{
  "attack_id": "checkpoint-yoba-fake-ai-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "seo-poison",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "lure",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "sideload",
      "profile": "windows-dll-sideload",
      "title": "DLL loaded from a user-writable location",
      "hypothesis": "A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.",
      "visibility": "Windows image-load telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows image-load events such as Sysmon Event 7 or EDR equivalents",
        "File provenance, signature, and process ancestry",
        "Subsequent network and payload activity"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Verify the executable and DLL signatures, original archive or installer, hashes, and load path.",
        "Compare the DLL name/location with the vendor's expected installation and correlate child activity."
      ],
      "limitation": "Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - DLL Load From User-Writable Location\nid: a5e6a4a2-be30-4a0a-8559-5f9a2623403e\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects DLL image loads from common user-writable Windows paths.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nfalsepositives:\n  - Portable, development, and self-updating applications\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: image_load\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection_path:\n    ImageLoaded|contains:\n      - \\Downloads\\\n      - \\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\n      - \\Windows\\Temp\\\n      - \\Users\\Public\\\n  selection_dll:\n    ImageLoaded|endswith: .dll\n  condition: all of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceImageLoadEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName endswith \".dll\"\n| where FolderPath has_any (\"\\\\Downloads\\\\\", \"\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\\", \"\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\\", \"\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FolderPath, FileName, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=7\nImageLoaded=\"*.dll\"\n(ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Downloads\\\\*\" OR ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\*\"\n  OR ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" OR ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\*\")\n| table _time host User Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus Hashes ProcessGuid\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "DLL image loads from common user-writable paths. Confirm the initiating executable is trusted and the loaded module is unexpected before treating the event as sideloading.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-dll-sideload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Microsoft Defender Blocked from Loading Unsigned DLL",
          "id": "0b0ea3cc-99c8-4730-9c53-45deee2a4c86",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security_mitigations/win_security_mitigations_defender_load_unsigned_dll.yml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "dropper",
      "profile": "windows-install",
      "title": "Unapproved Windows program execution",
      "hypothesis": "A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation",
        "Download provenance and file hashes",
        "File certificate information and application-control audit / block events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.",
        "Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events."
      ],
      "limitation": "Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution\nid: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable\n  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|contains:\n      - \\Downloads\\\n      - \\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\n      - \\AppData\\Roaming\\\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FolderPath contains \"\\\\Downloads\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\Downloads\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-install.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-install.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-install.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "c2",
      "profile": "payload",
      "title": "Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific process and file provenance",
        "Signer / hash and software inventory",
        "Per-process network and remote-session records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.",
        "Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization."
      ],
      "limitation": "A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.",
      "note": "Correlate the loader process with Telegram, Tor, Catbox, or DoH activity; those services are not malicious by themselves.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior\nid: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes\n  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - process.unapproved.exec\n      - remote.session.start\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/payload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/payload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/payload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/payload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "payload",
      "profile": "payload",
      "title": "Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific process and file provenance",
        "Signer / hash and software inventory",
        "Per-process network and remote-session records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.",
        "Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization."
      ],
      "limitation": "A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior\nid: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes\n  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - process.unapproved.exec\n      - remote.session.start\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/payload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/payload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/payload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/payload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "seo-poison",
        "title": "SEO poisoning and fake repositories",
        "description": "Created fake GitHub repositories impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus; GitHub.io pages with download links; no fake engagement but ranks highly on Google via SEO poisoning",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "lure",
        "title": "User downloads fake installer",
        "description": "Victim searches for AI desktop apps, finds malicious GitHub repositories via Google; downloads ZIP from GitHub releases (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip)",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "sideload",
        "title": "DLL sideloading from signed binaries",
        "description": "ZIP contains legitimate signed OpenAI/Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper DLL; when legitimate signed binary runs, it loads malicious DLL via DLL search order hijacking",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "dropper",
        "title": "YobaDropper deploys YobaLoader",
        "description": "YobaDropper executes, deploys YobaLoader component; anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques; no password protection needed due to low detection",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "c2",
        "title": "C2 via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DoH",
        "description": "YobaLoader contacts attacker infrastructure via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS; no dedicated C2 infrastructure for strong OPSEC; fetches final payload",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "payload",
        "title": "Final payload execution",
        "description": "YobaLoader executes final payload on infected system; details of final payload capabilities not disclosed in source",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/tricks-from-the-past-deployed-via-signed-chatgpt-and-claude-binaries/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "seo-poison",
        "target": "lure"
      },
      {
        "source": "lure",
        "target": "sideload"
      },
      {
        "source": "sideload",
        "target": "dropper"
      },
      {
        "source": "dropper",
        "target": "c2"
      },
      {
        "source": "c2",
        "target": "payload"
      }
    ]
  }
}