{
  "attack_id": "eset-guardbreaker-uac-0099-decoy-prompt-2026-08",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "vbs-stage",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "note": "wscript or cscript running the group's VBS. How this script arrived is not described.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/guardbreaker-derailing-ai-assisted-malware-analysis-code-comment/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "decoy-comment",
      "profile": "analysis-review",
      "title": "Independent malware-analysis validation",
      "hypothesis": "Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.",
      "visibility": "Review / research workflow",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sample hashes and static / dynamic analysis results",
        "Model verdicts with prompt provenance",
        "Independent analyst and deterministic scanner verdicts"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Compare model conclusions with independent behavioral evidence and a controlled evaluation set.",
        "Treat sample comments as data; measure disagreement and false negatives without following embedded instructions."
      ],
      "limitation": "This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.",
      "note": "The comment is inert and is meant to make an LLM code scanner refuse. ESET did not test a product. A refusal on a malware sample should start a review.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Independent malware-analysis validation\nid: aa44bd2e-f46c-4884-a6db-e6b370a12c50\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or\n  obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious\n  behavior.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - analysis.verdict\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"analysis.verdict\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"analysis.verdict\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/analysis-review.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/analysis-review.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/analysis-review.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/analysis-review.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/guardbreaker-derailing-ai-assisted-malware-analysis-code-comment/",
        "https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/08/31/russian-hackers-ai-safety-filters-manipulation/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "loader",
      "profile": "payload",
      "title": "Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific process and file provenance",
        "Signer / hash and software inventory",
        "Per-process network and remote-session records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.",
        "Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization."
      ],
      "limitation": "A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.",
      "note": "If the script runs, it still downloads MATCHBOIL. The comment does not change that behavior.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior\nid: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes\n  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - process.unapproved.exec\n      - remote.session.start\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/payload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/payload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/payload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/payload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/guardbreaker-derailing-ai-assisted-malware-analysis-code-comment/",
        "https://cert.gov.ua/article/6318634"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "scanner-gap",
      "profile": "analysis-review",
      "title": "Independent malware-analysis validation",
      "hypothesis": "Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.",
      "visibility": "Review / research workflow",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sample hashes and static / dynamic analysis results",
        "Model verdicts with prompt provenance",
        "Independent analyst and deterministic scanner verdicts"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Compare model conclusions with independent behavioral evidence and a controlled evaluation set.",
        "Treat sample comments as data; measure disagreement and false negatives without following embedded instructions."
      ],
      "limitation": "This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.",
      "note": "DugganUSA's one-day test is independent of ESET and used a synthetic script. One refusal is not a measurement of this incident file.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Independent malware-analysis validation\nid: aa44bd2e-f46c-4884-a6db-e6b370a12c50\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or\n  obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious\n  behavior.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - analysis.verdict\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"analysis.verdict\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"analysis.verdict\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/analysis-review.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/analysis-review.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/analysis-review.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/analysis-review.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/guardbreaker-derailing-ai-assisted-malware-analysis-code-comment/",
        "https://www.dugganusa.com/post/we-tested-the-russian-anti-analysis-trick-on-three-models-two-analyzed-the-sample-and-flagged-the-d"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "vbs-stage",
        "title": "VBScript in an early stage",
        "description": "UAC-0099 uses a VBScript early in an intrusion against a target in Ukraine. The script's runtime job is to download and install MATCHBOIL.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/guardbreaker-derailing-ai-assisted-malware-analysis-code-comment/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "decoy-comment",
        "title": "Inert refusal-bait comment",
        "description": "REM comments request help with a nuclear weapon and then add enrichment text. They do not execute. ESET says they are meant to make an LLM scanner refuse before it reaches the loader logic.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/guardbreaker-derailing-ai-assisted-malware-analysis-code-comment/",
          "https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/08/31/russian-hackers-ai-safety-filters-manipulation/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "loader",
        "title": "MATCHBOIL still installs",
        "description": "If the script is run, it still downloads MATCHBOIL, the group's loader. CERT-UA's July chain uses a double-extension VBS, Notepad++ components, LUNCHPOKE, BURNYBEAR, and MATCHBOIL.V2.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/guardbreaker-derailing-ai-assisted-malware-analysis-code-comment/",
          "https://cert.gov.ua/article/6318634"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "scanner-gap",
        "title": "A refusal is the gap",
        "description": "ESET did not measure the effect. DugganUSA's separate one-day test saw one of three models return an empty refusal and the other two flag the decoy and continue.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/business-security/guardbreaker-derailing-ai-assisted-malware-analysis-code-comment/",
          "https://www.dugganusa.com/post/we-tested-the-russian-anti-analysis-trick-on-three-models-two-analyzed-the-sample-and-flagged-the-d"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "vbs-stage",
        "target": "decoy-comment"
      },
      {
        "source": "vbs-stage",
        "target": "loader"
      },
      {
        "source": "decoy-comment",
        "target": "scanner-gap"
      }
    ]
  }
}