Arctic Wolf - AntiFox ARTEX fork web-shells IIS and reads AWS production secrets
Arctic Wolf Labs (pack alert committed Nov 10, 2026) describes AntiFox, an open-source Chinese-language agentic pentest platform forked from ARTEX, running multi-agent workflows on TCP 8787 and requiring an…
What happened
Arctic Wolf Labs (pack alert committed Nov 10, 2026) describes AntiFox, an open-source Chinese-language agentic pentest platform forked from ARTEX, running multi-agent workflows on TCP 8787 and requiring an Anthropic or OpenAI key. Self-hosted consoles on Alibaba Cloud were tied to real intrusions. On an internet-facing IIS app, w3wp.exe wrote an ASPX web shell (pwn*.aspx in upload directories) and then ran whoami, icacls, and write tests into the web root. PowerShell used System.Web.Configuration.WebConfigurationManager and WebConfigurationFileMap to parse web.config connection strings and app settings, then copied config and log files into web-reachable cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt, and tried an internal production database with the extracted credential. The initial exploit was not identified. In AWS, valid IAM users and in one case an assumed EC2 role ran GetCallerIdentity, ListUsers, ListRoles, ListPolicies, ListKeys, and an attempted ECR GetAuthorizationToken. One intrusion cycled multiple identities through hundreds of List, Get, and Describe calls across IAM, EC2, S3, Lambda, Secrets Manager, KMS, RDS, ECS, EKS, Redshift, Athena, Glue, Systems Manager, API Gateway, CloudWatch, CloudFormation, DynamoDB, and Bedrock in about 30 minutes. Most calls were denied. Some succeeded, ending in ListSecrets then GetSecretValue on a production secret. Another case ran S3 GetObject, CopyObject, and DeleteObject. User agents were Boto3/1.43.125 and Botocore/1.43.125. Source IPs 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210. Console title AntiFox autonomous pentest console. Banner hash c370d03542ed2ec696f7337940b14652e98e9bab. AntiFox source https://github.com/AntiFox-AI/antifox. Upstream fork https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX. IOC file https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools.
Arctic Wolf tied live IIS and AWS intrusions to source IPs that hosted AntiFox consoles, a Chinese-language fork of ARTEX
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · IIS worker writes an ASPX shell
w3wp.exe creates pwn*.aspx in an upload directory and runs whoami, icacls, and write tests.
Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Parse web.config
PowerShell uses WebConfigurationManager to copy connection strings and logs into cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt.
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Burst of AWS List and Get calls
Boto3 1.43.125 from the AntiFox IPs cycles identities across dozens of AWS services in about 30 minutes.
Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Source for step 3 - 04 · GetSecretValue and S3 object changes
A successful GetSecretValue hits a production secret. Other activity copies and deletes S3 objects.
Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Unknown exploit of an internet-facing IIS application; separate activity started from already-valid AWS credentials. Reported impact: A successful GetSecretValue hits a production secret. Other activity copies and deletes S3 objects; reported targets include Internet-facing IIS applications and associated AWS accounts, including a production secret; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Alert when w3wp.exe writes .aspx files or spawns cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami.exe, or icacls.exe. Hunt web roots for pwn*.aspx, cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt. Alert on GetSecretValue from 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210 and on Boto3/1.43.125 after a burst of AccessDenied. Block TCP 8787 consoles titled AntiFox.
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01IIS worker writes an ASPX shellSuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft
w3wp.exe creates pwn*.aspx in an upload directory and runs whoami, icacls, and write tests.
What to look for
A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
- PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
- Download / network and installer events
Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \wscript.exe
- \cscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- -enc
- http
- FromBase64String
- "javascript:"
- "vbscript:"
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
02Parse web.configSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
PowerShell uses WebConfigurationManager to copy connection strings and logs into cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt.
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
03Burst of AWS List and Get callsUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft
Boto3 1.43.125 from the AntiFox IPs cycles identities across dozens of AWS services in about 30 minutes.
What to look for
A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Cloud control-plane and identity audit
- AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
- Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- cloud.credential.use
- cloud.role.change
- model.invoke
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
04GetSecretValue and S3 object changesUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft
A successful GetSecretValue hits a production secret. Other activity copies and deletes S3 objects.
What to look for
A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Cloud control-plane and identity audit
- AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
- Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- cloud.credential.use
- cloud.role.change
- model.invoke
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI as operator
- Offensive frameworks
- AntiFox
- Additional role
- AI credential theft
- Initial access
- Unknown exploit of an internet-facing IIS application; separate activity started from already-valid AWS credentials
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- AntiFox (https://github.com/AntiFox-AI/antifox), forked from ARTEXCommunity-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- Anthropic or OpenAI API key required for the agent loop
Other tooling
- ASPX web shell written by w3wp.exe
- Boto3 1.43.125 / Botocore 1.43.125
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Internet-facing IIS applications and associated AWS accounts, including a production secret
- Reported scale / exposure
- Several intrusions. One AWS burst of hundreds of API calls in about 30 minutes, ending in GetSecretValue.
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Reported attribution
Unnamed operators. Arctic Wolf gives no country. The platform is Chinese-language and the consoles were on Alibaba Cloud. Arctic Wolf links the activity to AntiFox through the hosting consoles.
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Unnamed AntiFox operators
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- Arctic Wolf Labs
- Attribution confidence
- medium
Detection rules
- Potential IIS Web Shell File CreationELASTICView rule
Windows endpoint. Creation of ASPX files in IIS content directories. Matches w3wp.exe writing pwn*.aspx.
- Suspicious Process By Web Server ProcessSIGMAView rule
Windows process creation. w3wp.exe spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe, which Arctic Wolf saw running whoami and icacls.
- AWS Secrets Manager Rapid Secrets RetrievalELASTICView rule
AWS CloudTrail. Repeated GetSecretValue. The intrusion that succeeded used ListSecrets then GetSecretValue.
- First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets ManagerELASTICView rule
AWS CloudTrail. First GetSecretValue for an identity. Useful when the production-secret read is new for that IAM user or role.
- AntiFox console and file-name huntingGUIDANCE
Also hunt TCP 8787 with the AntiFox console title, banner hash c370d03542ed2ec696f7337940b14652e98e9bab, user agents Boto3/1.43.125 and Botocore/1.43.125, and files cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt dropped in web-reachable directories. Source IPs 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210.
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-11-10
- Last updated
- 2026-11-10
Updates
- 2026-11-10 — Arctic Wolf Labs
Pack alert links Alibaba-hosted AntiFox consoles to IIS ASPX web shells and AWS GetSecretValue against a production secret
Source defensive notes
Alert when w3wp.exe writes .aspx files or spawns cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami.exe, or icacls.exe. Hunt web roots for pwn*.aspx, cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt. Alert on GetSecretValue from 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210 and on Boto3/1.43.125 after a burst of AccessDenied. Block TCP 8787 consoles titled AntiFox.
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Operators run AntiFox, an agentic fork of ARTEX, from Alibaba Cloud consoles Source
w3wp.exe on an internet-facing IIS app wrote an ASPX web shell. The exploit itself was not identified. Source
PowerShell parsed web.config connection strings and app settings, then a later call read a production secret Source
Valid IAM users and an assumed EC2 role were used for the AWS enumeration Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
ips
47.79.4.338.208.101.210
hashes
c370d03542ed2ec696f7337940b14652e98e9bab
urls
Sources & research credit
4 sourcesResearch by Arctic Wolf Labs, Adversary Research · Arctic Wolf
- Arctic Wolf Labs pack alert: AntiFox on Alibaba Cloud github.com
- BleepingComputer: AntiFox AI agents in AWS credential theft www.bleepingcomputer.com
- The Hacker News: AntiFox linked to AWS credential theft thehackernews.com
- GitGuardian: AntiFox targeting AWS credentials blog.gitguardian.com
Host commands, file patterns, AWS API sequence, user agents, IPs, banner hash, and port are from the Arctic Wolf README. The AI link is that the attacking IPs hosted AntiFox consoles. No government source covers AntiFox.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Arctic Wolf - AntiFox ARTEX fork web-shells IIS and reads AWS production secrets
- Entry ID
- arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11
- Catalog review
- November 12, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- vendor-asserted