{
  "attack_id": "llmjacking-sysdig-2024-05",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "linux-webshell",
      "title": "Linux web worker → shell / interpreter",
      "hypothesis": "A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation (EDR / auditd normalized to process fields)",
        "PHP / web access logs",
        "File changes to web roots and PHP configuration"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Trace the worker's children and correlate them with inbound requests.",
        "Review auto_prepend_file, .bashrc changes, /dev/shm execution, and outbound tunnels where the report describes them."
      ],
      "limitation": "Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux web worker → shell / interpreter\nid: 068e005a-876e-4ba3-a414-791f9a1c2330\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or\n  reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - /sh\n      - /bash\n      - /python\n      - /python3\n      - /curl\n      - /wget\n    ParentImage|endswith:\n      - /php-fpm\n      - /php-fpm8.2\n      - /apache2\n      - /httpd\n      - /nginx\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"sh\", \"bash\", \"python\", \"python3\", \"curl\", \"wget\")\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"php-fpm\", \"php-fpm8.2\", \"apache2\", \"httpd\", \"nginx\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:process\"\nImage IN (\"*/sh\", \"*/bash\", \"*/python\", \"*/python3\", \"*/curl\", \"*/wget\")\nParentImage IN (\"*/php-fpm\", \"*/php-fpm8.2\", \"*/apache2\", \"*/httpd\", \"*/nginx\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "linux process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-webshell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack",
        "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack",
        "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "bedrock",
      "title": "Bedrock discovery / key testing",
      "hypothesis": "A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "AWS CloudTrail management events",
        "Bedrock invocation logging / relevant data events when explicitly enabled",
        "Key inventory and inference usage"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Group ListFoundationModels / GetFoundationModel calls by key, source IP and user agent; compare against normal application identities.",
        "Correlate with invocation logs and cost. Discovery alone does not establish a stolen key or successful inference."
      ],
      "limitation": "The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Bedrock discovery / key testing\nid: 89e0e836-0c7b-44b4-a9d4-3524f68318b2\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed\n  by unexpected model access or usage.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  product: aws\n  service: cloudtrail\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    eventSource: bedrock.amazonaws.com\n    eventName:\n      - ListFoundationModels\n      - GetFoundationModel\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Discovery only; correlate with principal inventory and enabled invocation logs.\nAWSCloudTrail\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventSource == \"bedrock.amazonaws.com\"\n| where EventName in (\"ListFoundationModels\", \"GetFoundationModel\")\n| summarize Requests=count() by UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, EventName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)\n| order by Requests desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudtrail\" eventSource=\"bedrock.amazonaws.com\"\neventName IN (\"ListFoundationModels\", \"GetFoundationModel\")\n| bin _time span=1h\n| stats count by _time userIdentity.arn sourceIPAddress userAgent eventName\n| sort - count"
      },
      "query_scope": "AWS discovery candidates: Sigma CloudTrail, Sentinel AWSCloudTrail, and Splunk aws:cloudtrail. Invocation logging is a separate prerequisite.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/bedrock.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/bedrock.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/bedrock.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/bedrock.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack",
        "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "cloud",
      "title": "Unexpected cloud / inference identity use",
      "hypothesis": "A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Cloud control-plane and identity audit",
        "AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled",
        "Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.",
        "Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized."
      ],
      "limitation": "Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use\nid: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains\n  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - cloud.credential.use\n      - cloud.role.change\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/cloud.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/cloud.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/cloud.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack",
        "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Vulnerable Laravel provides a foothold",
        "description": "The report identifies CVE-2021-3129 before credential theft.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack",
          "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Cloud credentials are stolen",
        "description": "Attackers obtain keys and probe multiple AI providers.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack",
          "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Inference access is proxied",
        "description": "Authorized model access is resold through attacker reverse proxies.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack",
          "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Victim accounts incur inference usage",
        "description": "The report describes high-volume requests and potentially substantial costs.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack",
          "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}