{
  "attack_id": "carbonato-botnet-hermes-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "scan-docker",
      "profile": "web",
      "title": "Web exploitation → host activity",
      "hypothesis": "Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs",
        "Server process and file events",
        "Outbound DNS / proxy records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.",
        "Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation."
      ],
      "limitation": "A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.",
      "note": "Use internet-facing Docker/API request logs for the scan, then require daemon or host activity before treating it as exploitation.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity\nid: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected\n  server process, file, or outbound connection.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - web.exploit_candidate\n      - web.upload\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/web.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/web.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/web.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/web.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "deploy-container",
      "profile": "privileged-container",
      "title": "Privileged container or pod with host access",
      "hypothesis": "A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.",
      "visibility": "Container orchestration and runtime audit logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Kubernetes API audit or Docker daemon events",
        "Container runtime process and mount telemetry",
        "Cloud control-plane identity and admission-controller decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the creating principal, image digest, namespace, security context, host mounts, and admission result.",
        "Compare with approved workloads, then inspect node-level file access, processes, and credentials."
      ],
      "limitation": "Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Privileged Kubernetes Pod or Host Mount\nid: 5a3e19f4-3f1f-46e9-974f-4985b4692d30\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects pod creation requests containing privileged containers or hostPath volumes.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Approved infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads\nlevel: high\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: kubernetes\n  service: audit\ndetection:\n  selection_create:\n    verb: create\n    objectRef.resource: pods\n  selection_privileged:\n    requestObject.spec.containers.securityContext.privileged: true\n  selection_hostpath:\n    requestObject.spec.volumes.hostPath.path|startswith: /\n  condition: selection_create and 1 of selection_privileged, selection_hostpath\n",
        "kql": "AzureDiagnostics\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where Category in (\"kube-audit\", \"kube-audit-admin\")\n| where log_s has '\"verb\":\"create\"' and log_s has '\"resource\":\"pods\"'\n| where log_s has '\"privileged\":true' or log_s has '\"hostPath\"'\n| project TimeGenerated, Resource, ResourceGroup, SubscriptionId, log_s\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"kube:apiserver-audit\" verb=create objectRef.resource=pods\n(requestObject.spec.containers{}.securityContext.privileged=true\n  OR requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path=\"*\")\n| table _time user.username sourceIPs{} objectRef.namespace objectRef.name\n    requestObject.spec.containers{}.image requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Kubernetes audit candidates for privileged pods or hostPath volumes. The KQL and SPL examples need the respective Kubernetes audit sources and local field extraction.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/privileged-container.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/privileged-container.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/privileged-container.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/privileged-container.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Privileged Container Deployed",
          "id": "c5cd1b20-36bb-488d-8c05-486be3d0cb97",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml"
        },
        {
          "name": "Linux Suspicious Privileged Container Execution",
          "id": "29b888db-d6e7-4286-bbf5-39d9f260444c",
          "source": "Splunk Security Content",
          "url": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_suspicious_privileged_container_execution.yml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "hermes-hunt",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "exfiltrate-mine",
      "profile": "exfil",
      "title": "Sensitive data → unusual destination",
      "hypothesis": "Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sensitive resource access / DLP records",
        "Proxy, egress and cloud upload events",
        "Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.",
        "Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing."
      ],
      "limitation": "An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.",
      "note": "This hunt covers the reported credential transfer. Mining needs separate process/network telemetry and is not implied by the exfiltration query.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination\nid: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public\n  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - data.export\n      - agent.external.send\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/exfil.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/exfil.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/exfil.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "scan-docker",
        "title": "Scan for exposed Docker",
        "description": "Botnet scans internet for exposed Docker daemons on TCP 2375 (unencrypted) and 2376 (TLS); brute-forces weak credentials or exploits no-auth configs",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "deploy-container",
        "title": "Deploy malicious container",
        "description": "Creates privileged Docker container with host filesystem mounts; runs Ubuntu image with Hermes agent, scanning tools, and XMRig miner; container gains host-level access",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "hermes-hunt",
        "title": "Autonomous credential hunting",
        "description": "Hermes agent autonomously navigates filesystem, reads env vars, parses .env files, queries Docker secrets, extracts credentials from running containers; adapts search patterns based on discovered infrastructure; targets AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, Anthropic, HuggingFace keys",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "exfiltrate-mine",
        "title": "Exfiltrate and mine",
        "description": "Hermes POSTs credentials to hxxps://carbonato-collect[.]net/api/ingest; XMRig mines Monero using host CPU; agent maintains persistence and continues hunting indefinitely; median 18-day dwell time",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "scan-docker",
        "target": "deploy-container"
      },
      {
        "source": "deploy-container",
        "target": "hermes-hunt"
      },
      {
        "source": "hermes-hunt",
        "target": "exfiltrate-mine"
      }
    ]
  }
}