{
  "attack_id": "eye-security-artex-gitops-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "upload",
      "profile": "linux-webshell",
      "title": "Linux web worker → shell / interpreter",
      "hypothesis": "A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation (EDR / auditd normalized to process fields)",
        "PHP / web access logs",
        "File changes to web roots and PHP configuration"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Trace the worker's children and correlate them with inbound requests.",
        "Review auto_prepend_file, .bashrc changes, /dev/shm execution, and outbound tunnels where the report describes them."
      ],
      "limitation": "Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux web worker → shell / interpreter\nid: 068e005a-876e-4ba3-a414-791f9a1c2330\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or\n  reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - /sh\n      - /bash\n      - /python\n      - /python3\n      - /curl\n      - /wget\n    ParentImage|endswith:\n      - /php-fpm\n      - /php-fpm8.2\n      - /apache2\n      - /httpd\n      - /nginx\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"sh\", \"bash\", \"python\", \"python3\", \"curl\", \"wget\")\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"php-fpm\", \"php-fpm8.2\", \"apache2\", \"httpd\", \"nginx\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:process\"\nImage IN (\"*/sh\", \"*/bash\", \"*/python\", \"*/python3\", \"*/curl\", \"*/wget\")\nParentImage IN (\"*/php-fpm\", \"*/php-fpm8.2\", \"*/apache2\", \"*/httpd\", \"*/nginx\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "linux process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-webshell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "secrets",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "tunnel",
      "profile": "unassessed",
      "title": "Stage hunt not mapped yet",
      "hypothesis": "A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.",
      "visibility": "Not assessed",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt."
      ],
      "limitation": "An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No query has been reviewed for this stage yet.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unassessed.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_assessed",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "gitops",
      "profile": "repository",
      "title": "Private access → public repository artifact",
      "hypothesis": "A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Git-provider organization / enterprise audit",
        "Repository and token permission inventory",
        "Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.",
        "Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications."
      ],
      "limitation": "Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact\nid: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,\n  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - repository.public.write\n      - repository.visibility.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/repository.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/repository.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/repository.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/repository.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "escape",
      "profile": "privileged-container",
      "title": "Privileged container or pod with host access",
      "hypothesis": "A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.",
      "visibility": "Container orchestration and runtime audit logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Kubernetes API audit or Docker daemon events",
        "Container runtime process and mount telemetry",
        "Cloud control-plane identity and admission-controller decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the creating principal, image digest, namespace, security context, host mounts, and admission result.",
        "Compare with approved workloads, then inspect node-level file access, processes, and credentials."
      ],
      "limitation": "Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Privileged Kubernetes Pod or Host Mount\nid: 5a3e19f4-3f1f-46e9-974f-4985b4692d30\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects pod creation requests containing privileged containers or hostPath volumes.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Approved infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads\nlevel: high\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: kubernetes\n  service: audit\ndetection:\n  selection_create:\n    verb: create\n    objectRef.resource: pods\n  selection_privileged:\n    requestObject.spec.containers.securityContext.privileged: true\n  selection_hostpath:\n    requestObject.spec.volumes.hostPath.path|startswith: /\n  condition: selection_create and 1 of selection_privileged, selection_hostpath\n",
        "kql": "AzureDiagnostics\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where Category in (\"kube-audit\", \"kube-audit-admin\")\n| where log_s has '\"verb\":\"create\"' and log_s has '\"resource\":\"pods\"'\n| where log_s has '\"privileged\":true' or log_s has '\"hostPath\"'\n| project TimeGenerated, Resource, ResourceGroup, SubscriptionId, log_s\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"kube:apiserver-audit\" verb=create objectRef.resource=pods\n(requestObject.spec.containers{}.securityContext.privileged=true\n  OR requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path=\"*\")\n| table _time user.username sourceIPs{} objectRef.namespace objectRef.name\n    requestObject.spec.containers{}.image requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Kubernetes audit candidates for privileged pods or hostPath volumes. The KQL and SPL examples need the respective Kubernetes audit sources and local field extraction.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/privileged-container.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/privileged-container.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/privileged-container.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/privileged-container.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Privileged Container Deployed",
          "id": "c5cd1b20-36bb-488d-8c05-486be3d0cb97",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml"
        },
        {
          "name": "Linux Suspicious Privileged Container Execution",
          "id": "29b888db-d6e7-4286-bbf5-39d9f260444c",
          "source": "Splunk Security Content",
          "url": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_suspicious_privileged_container_execution.yml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "runner",
      "profile": "repository",
      "title": "Private access → public repository artifact",
      "hypothesis": "A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Git-provider organization / enterprise audit",
        "Repository and token permission inventory",
        "Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.",
        "Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications."
      ],
      "limitation": "Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact\nid: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,\n  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - repository.public.write\n      - repository.visibility.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/repository.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/repository.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/repository.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/repository.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "upload",
        "title": "PHP upload becomes a webshell",
        "description": "Extension-fuzzed uploads such as artx_s5.php and zzartx0000.php accept X-ARTX-KEY and return ### ARTX-AGENT.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "secrets",
        "title": "Pod secrets used within minutes",
        "description": "Environment variables and the secret store yield API keys. A rate limiter is bypassed in about three minutes.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "tunnel",
        "title": "Neo-reGeorg across pods",
        "description": "Neo-reGeorg is modified to keep state in the internal cache so the tunnel survives load-balanced pods.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "gitops",
        "title": "GitOps restores the attacker pod",
        "description": "A deployment-repo change creates artx-pod. Deleting it brings the pod back within a second.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "escape",
        "title": "Privileged pod to the node",
        "description": "A privileged staging pod is used with nsenter to reach the host node.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "runner",
        "title": "Self-hosted runners named sink-*",
        "description": "A CI app key registers self-hosted GitHub runners that are re-registered through the night.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://labs.eye.security/how-we-defended-against-an-ai-driven-attack/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "upload",
        "target": "secrets"
      },
      {
        "source": "secrets",
        "target": "tunnel"
      },
      {
        "source": "secrets",
        "target": "gitops"
      },
      {
        "source": "gitops",
        "target": "escape"
      },
      {
        "source": "secrets",
        "target": "runner"
      }
    ]
  }
}