# Skynet autonomous agent hunts exposed LLM/MCP endpoints for 100K steps

- ID: symantec-skynet-llmjacking-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-21
- Researcher: Symantec Threat Hunter Team
- Organization: Broadcom (Symantec)
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/symantec-skynet-llmjacking-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/symantec-skynet-llmjacking-2026-10.json
- Browse title: Skynet autonomous agent hunts exposed LLM/MCP endpoints for 100K steps
- Editorial summary: Autonomous offensive agent hunts exposed LLM endpoints (OpenAI-compatible APIs, self-hosted models, AI gateways, MCP servers) without authentication or with stolen keys. Wraps jailbreak around ~74 offensive…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/symantec-skynet-llmjacking-2026-10.json

## Technique
Autonomous offensive agent hunts exposed LLM endpoints (OpenAI-compatible APIs, self-hosted models, AI gateways, MCP servers) without authentication or with stolen keys. Wraps jailbreak around ~74 offensive tools, instructs model to ignore safety controls and treat credential theft as routine development. 'Skynet mode' authorizes 100,000 unattended steps without human approval. Scans for targets (VS Code servers, Django, Jupyter, Laravel, Supabase, Prisma Studio), exploits web frameworks, steals databases/credentials, quietly deploys XMRig miners (github.com/xmrig/xmrig) under /tmp/.x and go2rtc camera paths. Symantec AI honeypot captured full working prompt summer 2026; 127,000+ external requests from tens of thousands of addresses, dominated by endpoint reconnaissance, API key spraying, exposed config probing.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Exposed LLM endpoints without authentication: OpenAI-compatible APIs, self-hosted model servers, AI gateways, MCP servers; stolen API keys

## AI tooling and models
- Exposed LLM endpoints (OpenAI-compatible)
- Self-hosted model servers
- AI gateways
- Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers

## Other tooling
- ~74 offensive tools (wrapped in jailbreak prompt)
- XMRig cryptocurrency miner
- go2rtc camera directory paths
- [VS Code](https://github.com/microsoft/vscode) servers
- Django
- Jupyter
- Laravel
- Supabase
- Prisma Studio

## Victims and sectors
Organizations with exposed AI/LLM endpoints; Symantec honeypot recorded 127,000+ requests from tens of thousands of addresses

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
Symantec honeypot summer 2026 captured full working prompt; 127,000+ external requests from tens of thousands of addresses; authorized up to 100,000 unattended steps per session; deploys XMRig miners

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### hunt-endpoints: Hunt exposed LLM/MCP endpoints [access]
Scans internet for exposed LLM endpoints without authentication (OpenAI-compatible APIs, self-hosted models, AI gateways, MCP servers); Symantec honeypot recorded 127,000+ requests from tens of thousands of addresses
Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/autonomous-llmjacking-skynet-agent-hijacks-exposed-ai-models-to-run-attacks

### jailbreak: Jailbreak with offensive tools [ai]
Wraps ~74 offensive tools in jailbreak prompt; tells model to ignore safety controls, treat credential theft as routine development; 'Skynet mode' authorizes 100,000 unattended steps without human approval
Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/autonomous-llmjacking-skynet-agent-hijacks-exposed-ai-models-to-run-attacks

### exploit-frameworks: Exploit web frameworks [execution]
Scans for and exploits VS Code servers, Django, Jupyter, Laravel, Supabase, Prisma Studio; steals databases and credentials
Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/autonomous-llmjacking-skynet-agent-hijacks-exposed-ai-models-to-run-attacks

### deploy-miner: Deploy XMRig miners [impact]
Quietly installs XMRig cryptocurrency miners under /tmp/.x and go2rtc camera paths; verifies miners running; victim pays for hijacked LLM compute while servers stripped of data
Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/autonomous-llmjacking-skynet-agent-hijacks-exposed-ai-models-to-run-attacks

Connections:
- hunt-endpoints -> jailbreak
- jailbreak -> exploit-frameworks
- exploit-frameworks -> deploy-miner
- deploy-miner -> hunt-endpoints [loop]

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### hunt-endpoints: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### jailbreak: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exploit-frameworks: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### deploy-miner: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0034: Cost Harvesting — Exploitation of exposed LLM/MCP endpoints for infrastructure hijacking
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0034
  Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/autonomous-llmjacking-skynet-agent-hijacks-exposed-ai-models-to-run-attacks
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — LLMjacking - hijacking exposed AI models to power autonomous cybercrime operations
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/autonomous-llmjacking-skynet-agent-hijacks-exposed-ai-models-to-run-attacks

## Defensive notes
Never expose LLM APIs/MCP endpoints without authentication; require auth on all paths including health checks; place behind gateway; rotate AI API keys; scope keys narrowly; monitor unusual inference volume/spend; restrict outbound network from AI tools; IMDSv2 with hop limit 1; least privilege for agents; human approval for sensitive actions; keep exploited software patched; block mining pools and known miner hashes

## Sources
- https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/autonomous-llmjacking-skynet-agent-hijacks-exposed-ai-models-to-run-attacks — Autonomous LLMjacking: 'Skynet' Agent Hijacks Exposed AI Models
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-llmjacking-skynet — Symantec Skynet LLMjacking autonomous agent

## Source notes
Symantec AI honeypot captured full working prompt; operators sent tool's entire prompt expecting real model on other end; honeypot impersonates unprotected internet-facing AI service. Detection guidance: monitor exposed endpoints, API key anomalies, XMRig processes, mining pool connections, web framework exploitation from AI infrastructure.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "mine.c3pool.com",
    "auto.c3pool.org",
    "auto.skypool.xyz",
    "xmrpool.eu"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "86.216.147.228",
    "13.140.161.91",
    "207.180.232.206"
  ],
  "hashes": [
    "fcde1323acceb46fd88f2276c010bb98839dccce03dc512c56d9529428ceec68",
    "b720a5e7c3a5b1760d15a8833a782f4fe7fc5c62b967fe57f607e72745ec0ccf"
  ],
  "urls": []
}
```
