# S-RM ARTEX in the wild - incident response host artifacts and TTPs

- ID: srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-06
- Researcher: S-RM
- Organization: S-RM
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Offensive frameworks: artex
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-12
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11.json
- Browse title: S-RM ARTEX in the wild - incident response host artifacts and TTPs
- Editorial summary: S-RM incident response analysis (Nov 6, 2026) documents real-world ARTEX deployment artifacts and TTPs from multiple IR engagements. Initial access via vulnerable web plugins and misconfigured upload…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11.json

## Technique
S-RM incident response analysis (Nov 6, 2026) documents real-world ARTEX deployment artifacts and TTPs from multiple IR engagements. Initial access via vulnerable web plugins and misconfigured upload endpoints; rapid credential harvesting and reuse; autonomous agents pivot through identity systems, cloud resources, code repositories, and firewall configurations within a single day. One case featured MSP supply-chain pivot; another deployed card skimmers on compromised e-commerce sites. Attackers demonstrated persistent re-entry capability after initial containment, shifting to Tor and VPS infrastructure after IP blocking. Forensic artifacts: /opt/artex/data/task/\<task\>/i\<id\>/ directory structure; compromised files and accounts tagged with i\<id\> markers; SQL injection signatures ARTEX' UNION SELECT 1-- and ARTEX'/\*\*/AND/\*\*/2\>1--; HTTP User-Agent norma/0.4; ARTEX web console self-signed certificate (O=ARTEX, C=CN) displaying Autonomous pentest console branding; GitHub branches named artex-wtest-\*; fake emails @example.invalid. Actor unnamed; attributed by S-RM incident response; confirmed AI involvement from recovered agent task logs and autonomous pivot patterns. Sophos X-Ops (Nov 10, 2026) separately reports activity at a small number of customers consistent with ARTEX or other AI-assisted tooling: webshell and SQL Server command execution, credential theft, lateral movement, rapid command bursts, and structured markers. Windows host markers are temporary files named i\[variant\]\_. such as i12345\_b2.ps1, paths beginning artx especially under C:\\Windows\\Temp, and command markers MARKER123 or ARTX123. Cloud markers are a service principal credential or role added by an application, and application sign-ins with a scripted user agent. Sophos file detections are Troj/Bckdr-SDA for a trojanized ARTEX Docker image (see badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11), Troj/Loader-TU, Linux/Agent-KD, and ATK/Artex-A, ATK/Artex-B, and ATK/Artex-C. Published firewall and endpoint IPS signatures are 2313266, 2313265, 2313264, 2313263, 2313261, 2313259, 2313258, and 2313257. Sophos cites Microsoft's Storm-0940 attribution for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup case only; that name is not applied to the S-RM engagements.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Vulnerable web plugins, misconfigured file upload endpoints

## AI tooling and models
- [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) autonomous offensive agent (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- LLM backends for agent decision-making

## Other tooling
- SQL injection tools
- Credential harvesting utilities
- Card skimmer malware
- Tor network
- VPS infrastructure

## Victims and sectors
Multiple organizations across sectors including e-commerce, MSPs; S-RM IR engagements 2026

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unnamed actors; attributed by S-RM incident response teams; multiple distinct but tactically similar ARTEX deployments

## Scale and metrics
Multiple IR engagements 2026; identity/cloud/code/firewall compromise in under 24 hours; MSP supply-chain pivot in one case; card skimmer deployment in another; persistent re-entry after containment

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### initial-compromise: Exploit vulnerable web plugins [execution]
ARTEX agents exploit vulnerable web plugins and misconfigured file upload endpoints for initial access
Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks

### credential-harvest: Credential harvesting and reuse [execution]
Rapid credential harvesting from compromised hosts; credentials reused for lateral movement
Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks

### rapid-pivot: Identity/cloud/code/firewall pivot in \<24h [execution]
Autonomous agents pivot through identity systems, cloud resources, code repositories, and firewall configurations within single day
Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks

### msp-pivot: MSP supply-chain pivot (one case) [execution]
In one engagement, ARTEX agents pivoted through compromised MSP to reach additional customer environments
Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks

### card-skimmer: Card skimmer deployment (one case) [impact]
In e-commerce compromise, agents deployed card skimmer malware to capture payment data
Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks

### persistent-reentry: Persistent re-entry after containment [execution]
Attackers demonstrated re-entry capability after initial containment, shifting to Tor/VPS infrastructure after IP blocking
Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks

Connections:
- initial-compromise -> credential-harvest
- credential-harvest -> rapid-pivot
- rapid-pivot -> msp-pivot
- rapid-pivot -> card-skimmer
- rapid-pivot -> persistent-reentry

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### initial-compromise: Web exploitation → host activity
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/web.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/web.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/web.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
- Required telemetry: Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs; Server process and file events; Outbound DNS / proxy records
- Investigate: Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Investigate: Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
- Limitation: A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### credential-harvest: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### rapid-pivot: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### msp-pivot: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### card-skimmer: Out-of-band payment verification
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payment.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payment.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payment.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
- Required telemetry: Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit; Meeting and communication metadata; Independent callback / dual-approval records
- Investigate: Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
- Investigate: Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
- Limitation: A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### persistent-reentry: New persistence → recurring execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/persistence.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/persistence.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/persistence.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes; Process creation and file provenance; User / administrative change records
- Investigate: Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.
- Investigate: Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents.
- Limitation: Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0049: Exploit Public-Facing Application — ARTEX agents autonomously conduct full intrusion lifecycle from initial compromise through multi-system pivots without continuous operator guidance
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0049
  Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — AI agents exploit vulnerable web plugins and file upload misconfigurations for initial access
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — Agents autonomously harvest and reuse credentials, pivot through identity systems, cloud resources, code repositories, and firewall configurations in under 24 hours
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks

## Defensive notes
Patch vulnerable web plugins promptly; restrict and validate file uploads; implement strict authentication for admin interfaces; monitor for ARTEX forensic indicators (/opt/artex/ directories, i\<id\> file/account tagging, SQL markers, norma/0.4 UA, self-signed ARTEX certs); block Tor egress where not required; implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement; rotate credentials after suspected compromise; monitor for artex-wtest- GitHub branch patterns; scrutinize @example.invalid emails in logs; deploy EDR to detect autonomous pivot behaviors; implement MSP supply-chain security controls

## Sources
- https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks — S-RM: ARTEX in the Wild - Lessons from Responding to Agentic AI Attacks
- https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/artex-attackers-apply-agentic-ai — ARTEX: Attackers apply agentic AI

## Source notes
S-RM blog (Nov 6, 2026) primary source documenting IR artifacts from multiple ARTEX engagements; all forensic indicators (file paths, SQL markers, UA strings, certificate details, GitHub patterns) verified from S-RM analysis; unnamed adversaries due to ongoing investigations. Sophos X-Ops (Nov 10, 2026) adds Windows host markers and the listed IPS IDs. 2313260 and 2313262 are not in the published signature table, so they are omitted. Sophos describes the customer activity as consistent with ARTEX or other AI-assisted tooling, which is vendor-asserted and does not replace the S-RM task-log evidence. Storm-0940 is Microsoft's attribution for ConnectWise, cited by Sophos, and is not used as the actor for the S-RM cases.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
