{
  "attack_id": "jfrog-testmetest-worm-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "initial-compromise",
      "profile": "identity",
      "title": "Credential / session use outside baseline",
      "hypothesis": "Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Identity / service authentication logs",
        "Device, source-IP and session context",
        "Resource access and token issuance audit"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.",
        "Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise."
      ],
      "limitation": "Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline\nid: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a\n  successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - identity.login\n      - identity.token.use\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"identity.login\", \"identity.token.use\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"identity.login\", \"identity.token.use\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/identity.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/identity.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/identity.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/identity.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "repository-poison",
      "profile": "repository",
      "title": "Private access → public repository artifact",
      "hypothesis": "A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Git-provider organization / enterprise audit",
        "Repository and token permission inventory",
        "Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.",
        "Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications."
      ],
      "limitation": "Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact\nid: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,\n  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - repository.public.write\n      - repository.visibility.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/repository.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/repository.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/repository.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/repository.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "npm-distribution",
      "profile": "package",
      "title": "Dependency / CI trust boundary",
      "hypothesis": "A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Package-manager and CI job logs",
        "Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs",
        "Runner process trees, secret access and egress"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.",
        "Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise."
      ],
      "limitation": "Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary\nid: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote\n  dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - package.install\n      - ci.workflow.change\n      - package.lifecycle.exec\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"package.install\", \"ci.workflow.change\", \"package.lifecycle.exec\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"package.install\", \"ci.workflow.change\", \"package.lifecycle.exec\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/package.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/package.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/package.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/package.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "evasion",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "The source describes anti-analysis checks inside the payload; no separate stage query is displayed without execution telemetry.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "decrypt-payload",
      "profile": "linux-fileless-execution",
      "title": "Linux fileless or anonymous-file execution",
      "hypothesis": "A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.",
      "visibility": "Linux process and audit telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines",
        "Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available",
        "Network and persistence activity from the resulting process"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.",
        "Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells."
      ],
      "limitation": "Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution\nid: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection_image:\n    Image|contains:\n      - /memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  selection_command:\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  condition: 1 of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where OSPlatform =~ \"Linux\"\n| where FolderPath has_any (\"/memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n    or ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\n  where Processes.process IN (\"*memfd:*\", \"*/proc/self/fd/*\", \"*/proc/thread-self/fd/*\")\n  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process\n     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process\n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\n| sort - lastTime"
      },
      "query_scope": "Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-fileless-execution.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call",
          "id": "42663c0e-572e-4459-bf61-476a81d6aab1",
          "source": "Elastic detection-rules",
          "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "credential-theft",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "c2",
      "profile": "exfil",
      "title": "Sensitive data → unusual destination",
      "hypothesis": "Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sensitive resource access / DLP records",
        "Proxy, egress and cloud upload events",
        "Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.",
        "Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing."
      ],
      "limitation": "An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination\nid: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public\n  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - data.export\n      - agent.external.send\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/exfil.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/exfil.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/exfil.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "initial-compromise",
        "title": "Account/repository hijacking",
        "description": "Hijacked 11 legitimate GitHub owners and 42 repositories via credential theft from earlier infections; exposed npm credentials; linked to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 Shellpanel exploitation",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "repository-poison",
        "title": "AI assistant execution hooks",
        "description": "Armed repositories with .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md files; added 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers; all decode to same CI-publisher payload",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "npm-distribution",
        "title": "Malicious npm packages",
        "description": "Published event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest; binding.gyp command expansion executes index.js during install; later versions use compiled native addon",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "evasion",
        "title": "Scanner evasion via native addon",
        "description": "Compiled addon.node checks CI/container/sandbox env vars (GITHUB_ACTIONS, CI, VERCEL, etc.), /proc/1/cgroup for docker/kubepod, RAM <1.5GB, CPU=1, TracerPid; returns without running if detected; skips automated scanners",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "decrypt-payload",
        "title": "Runtime decryption",
        "description": "Addon reads /proc/self/maps for own folder, opens .napi_cache, XORs every byte with 0x96; drops result in /tmp, chmod 0600, forks detached process with node; decrypts Bun bootstrap and credential stealer",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "credential-theft",
        "title": "Credential collection and propagation",
        "description": "Collects GitHub/npm/cloud credentials; poisons repositories and CI configuration; propagates through package registries; CI-publisher payload designed to run in GitHub Actions with npm tokens/trusted publishing",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "c2",
        "title": "Encrypted data exfiltration",
        "description": "Attacker-owned CementBeetleSteeple repository operates as active encrypted data sink receiving snapshot envelopes",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "initial-compromise",
        "target": "repository-poison"
      },
      {
        "source": "repository-poison",
        "target": "npm-distribution"
      },
      {
        "source": "npm-distribution",
        "target": "evasion"
      },
      {
        "source": "evasion",
        "target": "decrypt-payload"
      },
      {
        "source": "decrypt-payload",
        "target": "credential-theft"
      },
      {
        "source": "credential-theft",
        "target": "c2"
      },
      {
        "source": "credential-theft",
        "target": "repository-poison",
        "loop": true
      },
      {
        "source": "credential-theft",
        "target": "npm-distribution",
        "loop": true
      }
    ]
  }
}