{
  "attack_id": "thisbash-claude-dispatch-rce-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "install-extension",
      "profile": "extension",
      "title": "Browser extension change / data access",
      "hypothesis": "A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Managed-browser extension inventory and update history",
        "Extension ID, permissions and provenance",
        "Browser / proxy / DLP evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.",
        "Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately."
      ],
      "limitation": "Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access\nid: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses\n  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - browser.extension.install\n      - browser.extension.update\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/extension.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/extension.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/extension.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/extension.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/thisbash-claude-dispatch-browser-extension-rce/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "push-prompt",
      "profile": "agent-input",
      "title": "Untrusted content enters an agent session",
      "hypothesis": "An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Application / agent audit records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier",
        "Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved",
        "Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.",
        "Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session\nid: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session\n  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved\n  task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-04\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.input.ingest\n      - agent.session.resume\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-input.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-input.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-input.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/thisbash-claude-dispatch-browser-extension-rce/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "auto-allow",
      "profile": "agent-tools",
      "title": "Unexpected agent tool use",
      "hypothesis": "Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination",
        "Tool-definition and approval changes",
        "Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.",
        "Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector."
      ],
      "limitation": "Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use\nid: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file\n  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.tool.call\n      - agent.tool.definition.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-tools.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-tools.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-tools.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/thisbash-claude-dispatch-browser-extension-rce/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "execute-command",
      "profile": "unassessed",
      "title": "Stage hunt not mapped yet",
      "hypothesis": "A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.",
      "visibility": "Not assessed",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt."
      ],
      "limitation": "An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No query has been reviewed for this stage yet.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unassessed.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_assessed",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/thisbash-claude-dispatch-browser-extension-rce/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "install-extension",
        "title": "Malicious extension installed",
        "description": "User installs malicious browser extension with claude.ai permissions",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/thisbash-claude-dispatch-browser-extension-rce/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "push-prompt",
        "title": "Extension pushes prompt via Dispatch",
        "description": "Extension uses Dispatch API to push command prompt to Claude Desktop",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/thisbash-claude-dispatch-browser-extension-rce/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "auto-allow",
        "title": "Auto-click Allow button",
        "description": "Extension automatically clicks Allow to bypass user consent",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/thisbash-claude-dispatch-browser-extension-rce/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "execute-command",
        "title": "Execute arbitrary command",
        "description": "Command executes on Claude Desktop (PoC: npm install -g add-colors-to-bash)",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/thisbash-claude-dispatch-browser-extension-rce/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "install-extension",
        "target": "push-prompt"
      },
      {
        "source": "push-prompt",
        "target": "auto-allow"
      },
      {
        "source": "auto-allow",
        "target": "execute-command"
      }
    ]
  }
}