{
  "attack_id": "promptsteal-lamehug-apt28-2025-07",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
        "https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/",
        "https://csirt.csi.cip.gov.ua/en/posts/apt28-targets-security-and-defence-sector-with-ai-powered-software"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "model-network",
      "title": "Unexpected process → model service",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected script, implant or local model client communicates with a model service near command execution, collection or file modification.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Per-process network / DNS records",
        "AI-service request logs where available",
        "Process and file behavior on the calling host"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the network connection to the process tree and the actions before and after the response.",
        "Compare with approved AI integrations; inspect local model listeners for PoCs that do not use a hosted API."
      ],
      "limitation": "Connecting to a legitimate model domain does not establish malicious use or reveal returned code. Local / in-process models can evade network-only hunts.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected process → model service\nid: 8560daf7-ecd1-4f2b-ad09-b794bb56a394\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected script, implant or local model client communicates\n  with a model service near command execution, collection or file modification.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - model.connection\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"model.connection\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"model.connection\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/model-network.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/model-network.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/model-network.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/model-network.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
        "https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/",
        "https://csirt.csi.cip.gov.ua/en/posts/apt28-targets-security-and-defence-sector-with-ai-powered-software"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
        "https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/",
        "https://csirt.csi.cip.gov.ua/en/posts/apt28-targets-security-and-defence-sector-with-ai-powered-software"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": [],
      "control": {
        "title": "Deny an unapproved executable",
        "action": "Use MagicSword to audit the actual executable's signer, publisher or hash, then enforce a policy that denies unapproved code on managed Windows hosts.",
        "scope": "The Windows Python / PyInstaller payload if an enforced policy denies that payload. Permitted interpreters can still execute generated commands.",
        "limitation": "Policy opportunity, not tested incident coverage. Requires enrolled Windows devices, a policy covering the actual executable, and enforcement. Audit mode records decisions without blocking; allowed tools and in-process / cloud actions can remain reachable.",
        "url": "https://www.magicsword.io/use-cases/application-control?utm_source=openattacks&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=stage-control"
      }
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "exfil",
      "title": "Sensitive data → unusual destination",
      "hypothesis": "Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sensitive resource access / DLP records",
        "Proxy, egress and cloud upload events",
        "Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.",
        "Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing."
      ],
      "limitation": "An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination\nid: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public\n  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - data.export\n      - agent.external.send\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/exfil.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/exfil.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/exfil.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
        "https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/",
        "https://csirt.csi.cip.gov.ua/en/posts/apt28-targets-security-and-defence-sector-with-ai-powered-software"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Phishing delivers a ZIP attachment",
        "description": "The message impersonates a ministry representative.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
          "https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/",
          "https://csirt.csi.cip.gov.ua/en/posts/apt28-targets-security-and-defence-sector-with-ai-powered-software"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Miner queries a hosted code model",
        "description": "The executable requests Windows reconnaissance and collection commands through Hugging Face.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
          "https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/",
          "https://csirt.csi.cip.gov.ua/en/posts/apt28-targets-security-and-defence-sector-with-ai-powered-software"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Generated commands run on the host",
        "description": "The Python/PyInstaller malware executes the returned one-line commands.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
          "https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/",
          "https://csirt.csi.cip.gov.ua/en/posts/apt28-targets-security-and-defence-sector-with-ai-powered-software"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Documents and information are exfiltrated",
        "description": "The report links the data-mining campaign to Ukrainian government targets.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
          "https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/",
          "https://csirt.csi.cip.gov.ua/en/posts/apt28-targets-security-and-defence-sector-with-ai-powered-software"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}