{
  "attack_id": "kaspersky-cyberstrikeai-schools-2026",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "initial-access",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "The source states that SQL Server was compromised but does not establish the access procedure.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "implant",
      "profile": "windows-install",
      "title": "Unapproved Windows program execution",
      "hypothesis": "A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation",
        "Download provenance and file hashes",
        "File certificate information and application-control audit / block events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.",
        "Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events."
      ],
      "limitation": "Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution\nid: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable\n  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|contains:\n      - \\Downloads\\\n      - \\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\n      - \\AppData\\Roaming\\\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FolderPath contains \"\\\\Downloads\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\Downloads\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-install.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-install.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-install.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "llm-decision",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "The LLM decision occurs on attacker-controlled C2 infrastructure and is not independently observable in victim logs.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "privilege-escalation",
      "profile": "windows-credential-dump",
      "title": "Windows credential dumping with system utilities",
      "hypothesis": "A Windows utility accesses or dumps LSASS memory using comsvcs.dll or a similar system-binary technique, followed by credential use or lateral movement.",
      "visibility": "Windows process and process-access telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation with complete command lines",
        "Process-access telemetry for LSASS",
        "Authentication and lateral-movement logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Recover the dump path, process ancestry, account, and initiating remote session or scheduled task.",
        "Correlate the event with new logons, DCSync, ticket creation, and credential use from other hosts."
      ],
      "limitation": "Diagnostic and security tools can dump processes. The command-line hunt covers the common comsvcs pattern and does not detect every in-memory or kernel-assisted credential-dumping method.",
      "note": "This query covers the reported comsvcs.dll LSASS dump. The scheduled task and certutil branches require their own correlation.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Process Dump Via Comsvcs DLL\nid: 1c658574-7d21-4fc8-b272-d6b1508d0aad\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects rundll32 invoking the comsvcs MiniDump export.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized diagnostics or incident-response collection\nlevel: high\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection_image:\n    Image|endswith: \\rundll32.exe\n  selection_command:\n    CommandLine|contains|all:\n      - comsvcs.dll\n      - MiniDump\n  condition: all of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName =~ \"rundll32.exe\"\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"comsvcs.dll\" and ProcessCommandLine contains \"MiniDump\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage=\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" CommandLine=\"*comsvcs.dll*\" CommandLine=\"*MiniDump*\"\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine ProcessGuid\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows rundll32/comsvcs MiniDump command candidates. Correlate with process-access telemetry and confirm the target PID belongs to LSASS.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-credential-dump.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-credential-dump.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-credential-dump.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-credential-dump.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL",
          "id": "646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml"
        },
        {
          "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL",
          "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184",
          "source": "Splunk Security Content",
          "url": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "domain-admin",
      "profile": "windows-dcsync",
      "title": "Active Directory replication from an unexpected account",
      "hypothesis": "A non-domain-controller or non-machine account requests directory replication rights consistent with DCSync, enabling extraction of domain credential material.",
      "visibility": "Domain-controller Security logs where configured",
      "telemetry": [
        "Domain-controller Security Event 4662 with Directory Service Access auditing",
        "Identity and endpoint telemetry for the requesting account and source host",
        "Kerberos ticket and subsequent authentication activity"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Confirm the subject account, source workstation, object, and replication-right GUIDs.",
        "Compare with approved directory synchronization, then rotate exposed credentials and inspect ticket use."
      ],
      "limitation": "Event 4662 is high-volume and requires appropriate SACL/audit configuration. Backup, identity, migration, and synchronization products can legitimately use replication rights.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Directory Replication From Non-Machine Account\nid: cc0c6803-2f24-420f-b206-f0b081bb6f9d\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects Directory Service Access events with replication-right GUIDs from a non-machine account.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Approved directory synchronization, backup, migration, and identity services\nlevel: high\nlogsource:\n  product: windows\n  service: security\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventID: 4662\n    Properties|contains:\n      - 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\n      - 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\n      - 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c\n  filter_machine:\n    SubjectUserName|endswith: $\n  condition: selection and not filter_machine\n",
        "kql": "SecurityEvent\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has_any (\"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\",\n    \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\", \"89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c\")\n| where Account !endswith \"$\"\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectAccount, ObjectName, Properties, Activity\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4662\n(Properties=\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\"\n  OR Properties=\"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\"\n  OR Properties=\"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\nNOT SubjectUserName=\"*$\"\n| table _time host SubjectDomainName SubjectUserName ObjectName Properties\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Security Event 4662 candidates containing directory-replication extended-right GUIDs and a non-machine subject account. Tune approved synchronization identities.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-dcsync.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-dcsync.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-dcsync.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-dcsync.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account - DcSync Indicator",
          "id": "17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml"
        },
        {
          "name": "First Time Seen Account Performing DCSync",
          "id": "5c6f4c58-b381-452a-8976-f1b1c6aa0def",
          "source": "Elastic detection-rules",
          "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/windows/credential_access_dcsync_newterm_subjectuser.toml"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "initial-access",
        "title": "SQL Server compromised",
        "description": "Attacker gained initial access through compromised SQL Server",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "implant",
        "title": "CyberStrikeAI implant deployed",
        "description": "Open-source CyberStrikeAI implant installed with C2 connection to fastcdn.bar and 185.186.245.144",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "llm-decision",
        "title": "LLM selects attack commands",
        "description": "C2-side LLM using MCP tools autonomously chooses and executes attack techniques",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "privilege-escalation",
        "title": "SystemUpdate task and credential dumping",
        "description": "SystemUpdate scheduled task created; certutil used for downloads; comsvcs.dll dumps LSASS memory",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "domain-admin",
        "title": "Domain admin achieved via DCSync and Golden Ticket",
        "description": "DCSync extracts domain credentials; Golden Ticket generated for persistence; domain admin achieved in 3-4 days",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/cyberstrikeai-attacks/121715/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "initial-access",
        "target": "implant"
      },
      {
        "source": "implant",
        "target": "llm-decision"
      },
      {
        "source": "llm-decision",
        "target": "privilege-escalation"
      },
      {
        "source": "privilege-escalation",
        "target": "domain-admin"
      }
    ]
  }
}