{
  "attack_id": "claude-agent-sdk-cve-2026-96620",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "agent-input",
      "title": "Untrusted content enters an agent session",
      "hypothesis": "An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Application / agent audit records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier",
        "Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved",
        "Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.",
        "Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.",
      "note": "Capture resume/session identifiers at the application boundary and correlate with later session handling; do not treat every resume request as malicious.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session\nid: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session\n  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved\n  task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-04\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.input.ingest\n      - agent.session.resume\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-input.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-input.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-input.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4mw-j7qp-8mwm"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "mcp-config",
      "title": "Agent trust / configuration changes",
      "hypothesis": "A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration",
        "Repository audit / pull-request history",
        "Agent startup and tool-invocation logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.",
        "Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant."
      ],
      "limitation": "A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Agent trust / configuration changes\nid: 2dfc8034-d66b-42a7-a699-a76b2ef872ac\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands,\n  automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before\n  new execution.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.config.write\n      - agent.approval.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.config.write\", \"agent.approval.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.config.write\", \"agent.approval.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/mcp-config.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/mcp-config.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/mcp-config.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/mcp-config.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4mw-j7qp-8mwm"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": [],
      "resource": {
        "name": "LOLSkills",
        "url": "https://lolskills.io"
      }
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "mcp-config",
      "title": "Agent trust / configuration changes",
      "hypothesis": "A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration",
        "Repository audit / pull-request history",
        "Agent startup and tool-invocation logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.",
        "Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant."
      ],
      "limitation": "A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Agent trust / configuration changes\nid: 2dfc8034-d66b-42a7-a699-a76b2ef872ac\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands,\n  automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before\n  new execution.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.config.write\n      - agent.approval.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.config.write\", \"agent.approval.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.config.write\", \"agent.approval.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/mcp-config.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/mcp-config.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/mcp-config.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/mcp-config.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4mw-j7qp-8mwm"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "agent-tools",
      "title": "Unexpected agent tool use",
      "hypothesis": "Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination",
        "Tool-definition and approval changes",
        "Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.",
        "Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector."
      ],
      "limitation": "Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use\nid: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file\n  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.tool.call\n      - agent.tool.definition.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-tools.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-tools.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-tools.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4mw-j7qp-8mwm"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Application accepts a session ID",
        "description": "An application passes an untrusted resume identifier into the SDK.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4mw-j7qp-8mwm"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Identifier becomes a CLI flag",
        "description": "A leading hyphen causes the supplied value to be interpreted as command-line options.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4mw-j7qp-8mwm"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "MCP configuration is injected",
        "description": "The argument selects a stdio MCP server configuration.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4mw-j7qp-8mwm"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Server launches outside controls",
        "description": "The MCP startup command executes outside the SDK permission boundary.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4mw-j7qp-8mwm"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}