{
  "attack_id": "symantec-ai-revived-retailer-intrusion-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "sql-and-iis",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "note": "cmd.exe under sqlservr.exe and commands under w3wp.exe. The initial entry vector is unknown.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "stalled",
      "profile": "windows-dll-sideload",
      "title": "DLL loaded from a user-writable location",
      "hypothesis": "A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.",
      "visibility": "Windows image-load telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows image-load events such as Sysmon Event 7 or EDR equivalents",
        "File provenance, signature, and process ancestry",
        "Subsequent network and payload activity"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Verify the executable and DLL signatures, original archive or installer, hashes, and load path.",
        "Compare the DLL name/location with the vendor's expected installation and correlate child activity."
      ],
      "limitation": "Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.",
      "note": "bdreinit.exe with log.dll and ask.exe with ask.dll loaded from the same directory. Hand-typed typos are not a detection.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - DLL Load From User-Writable Location\nid: a5e6a4a2-be30-4a0a-8559-5f9a2623403e\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects DLL image loads from common user-writable Windows paths.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nfalsepositives:\n  - Portable, development, and self-updating applications\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: image_load\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection_path:\n    ImageLoaded|contains:\n      - \\Downloads\\\n      - \\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\n      - \\Windows\\Temp\\\n      - \\Users\\Public\\\n  selection_dll:\n    ImageLoaded|endswith: .dll\n  condition: all of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceImageLoadEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName endswith \".dll\"\n| where FolderPath has_any (\"\\\\Downloads\\\\\", \"\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\\", \"\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\\", \"\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FolderPath, FileName, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=7\nImageLoaded=\"*.dll\"\n(ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Downloads\\\\*\" OR ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\*\"\n  OR ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" OR ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\*\")\n| table _time host User Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus Hashes ProcessGuid\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "DLL image loads from common user-writable paths. Confirm the initiating executable is trusted and the loaded module is unexpected before treating the event as sideloading.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-dll-sideload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-dll-sideload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Microsoft Defender Blocked from Loading Unsigned DLL",
          "id": "0b0ea3cc-99c8-4730-9c53-45deee2a4c86",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security_mitigations/win_security_mitigations_defender_load_unsigned_dll.yml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "ai-scripts",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "note": "Long PowerShell submitted through the existing shell. Section banners are content, not a process-name signal.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "orion-move",
      "profile": "payload",
      "title": "Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific process and file provenance",
        "Signer / hash and software inventory",
        "Per-process network and remote-session records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.",
        "Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization."
      ],
      "limitation": "A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.",
      "note": "The second-server command used Orion's bundled erl.exe. Later hive saves came from an EfsPotato payload. The generic payload query does not name either.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior\nid: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes\n  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - process.unapproved.exec\n      - remote.session.start\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/payload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/payload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/payload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/payload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-17",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "sql-and-iis",
        "title": "SQL Server and IIS command shells",
        "description": "From Sep 18, cmd.exe runs under sqlservr.exe. From Sep 21, commands run under w3wp.exe. Symantec does not identify the initial entry vector.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "stalled",
        "title": "Hand-typed commands stall",
        "description": "Sep 22 commands include typos such as systemifo and pwoershell. Security software kills staged loaders, including the bdreinit.exe and log.dll pair, and the operators retry without changing approach.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "ai-scripts",
        "title": "Long labelled scripts",
        "description": "On Sep 23 about 50 error-free PowerShell scripts run in about two hours, with section banners and comments Symantec reads as model reasoning. Pauses fit an operator pasting the next script.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "orion-move",
        "title": "Orion cookie reaches a second server",
        "description": "About 10 minutes after the first Orion query, the operators read the RabbitMQ cookie and use the bundled erl.exe rpc:call path to run a command on a second server. Later activity dumps credential hives. No encryption was observed.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "sql-and-iis",
        "target": "stalled"
      },
      {
        "source": "stalled",
        "target": "ai-scripts"
      },
      {
        "source": "ai-scripts",
        "target": "orion-move"
      }
    ]
  }
}