# Storm-3358 ARTEX autonomous agent bank intrusions (Southeast Asia)

- ID: storm-3358-artex-bank-intrusions-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-06
- Researcher: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Censys (Silas Cutler)
- Organization: Microsoft, Censys
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Offensive frameworks: artex
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-10
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/storm-3358-artex-bank-intrusions-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/storm-3358-artex-bank-intrusions-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Storm-3358 ARTEX autonomous agent bank intrusions (Southeast Asia)
- Editorial summary: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Nov 6, 2026) reports Storm-3358, Cambodia-based financially motivated actor, targeting Southeast Asian financial sector using ARTEX autonomous offensive agents. Censys…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/storm-3358-artex-bank-intrusions-2026-11.json

## Technique
Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Nov 6, 2026) reports Storm-3358, Cambodia-based financially motivated actor, targeting Southeast Asian financial sector using ARTEX autonomous offensive agents. Censys fingerprinting (Silas Cutler) identifies exposed ARTEX control panels via console title starting ARTEX + Next.js signature, port 8787, open directories leaking attack kit configurations. Oct 2026 activity: ARTEX agents autonomously scanned targets, exploited anonymous file upload vulnerabilities and SSRF, used netcat/curl to pull WISP RAT, vshell, and AdaptixC2 C2 frameworks; deployed web shells; conducted brute-force and password-spraying attacks; performed lateral movement. C2 infrastructure: WISP C2 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52. ARTEX control panel servers: 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35, 178.16.54.129 (Microsoft post hunting query lists 178.15.54.129 - note IP discrepancy). Storm-3358 attributed by Microsoft; vendor-asserted AI involvement. Tools: AdaptixC2 (github.com/Adaptix-Framework/AdaptixC2), ARTEX fork (github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX; original Autumn-27/ARTEX repository down).

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Anonymous file upload exploitation, SSRF vulnerabilities

## AI tooling and models
- [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) autonomous offensive agent (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai) and other LLM backends

## Other tooling
- WISP RAT
- vshell
- AdaptixC2 C2 framework (https://github.com/Adaptix-Framework/AdaptixC2)
- netcat
- curl
- Web shells

## Victims and sectors
Southeast Asian financial institutions; Oct 2026 active campaign

## Target geography
- Asia

## Attribution
Storm-3358, Cambodia-based, financially motivated; attributed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence

## Scale and metrics
Active Oct 2026; multiple financial institutions compromised; Censys identified exposed ARTEX panels on port 8787 with leaked attack kit configurations

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### recon-scan: ARTEX autonomous reconnaissance [ai]
ARTEX agents autonomously scan Southeast Asian financial institution networks for vulnerabilities
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/

### exploit-upload: Exploit anonymous file upload and SSRF [execution]
Agents exploit anonymous file upload vulnerabilities and SSRF to gain initial foothold
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/

### deploy-rats: Deploy WISP, vshell, AdaptixC2 [execution]
netcat/curl used to pull WISP RAT, vshell, AdaptixC2 C2 frameworks to compromised hosts
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/

### web-shells: Deploy web shells [execution]
Web shells deployed for persistent access to compromised web servers
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/

### lateral-movement: Brute-force, spraying, lateral movement [execution]
Autonomous password brute-force and spraying attacks; lateral movement across financial institution networks
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/

### maintain-access: Maintain C2 and data access [impact]
WISP C2 199.19.95.66-68, AdaptixC2 85.11.167.52 maintain persistent access for financial data theft
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/

Connections:
- recon-scan -> exploit-upload
- exploit-upload -> deploy-rats
- deploy-rats -> web-shells
- web-shells -> lateral-movement
- lateral-movement -> maintain-access

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### recon-scan: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exploit-upload: Web exploitation → host activity
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/web.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/web.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/web.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
- Required telemetry: Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs; Server process and file events; Outbound DNS / proxy records
- Investigate: Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Investigate: Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
- Limitation: A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### deploy-rats: Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payload.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payload.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payload.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific process and file provenance; Signer / hash and software inventory; Per-process network and remote-session records
- Investigate: Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Investigate: Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
- Limitation: A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### web-shells: Linux web worker → shell / interpreter
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/linux-webshell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/linux-webshell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/linux-webshell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.
- Required telemetry: Linux process creation (EDR / auditd normalized to process fields); PHP / web access logs; File changes to web roots and PHP configuration
- Investigate: Trace the worker's children and correlate them with inbound requests.
- Investigate: Review auto\_prepend\_file, .bashrc changes, /dev/shm execution, and outbound tunnels where the report describes them.
- Limitation: Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### lateral-movement: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### maintain-access: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0049: Exploit Public-Facing Application — Storm-3358 deploys ARTEX autonomous AI agents to conduct reconnaissance, vulnerability exploitation, and lateral movement without continuous operator input
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0049
  Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — ARTEX agents autonomously exploit file upload and SSRF vulnerabilities to gain initial access to financial institution networks
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/
- AML.T0016: Obtain Capabilities — Adversaries use AI agents to automate post-exploitation activities including lateral movement and C2 deployment
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016
  Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/

## Defensive notes
Implement file upload restrictions and validation; patch SSRF vulnerabilities; monitor for ARTEX console fingerprints (title ARTEX + Next.js, port 8787); block known C2 IPs (199.19.95.66-68, 85.11.167.52, 91.92.240.238, 85.11.168.45, 31.77.229.35); detect anomalous autonomous scanning patterns; monitor netcat/curl downloading RATs; implement web application firewalls; enable brute-force protection; segment networks to limit lateral movement

## Sources
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/ — Microsoft Threat Intelligence: ARTEX Abuse Expands as Cybercriminals Target Financial Sector
- https://censys.com/blog/artex-agentic-asbestos/ — Censys: ARTEX - Agentic Asbestos

## Source notes
Microsoft Threat Intelligence blog (Nov 6, 2026) primary source; Censys Agentic Asbestos analysis (Silas Cutler) provides ARTEX fingerprinting methodology; all IOCs verified from sources; note IP discrepancy between main text (178.16.54.129) and hunting query (178.15.54.129) in Microsoft post

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [
    "199.19.95.66",
    "199.19.95.67",
    "199.19.95.68",
    "85.11.167.52",
    "91.92.240.238",
    "85.11.168.45",
    "31.77.229.35",
    "178.16.54.129",
    "178.15.54.129"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
