{
  "attack_id": "apiiro-claude-code-settings-local-secrets-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "approve",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://apiiro.com/blog/coding-agents-leaking-secrets-github-dont-ask-again"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "save",
      "profile": "repository",
      "title": "Private access → public repository artifact",
      "hypothesis": "A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Git-provider organization / enterprise audit",
        "Repository and token permission inventory",
        "Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.",
        "Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications."
      ],
      "limitation": "Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact\nid: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,\n  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - repository.public.write\n      - repository.visibility.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/repository.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/repository.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/repository.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/repository.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://apiiro.com/blog/coding-agents-leaking-secrets-github-dont-ask-again"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "commit",
      "profile": "repository",
      "title": "Private access → public repository artifact",
      "hypothesis": "A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Git-provider organization / enterprise audit",
        "Repository and token permission inventory",
        "Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.",
        "Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications."
      ],
      "limitation": "Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact\nid: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,\n  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - repository.public.write\n      - repository.visibility.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/repository.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/repository.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/repository.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/repository.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://apiiro.com/blog/coding-agents-leaking-secrets-github-dont-ask-again"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "public",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://apiiro.com/blog/coding-agents-leaking-secrets-github-dont-ask-again",
        "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/33150"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "approve",
        "title": "Yes, and don't ask again",
        "description": "Claude Code proposes a shell command that already contains a secret from config or .env. The user approves that exact command for good.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://apiiro.com/blog/coding-agents-leaking-secrets-github-dont-ask-again"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "save",
        "title": "The command is saved in settings.local.json",
        "description": "The allow rule can be the full command line. Global git excludes hide the file on that one computer and are not written into the repository .gitignore.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://apiiro.com/blog/coding-agents-leaking-secrets-github-dont-ask-again"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "commit",
        "title": "The file is committed",
        "description": "In 539 of 1,105 traced repositories with a secret, a commit co-authored by Claude changed the file. History and forks keep copies after deletion.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://apiiro.com/blog/coding-agents-leaking-secrets-github-dont-ask-again"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "public",
        "title": "1,122 public copies hold a secret",
        "description": "Apiiro counted 1,379 secrets in current copies and 2,539 once history, shared settings, and transcripts are included. A July 2026 ISC diary also shows scans for this path on web servers.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://apiiro.com/blog/coding-agents-leaking-secrets-github-dont-ask-again",
          "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/33150"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "approve",
        "target": "save"
      },
      {
        "source": "save",
        "target": "commit"
      },
      {
        "source": "commit",
        "target": "public"
      }
    ]
  }
}