{
  "attack_id": "gpustack-cve-2026-102895-reverse-shell-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "bypass",
      "profile": "web",
      "title": "Web exploitation → host activity",
      "hypothesis": "Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs",
        "Server process and file events",
        "Outbound DNS / proxy records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.",
        "Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation."
      ],
      "limitation": "A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity\nid: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected\n  server process, file, or outbound connection.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - web.exploit_candidate\n      - web.upload\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/web.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/web.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/web.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/web.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "mint-key",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "backend",
      "profile": "agent-tools",
      "title": "Unexpected agent tool use",
      "hypothesis": "Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination",
        "Tool-definition and approval changes",
        "Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.",
        "Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector."
      ],
      "limitation": "Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use\nid: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file\n  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.tool.call\n      - agent.tool.definition.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-tools.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-tools.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-tools.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "shell",
      "profile": "linux-fileless-execution",
      "title": "Linux fileless or anonymous-file execution",
      "hypothesis": "A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.",
      "visibility": "Linux process and audit telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines",
        "Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available",
        "Network and persistence activity from the resulting process"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.",
        "Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells."
      ],
      "limitation": "Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution\nid: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection_image:\n    Image|contains:\n      - /memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  selection_command:\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  condition: 1 of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where OSPlatform =~ \"Linux\"\n| where FolderPath has_any (\"/memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n    or ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\n  where Processes.process IN (\"*memfd:*\", \"*/proc/self/fd/*\", \"*/proc/thread-self/fd/*\")\n  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process\n     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process\n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\n| sort - lastTime"
      },
      "query_scope": "Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-fileless-execution.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call",
          "id": "42663c0e-572e-4459-bf61-476a81d6aab1",
          "source": "Elastic detection-rules",
          "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "bypass",
        "title": "Appear as loopback",
        "description": "A remote request arrives through a same-host reverse proxy or sends X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1, and GPUStack logs it in as the built-in admin.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "mint-key",
        "title": "Mint an admin API key",
        "description": "The attacker creates an API key with scope star that remains valid from any source IP after the patch.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "backend",
        "title": "Register a malicious inference backend",
        "description": "POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml installs a custom backend on worker hosts.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "shell",
        "title": "Reverse shell on the worker",
        "description": "In the observed v2.1.1 case, the custom backend ran a reverse shell.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "bypass",
        "target": "mint-key"
      },
      {
        "source": "mint-key",
        "target": "backend"
      },
      {
        "source": "backend",
        "target": "shell"
      }
    ]
  }
}