{
  "attack_id": "datadog-bedrock-key-testing-2025",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "unassessed",
      "title": "Stage hunt not mapped yet",
      "hypothesis": "A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.",
      "visibility": "Not assessed",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt."
      ],
      "limitation": "An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.",
      "note": "This stage is included for completeness; a query needs a reviewed link between the described behavior and logs available to the observing party.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No query has been reviewed for this stage yet.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unassessed.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_assessed",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "bedrock",
      "title": "Bedrock discovery / key testing",
      "hypothesis": "A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "AWS CloudTrail management events",
        "Bedrock invocation logging / relevant data events when explicitly enabled",
        "Key inventory and inference usage"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Group ListFoundationModels / GetFoundationModel calls by key, source IP and user agent; compare against normal application identities.",
        "Correlate with invocation logs and cost. Discovery alone does not establish a stolen key or successful inference."
      ],
      "limitation": "The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Bedrock discovery / key testing\nid: 89e0e836-0c7b-44b4-a9d4-3524f68318b2\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed\n  by unexpected model access or usage.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  product: aws\n  service: cloudtrail\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    eventSource: bedrock.amazonaws.com\n    eventName:\n      - ListFoundationModels\n      - GetFoundationModel\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Discovery only; correlate with principal inventory and enabled invocation logs.\nAWSCloudTrail\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventSource == \"bedrock.amazonaws.com\"\n| where EventName in (\"ListFoundationModels\", \"GetFoundationModel\")\n| summarize Requests=count() by UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, EventName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)\n| order by Requests desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudtrail\" eventSource=\"bedrock.amazonaws.com\"\neventName IN (\"ListFoundationModels\", \"GetFoundationModel\")\n| bin _time span=1h\n| stats count by _time userIdentity.arn sourceIPAddress userAgent eventName\n| sort - count"
      },
      "query_scope": "AWS discovery candidates: Sigma CloudTrail, Sentinel AWSCloudTrail, and Splunk aws:cloudtrail. Invocation logging is a separate prerequisite.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/bedrock.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/bedrock.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/bedrock.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/bedrock.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "bedrock",
      "title": "Bedrock discovery / key testing",
      "hypothesis": "A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "AWS CloudTrail management events",
        "Bedrock invocation logging / relevant data events when explicitly enabled",
        "Key inventory and inference usage"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Group ListFoundationModels / GetFoundationModel calls by key, source IP and user agent; compare against normal application identities.",
        "Correlate with invocation logs and cost. Discovery alone does not establish a stolen key or successful inference."
      ],
      "limitation": "The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Bedrock discovery / key testing\nid: 89e0e836-0c7b-44b4-a9d4-3524f68318b2\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed\n  by unexpected model access or usage.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  product: aws\n  service: cloudtrail\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    eventSource: bedrock.amazonaws.com\n    eventName:\n      - ListFoundationModels\n      - GetFoundationModel\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Discovery only; correlate with principal inventory and enabled invocation logs.\nAWSCloudTrail\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventSource == \"bedrock.amazonaws.com\"\n| where EventName in (\"ListFoundationModels\", \"GetFoundationModel\")\n| summarize Requests=count() by UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, EventName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)\n| order by Requests desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudtrail\" eventSource=\"bedrock.amazonaws.com\"\neventName IN (\"ListFoundationModels\", \"GetFoundationModel\")\n| bin _time span=1h\n| stats count by _time userIdentity.arn sourceIPAddress userAgent eventName\n| sort - count"
      },
      "query_scope": "AWS discovery candidates: Sigma CloudTrail, Sentinel AWSCloudTrail, and Splunk aws:cloudtrail. Invocation logging is a separate prerequisite.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/bedrock.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/bedrock.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/bedrock.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/bedrock.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Exposed AWS keys are collected",
        "description": "Attackers obtain credentials exposed outside the legitimate account boundary.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Automated key tests run",
        "description": "Requests check model listing, invocation and conversation permissions.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Bedrock access is identified",
        "description": "Testing distinguishes keys that can use model inference services.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Per-key abuse is not quantified",
        "description": "The supplied entry establishes reconnaissance at scale, rather than a bill or victim count for every key.",
        "kind": "unknown",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}