# Storm-0940 used ARTEX agentic AI framework in ConnectWise supply-chain attack reaching 2,250+ Microsoft 365 tenants

- ID: storm-0940-used-artex-agentic-ai-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-21
- Researcher: unknown
- Organization: Microsoft Threat Intelligence
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Offensive frameworks: artex
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: not assessed
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/storm-0940-used-artex-agentic-ai-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/storm-0940-used-artex-agentic-ai-2026-10.json
- Browse title: Storm-0940 used ARTEX agentic AI framework in ConnectWise supply-chain attack reaching 2,250+ Microsoft 365 tenants
- Editorial summary: Microsoft attributes the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain compromise to China-aligned Storm-0940, which used the ARTEX multi-agent AI framework to automate recon, spraying and OAuth abuse, reaching…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/storm-0940-used-artex-agentic-ai-2026-10.json

## Technique
Microsoft attributes the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain compromise to China-aligned Storm-0940, which used the ARTEX multi-agent AI framework to automate recon, spraying and OAuth abuse, reaching privileged cloud access in some tenants in under three hours.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
unknown

## AI tooling and models
- [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) (open-source multi-agent LLM pen-test framework, model-agnostic) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) app identities
- Microsoft 365 / Entra ID

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
Defense; Government; Finance; Technology and AI companies; Critical infrastructure; Multiple sectors

## Target geography
- unknown
Target geography was not captured by the Notion feed. Actor attribution is not used as a victim location.

## Attribution
Storm-0940

## Scale and metrics
unknown

## Attack flow
Summary diagram derived from entry fields; a detailed sequence has not been supplied.
### entry: Reported initial access [unknown]
unknown
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/ ; https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-breach-microsoft-365-tenants-via-connectwise-supply-chain-attack/ ; https://cyberscoop.com/microsoft-attributes-connectwise-supply-chain-attack-china-storm-0940/ ; https://www.business-standard.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/chinese-linked-hackers-use-ai-to-compromise-firms-globally-microsoft-126102200170_1.html

### activity: Reported activity [execution]
Microsoft attributes the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain compromise to China-aligned Storm-0940, which used the ARTEX multi-agent AI framework to automate recon, spraying and OAuth abuse, reaching privileged cloud access in some tenants in under three hours.
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/ ; https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-breach-microsoft-365-tenants-via-connectwise-supply-chain-attack/ ; https://cyberscoop.com/microsoft-attributes-connectwise-supply-chain-attack-china-storm-0940/ ; https://www.business-standard.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/chinese-linked-hackers-use-ai-to-compromise-firms-globally-microsoft-126102200170_1.html

### ai: AI involvement [ai]
ARTEX (open-source multi-agent LLM pen-test framework, model-agnostic) · ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) app identities · Microsoft 365 / Entra ID
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/ ; https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-breach-microsoft-365-tenants-via-connectwise-supply-chain-attack/ ; https://cyberscoop.com/microsoft-attributes-connectwise-supply-chain-attack-china-storm-0940/ ; https://www.business-standard.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/chinese-linked-hackers-use-ai-to-compromise-firms-globally-microsoft-126102200170_1.html

Connections:
- entry -> activity
- ai -> activity (AI context)

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### entry: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### activity: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### ai: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
unknown

## Sources
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-breach-microsoft-365-tenants-via-connectwise-supply-chain-attack/
- https://cyberscoop.com/microsoft-attributes-connectwise-supply-chain-attack-china-storm-0940/
- https://www.business-standard.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/chinese-linked-hackers-use-ai-to-compromise-firms-globally-microsoft-126102200170_1.html

## Source notes
Imported from the AI Threat Watch Notion feed (an automated daily scan); not yet editorially reviewed. Feed severity: High. Feed novelty: Evolution.
