail phishing panel
- Phantom53 DoH beacon and watcher (.pyd under pythonw.exe)
- HavoX / Havoc Demon, reflective load
- Cloudflare Workers and KV
- msiexec, mshta, [PowerShell](https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell) (LOLBAS)
- GUP.exe sideloading libcurl.dll (HijackLibs), earlier path
- fodhelper.exe UAC bypass (LOLBAS)
- Level RMM (LOLRMM)

## Victims and sectors
Technology, finance, education, government, logistics, and manufacturing. Almost a thousand personalized lure pages. No organization names are listed here.

## Target geography
- Brazil
- Peru
- India
- Indonesia
- Spain
Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia, and Spain are the countries SOCRadar names. The article also describes the set as Latin America, Asia, and Europe. Operator language is not a victim region.

## Attribution
Unnamed Russian-speaking operator. SOCRadar does not name a country or a tracked cluster.

## Scale and metrics
Almost a thousand personalized XaocMail pages. 143 Claude Code task files. implant\_v4/arch.md is 117 KB. No victim-host count was published.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### phish: XaocMail sends the lure [access]
A self-hosted panel writes a per-victim landing page to Cloudflare KV and emails a workers.dev link.
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/

### clickfix: ClickFix runs the MSI [execution]
The page asks the user to run msiexec /i against /m?id=, or an older mshta or PowerShell path.
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/

### beacon: pythonw beacon over DoH [execution]
Python 3.11 in AppData runs cv2.pyd every 12 minutes and a watcher every 3 minutes. Commands return inside DNS AAAA answers.
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/

### claude: Claude Code built the implant [ai]
The operator tree has .claude/settings.json, 143 numbered task files, a 117 KB arch.md, and a Russian authorized-red-team test prompt.
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/

### havoc: HavoX in memory and AI-secret theft [impact]
CMD\_WAKE loads the Havoc Demon reflectively. Aliases include Level RMM and a stealer for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, and Windsurf.
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/

Connections:
- phish -> clickfix
- clickfix -> beacon
- beacon -> havoc
- claude -> beacon

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### phish: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### clickfix: Suspicious Windows script execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents; PowerShell script-block logging when enabled; Download / network and installer events
- Investigate: Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Investigate: Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
- Limitation: Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### beacon: New persistence → recurring execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/persistence.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/persistence.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/persistence.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes; Process creation and file provenance; User / administrative change records
- Investigate: Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.
- Investigate: Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents.
- Limitation: Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### claude: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### havoc: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — Claude Code task files, settings, and a Russian test prompt show the operator used a Claude agent to build and test the implant
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/
- AML.T0054: LLM Jailbreak — The NoAV prompt frames the job as authorized red-team work so the agent stays on task
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0054
  Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — A payload alias steals secrets from Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Windsurf, and other AI tools
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/
- AML.T0052: Phishing — XaocMail sends document-sharing phishing links to Cloudflare Worker ClickFix pages
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0052
  Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/

## Defensive notes
Block ClickFix paste-and-run. Alert when explorer.exe starts msiexec.exe with a workers.dev URL, when mshta.exe fetches an HTTP URL, and when pythonw.exe runs a .pyw from AppData and loads a .pyd outside a normal Python install. Hunt scheduled tasks named like MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask, OneDriveSyncTask, WindowsDefenderScheduledScan, OfficeBackgroundTaskHandler, or AdobeAcrobatUpdateTask with a short random suffix. Treat DoH from pythonw.exe to 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, or 76.76.2.11 as suspicious when paired with those tasks.

## Sources
- https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/ — XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX Across Latin America, Asia, and Europe

## Source notes
Chain, timings, Claude Code artifacts, and IOCs are from the SOCRadar article. Operator mailbox addresses in that IOC table are omitted. Victim names and stolen-file contents are not included. The article lists additional MSI and payload hashes beyond the set below. Havoc is the public framework; HavoX is SOCRadar's name for this operator's Demon build.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "dns.timesyncserver-312453.com",
    "securedoc.makeneg458.workers.dev",
    "securedoc.mesuttgulerr573.workers.dev",
    "linkrot.fypahedupal2-0maz.workers.dev",
    "sync-node-serv.com",
    "dns.cdn-syncnode-server.com",
    "a8f2aac37385.xyz",
    "kfkwrfdd.xyz",
    "544504d7fe1e.xyz",
    "bestutyresdomaonupder.com"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "185.224.132.148",
    "145.63.138.67",
    "162.252.198.204",
    "162.252.199.92",
    "94.156.152.7",
    "91.132.93.251",
    "176.9.154.69"
  ],
  "hashes": [
    "bceeb2d54b6a756c73a3e06617e9e95ad4d8e53da47639bcd6ef3cae98c6da6d",
    "7055483a77f679ad569c3a9bfe76cdb8e5b96efc44d2bf2a6f08e930add598b0",
    "4f656834e545c0b44922ce6d8952989c8c0859d8ae8b1f117c06ab07b047e2b4",
    "8ebb2bf61b48ae7abdcd674413bebd79b30ddd945854e175ba60d56c0a3adf54",
    "a4ad001c6900176eba43a747ae5d212db6fc78f7ef4e777f276cbbdf8099dbe8",
    "0aff424f9a02eb9f429119c4caa05e85fc952603549d69849e745293d20235d6"
  ],
  "urls": []
}
```
