{
  "attack_id": "bitdefender-3am-ransomware-ai-2026",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "initial-access",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "The source does not disclose the initial-access procedure, so no runtime query is displayed for this stage.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "ai-commands",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "note": "Apply the process hunt to the generated Windows commands and their parent process; syntax errors alone are not malicious.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "iteration",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "persistence",
      "profile": "persistence",
      "title": "New persistence → recurring execution",
      "hypothesis": "A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes",
        "Process creation and file provenance",
        "User / administrative change records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.",
        "Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents."
      ],
      "limitation": "Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - New persistence → recurring execution\nid: 6154ff56-2978-45fa-aecd-86d91557f32e\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is\n  changed and later launches the same unexpected program.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - persistence.create\n      - persistence.modify\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"persistence.create\", \"persistence.modify\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"persistence.create\", \"persistence.modify\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/persistence.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/persistence.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/persistence.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/persistence.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "ransomware",
      "profile": "impact",
      "title": "Collection / encryption behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-operation rates and process attribution",
        "Ransomware / DLP behavior alerts",
        "Canary files and recovery / backup audit"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Correlate file bursts, extension changes and outbound transfer to the same process and identity.",
        "Validate against bulk backup / archiving activity and preserve the research-only qualification of a PoC."
      ],
      "limitation": "A file-write burst is not proof of ransomware; in-process interpreters may not spawn a separate executable.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Collection / encryption behavior\nid: 0b1098da-0957-4f77-a2a4-e89a5a2e1a36\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is\n  followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - file.bulk.modify\n      - data.export\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"file.bulk.modify\", \"data.export\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"file.bulk.modify\", \"data.export\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/impact.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/impact.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/impact.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/impact.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "initial-access",
        "title": "Initial access to UK schools",
        "description": "Initial access vector not disclosed in source",
        "kind": "unknown",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "ai-commands",
        "title": "AI loop generates attack commands",
        "description": "Model generates commands with observable errors including Bash escapes in Windows commands and broken for /f syntax",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "iteration",
        "title": "Automated retry with numbered scripts",
        "description": "Numbered scripts av_remove2, av_remove3 show iteration; probe files da_proof.txt, psexec-ok validate steps",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "persistence",
        "title": "Backdoor accounts and registry staging",
        "description": "Backdoor admins library and svc_bkpmon created; staging in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\FIN001",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "ransomware",
        "title": "3AM ransomware deployed",
        "description": "3AM ransomware payload deployed after preparation",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/3am-ransomware-hybrid-ai-attack"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "initial-access",
        "target": "ai-commands"
      },
      {
        "source": "ai-commands",
        "target": "iteration"
      },
      {
        "source": "iteration",
        "target": "persistence"
      },
      {
        "source": "persistence",
        "target": "ransomware"
      }
    ]
  }
}