{
  "attack_id": "barracuda-artex-cloud-key-intrusion-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "vendor-key",
      "profile": "identity",
      "title": "Credential / session use outside baseline",
      "hypothesis": "Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Identity / service authentication logs",
        "Device, source-IP and session context",
        "Resource access and token issuance audit"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.",
        "Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise."
      ],
      "limitation": "Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.",
      "note": "The first calls used a still-valid cloud key issued to a vendor. The GitHub config file is where the key was found, not a commit on a Barracuda repository.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline\nid: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a\n  successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - identity.login\n      - identity.token.use\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"identity.login\", \"identity.token.use\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"identity.login\", \"identity.token.use\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/identity.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/identity.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/identity.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/identity.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion",
        "https://trust.barracuda.com/security/barracuda-xdr-integration-credentials"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "secret-chain",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "note": "Secret-store reads, infrastructure-as-code state, and Kubernetes secret lists. Instance-metadata credential requests are a separate metadata hunt.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "artex-match",
      "profile": "agent-tools",
      "title": "Unexpected agent tool use",
      "hypothesis": "Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination",
        "Tool-definition and approval changes",
        "Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.",
        "Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector."
      ],
      "limitation": "Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.",
      "note": "Barracuda did not recover the tool. Resource names and probe order are a hunt clue, not a tool-call audit record.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use\nid: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file\n  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.tool.call\n      - agent.tool.definition.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-tools.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-tools.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-tools.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "ci-and-mount",
      "profile": "privileged-container",
      "title": "Privileged container or pod with host access",
      "hypothesis": "A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.",
      "visibility": "Container orchestration and runtime audit logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Kubernetes API audit or Docker daemon events",
        "Container runtime process and mount telemetry",
        "Cloud control-plane identity and admission-controller decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the creating principal, image digest, namespace, security context, host mounts, and admission result.",
        "Compare with approved workloads, then inspect node-level file access, processes, and credentials."
      ],
      "limitation": "Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.",
      "note": "The read-only host filesystem mount is the pod event. A short-lived branch that prints secrets into a build log is a CI event this pod query does not cover.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Privileged Kubernetes Pod or Host Mount\nid: 5a3e19f4-3f1f-46e9-974f-4985b4692d30\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects pod creation requests containing privileged containers or hostPath volumes.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Approved infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads\nlevel: high\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: kubernetes\n  service: audit\ndetection:\n  selection_create:\n    verb: create\n    objectRef.resource: pods\n  selection_privileged:\n    requestObject.spec.containers.securityContext.privileged: true\n  selection_hostpath:\n    requestObject.spec.volumes.hostPath.path|startswith: /\n  condition: selection_create and 1 of selection_privileged, selection_hostpath\n",
        "kql": "AzureDiagnostics\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where Category in (\"kube-audit\", \"kube-audit-admin\")\n| where log_s has '\"verb\":\"create\"' and log_s has '\"resource\":\"pods\"'\n| where log_s has '\"privileged\":true' or log_s has '\"hostPath\"'\n| project TimeGenerated, Resource, ResourceGroup, SubscriptionId, log_s\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"kube:apiserver-audit\" verb=create objectRef.resource=pods\n(requestObject.spec.containers{}.securityContext.privileged=true\n  OR requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path=\"*\")\n| table _time user.username sourceIPs{} objectRef.namespace objectRef.name\n    requestObject.spec.containers{}.image requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Kubernetes audit candidates for privileged pods or hostPath volumes. The KQL and SPL examples need the respective Kubernetes audit sources and local field extraction.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/privileged-container.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/privileged-container.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/privileged-container.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/privileged-container.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Privileged Container Deployed",
          "id": "c5cd1b20-36bb-488d-8c05-486be3d0cb97",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml"
        },
        {
          "name": "Linux Suspicious Privileged Container Execution",
          "id": "29b888db-d6e7-4286-bbf5-39d9f260444c",
          "source": "Splunk Security Content",
          "url": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_suspicious_privileged_container_execution.yml"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "vendor-key",
        "title": "Unretired vendor key",
        "description": "A cloud access key given to an AI vendor was never retired. After the vendor's October compromise, the key was in a configuration file in the vendor's GitHub repository.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion",
          "https://trust.barracuda.com/security/barracuda-xdr-integration-credentials"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "secret-chain",
        "title": "Secrets open the next system",
        "description": "From Nov 1 04:33 UTC the key reads secret stores, infrastructure-as-code state, instance metadata, and Kubernetes service accounts, then reaches analytics, a source-code token, and clusters.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "artex-match",
        "title": "ARTEX fingerprints, tool not recovered",
        "description": "Resources named with i plus digits, probe names, the order of operations, and wallet hunting match ARTEX. Barracuda did not recover the tool and does not name the operator.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "ci-and-mount",
        "title": "CI logs and a host mount",
        "description": "On Nov 2, short-lived branches make a build workflow print encoded secrets into job logs. A read-only host filesystem mount harvests node credentials. A new cloud administrator identity is blocked.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/11/11/anatomy-of-a-machine-speed-intrusion"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "vendor-key",
        "target": "secret-chain"
      },
      {
        "source": "secret-chain",
        "target": "artex-match"
      },
      {
        "source": "secret-chain",
        "target": "ci-and-mount"
      }
    ]
  }
}