{
  "attack_id": "agentcorruption-bedrock-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "agent-input",
      "title": "Untrusted content enters an agent session",
      "hypothesis": "An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Application / agent audit records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier",
        "Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved",
        "Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.",
        "Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.",
      "note": "Collect the exposed agent input and request/session context. A received prompt alone does not establish exploitation.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session\nid: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session\n  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved\n  task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-04\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.input.ingest\n      - agent.session.resume\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-input.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-input.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-input.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentcorruption-how-a-single-prompt-collapsed-the-entire-cloud-security-model"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "metadata",
      "title": "Agent tool access to cloud metadata",
      "hypothesis": "An agent tool reaches a metadata endpoint and the resulting role identity is used outside its intended task or resource scope.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent HTTP / shell tool audit",
        "Workload egress / metadata access instrumentation",
        "Role-session and downstream cloud audit"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Look for metadata destination access from the agent's execution context and determine which credentials were available.",
        "Trace that role session into agent memory, secrets and other resources; review the permissions boundary."
      ],
      "limitation": "Metadata traffic may stay on the host and be absent from ordinary proxy logs. IMDS access can be legitimate; correlate the role and task.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Agent tool access to cloud metadata\nid: c88eca38-d2f7-4e6a-aabf-6a58f5787823\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An agent tool reaches a metadata endpoint and the resulting role\n  identity is used outside its intended task or resource scope.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.metadata.request\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.metadata.request\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.metadata.request\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/metadata.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/metadata.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/metadata.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/metadata.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentcorruption-how-a-single-prompt-collapsed-the-entire-cloud-security-model"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "cloud",
      "title": "Unexpected cloud / inference identity use",
      "hypothesis": "A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Cloud control-plane and identity audit",
        "AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled",
        "Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.",
        "Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized."
      ],
      "limitation": "Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use\nid: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains\n  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - cloud.credential.use\n      - cloud.role.change\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/cloud.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/cloud.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/cloud.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentcorruption-how-a-single-prompt-collapsed-the-entire-cloud-security-model"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "cloud",
      "title": "Unexpected cloud / inference identity use",
      "hypothesis": "A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Cloud control-plane and identity audit",
        "AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled",
        "Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.",
        "Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized."
      ],
      "limitation": "Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use\nid: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains\n  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - cloud.credential.use\n      - cloud.role.change\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/cloud.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/cloud.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/cloud.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentcorruption-how-a-single-prompt-collapsed-the-entire-cloud-security-model"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Public agent receives a prompt",
        "description": "An exposed AWS AgentCore agent accepts attacker input.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentcorruption-how-a-single-prompt-collapsed-the-entire-cloud-security-model"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Agent tools reach metadata",
        "description": "Prompt injection abuses HTTP or shell tools to query the instance metadata service.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentcorruption-how-a-single-prompt-collapsed-the-entire-cloud-security-model"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Execution credentials are exposed",
        "description": "The response discloses the agent execution-role credentials.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentcorruption-how-a-single-prompt-collapsed-the-entire-cloud-security-model"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Broader agent access",
        "description": "The role can reach other agents, memories and connected services; persistent memory hijacks are described.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.zenity.io/post/agentcorruption-how-a-single-prompt-collapsed-the-entire-cloud-security-model"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}