# VECERT Operation Ghost Campus - FOFA account farm harvesting OpenAI and DeepSeek keys

- ID: vecert-operation-ghost-campus-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-08
- Researcher: VECERT Threat Research and Intelligence
- Organization: VECERT
- AI role: ai_credential_theft (AI credential theft)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-12
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/vecert-operation-ghost-campus-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/vecert-operation-ghost-campus-2026-11.json
- Browse title: VECERT Operation Ghost Campus - FOFA account farm harvesting OpenAI and DeepSeek keys
- Editorial summary: VECERT (case VECERT-TI-2026-1107-B, Medium, about Nov 8, 2026) describes Operation Ghost Campus. The operator ran a catch-all mail domain, melocc.cc, with mail, api, pop, imap, and smtp subdomains. A script…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/vecert-operation-ghost-campus-2026-11.json

## Evidence qualification
Private-research write-up with no government or vendor corroboration. The key-theft and validation steps are shown in the author's screenshots. The autonomous-agent label is not backed by agent internals.

## Technique
VECERT (case VECERT-TI-2026-1107-B, Medium, about Nov 8, 2026) describes Operation Ghost Campus. The operator ran a catch-all mail domain, melocc.cc, with mail, api, pop, imap, and smtp subdomains. A script registered FOFA accounts, read the confirmation mail over POP or IMAP, and activated them within seconds. VECERT says it recovered fofa\_accounts.csv with at least 1,438 accounts (examples fofaa4x3y145@melocc.cc and fofa6o4vg697@melocc.cc) plus passwords and JWTs. Rotating those free-tier tokens is described as producing tens of thousands of FOFA queries a day for exposed .env files, Docker configs, and Git repos. Hits are regex-parsed for OpenAI sk-proj keys and DeepSeek keys matching sk- followed by 32 hex characters. OpenAI keys are checked against api.openai.com and sorted into valid\_no\_balance (HTTP 429) or revoked (HTTP 401). DeepSeek balances are queried; the post names keys pulled from labibiyat.com and nyisu.com. The same control server, 134.175.71.194 (Tencent Cloud, Guangzhou), is described as hosting a GoTTY web terminal titled Pi – AI Coding Assistant (https://github.com/yudai/gotty), heartbeat bots that fake student reading time, and a scraper of 5,132 student records from the Fengxian campus of the Shanghai Publishing and Printing College, including campus-card balances and a QR payment-code module. VECERT says the operator is possibly in China and likely tied to Shanghai's academic community. Link keyhunter-llm-key-theft-2026-11, which also uses FOFA to hunt LLM keys.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Mass FOFA account registration through a private catch-all mail domain, then searches for exposed .env files and git repos

## AI tooling and models
- GoTTY web terminal (https://github.com/yudai/gotty), described as Pi – AI Coding Assistant
- Stolen OpenAI and [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai) API keys

## Other tooling
- FOFA account farm on melocc.cc
- fofa\_accounts.csv

## Victims and sectors
Holders of exposed OpenAI and DeepSeek keys; VECERT also describes 5,132 student records at a Shanghai college campus

## Target geography
- China
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unnamed. VECERT (VECERT-TI-2026-1107-B) says the operator is possibly in China and likely tied to Shanghai's academic community. No government or vendor attribution.

## Scale and metrics
At least 1,438 FOFA accounts. 5,132 student records described. Control server 134.175.71.194.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### farm-accounts: Farm FOFA accounts [access]
A script registers FOFA accounts on melocc.cc, reads the confirmation mail, and stores passwords and JWTs in fofa\_accounts.csv.
Evidence: https://medium.com/@vecert/investigation-operation-ghost-campus-artificial-intelligence-agents-academic-fraud-and-global-0ea0ded1e688

### search-env: Search for exposed keys [execution]
Rotated free-tier tokens query FOFA for .env files, Docker configs, and git repos.
Evidence: https://medium.com/@vecert/investigation-operation-ghost-campus-artificial-intelligence-agents-academic-fraud-and-global-0ea0ded1e688

### validate: Validate OpenAI and DeepSeek keys [ai]
Regex hits are checked at api.openai.com or for DeepSeek balance and sorted into valid\_no\_balance or revoked.
Evidence: https://medium.com/@vecert/investigation-operation-ghost-campus-artificial-intelligence-agents-academic-fraud-and-global-0ea0ded1e688

### panel: Keys land in the GoTTY panel [impact]
VECERT says working keys feed the Pi AI Coding Assistant terminal on 134.175.71.194.
Evidence: https://medium.com/@vecert/investigation-operation-ghost-campus-artificial-intelligence-agents-academic-fraud-and-global-0ea0ded1e688

Connections:
- farm-accounts -> search-env
- search-env -> validate
- validate -> panel

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### farm-accounts: Credential / session use outside baseline
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/identity.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/identity.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/identity.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: Identity / service authentication logs; Device, source-IP and session context; Resource access and token issuance audit
- Investigate: Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
- Investigate: Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
- Limitation: Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### search-env: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### validate: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### panel: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0021: Establish Accounts — The operator mass-registers FOFA accounts through its own mail domain
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0021
  Evidence: https://medium.com/@vecert/investigation-operation-ghost-campus-artificial-intelligence-agents-academic-fraud-and-global-0ea0ded1e688
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — FOFA queries are used to find exposed .env files and pull OpenAI and DeepSeek keys
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://medium.com/@vecert/investigation-operation-ghost-campus-artificial-intelligence-agents-academic-fraud-and-global-0ea0ded1e688
- AML.T0034: Cost Harvesting — Validated keys are checked for remaining balance and described as fuel for the operator's own tools
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0034
  Evidence: https://medium.com/@vecert/investigation-operation-ghost-campus-artificial-intelligence-agents-academic-fraud-and-global-0ea0ded1e688

## Defensive notes
Do not leave provider keys in .env files, Docker configs, or public git repos. Monitor api.openai.com for bursts of validation calls that return 429 or 401. Treat melocc.cc and the named control IP as suspicious. Rotate any key that appeared in a public env file.

## Sources
- https://medium.com/@vecert/investigation-operation-ghost-campus-artificial-intelligence-agents-academic-fraud-and-global-0ea0ded1e688 — VECERT: Operation Ghost-Campus
- https://cyberpress.org/hackers-weaponize-ai-agents/ — Cyber Press coverage of Operation Ghost Campus
- https://cybersecuritynews.com/fake-fofa-accounts/ — Cyber Security News: fake FOFA accounts

## Source notes
Control IP 134.175.71.194, melocc.cc, the 1,438-account count, example mailbox local-parts, labibiyat.com, nyisu.com, and the GoTTY panel name are from the VECERT Medium post. The mail-server IP is not listed. The same post gives 156.251.234.242 in the DNS section (mail, api, pop, imap, and smtp subdomains) and 156.233.234.242 in the infrastructure section (Cognetcloud, ASN 401701). Secondary write-ups disagree about which address is the Cognetcloud mail server, and the embedded screenshots were not independently re-resolved. Both addresses are omitted.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "melocc.cc",
    "labibiyat.com",
    "nyisu.com"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "134.175.71.194"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
