Arup Hong Kong deepfake video-call fraud (~US$25.6M)
A finance employee on a video call with deepfaked executives approved transfers of about US$25.6M. Arup said its internal IT systems were not compromised.
What happened
Jan 2024: Hong Kong finance employee joined video call with deepfake of UK CFO and colleagues; authorized 15 transfers totaling ~HK$200M (~US$25.6M) to five local accounts. Arup said internal IT systems were not compromised.
Deepfake-enabled BEC/fraud (video call impersonation); internal systems not compromised
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Finance employee joins a video call
The victim is approached through a meeting impersonating company executives.
Hunt: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Deepfake executives appear on screen
Synthetic video and audio impersonate the UK CFO and colleagues.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Payment requests are authorized
The employee approves 15 transfers to five local accounts.
Hunt: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Approximately US$25.6M lost
Arup disclosed the loss and said its internal IT systems were not compromised.
Hunt: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Social engineering via deepfake video conference. Reported impact: Arup disclosed the loss and said its internal IT systems were not compromised; reported targets include Arup (engineering consultancy) Hong Kong finance staff; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Out-of-band payment verification; dual control; challenge deepfake meetings
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Finance employee joins a video callOut-of-band payment verificationCustom schema · Draft
The victim is approached through a meeting impersonating company executives.
What to look for
A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit
- Meeting and communication metadata
- Independent callback / dual-approval records
Coverage limit. A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Out-of-band payment verification
id: 813e417f-8751-4479-ad17-0f3d146ff036
status: experimental
description: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or
an override of normal payment approval.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- payment.beneficiary.change
- payment.approval.override
- payment.transfer
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
- Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
03Payment requests are authorizedOut-of-band payment verificationCustom schema · Draft
The employee approves 15 transfers to five local accounts.
What to look for
A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit
- Meeting and communication metadata
- Independent callback / dual-approval records
Coverage limit. A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Out-of-band payment verification
id: 813e417f-8751-4479-ad17-0f3d146ff036
status: experimental
description: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or
an override of normal payment approval.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- payment.beneficiary.change
- payment.approval.override
- payment.transfer
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
- Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
04Approximately US$25.6M lostOut-of-band payment verificationCustom schema · Draft
Arup disclosed the loss and said its internal IT systems were not compromised.
What to look for
A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
Payment and approval records can support investigation of the loss; they do not prove that media was synthetic.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit
- Meeting and communication metadata
- Independent callback / dual-approval records
Coverage limit. A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Out-of-band payment verification
id: 813e417f-8751-4479-ad17-0f3d146ff036
status: experimental
description: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or
an override of normal payment approval.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- payment.beneficiary.change
- payment.approval.override
- payment.transfer
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("payment.beneficiary.change", "payment.approval.override", "payment.transfer")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
- Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- Other AI-enabled attacks
- Initial access
- Social engineering via deepfake video conference
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Deepfake video/audio of executives
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Arup (engineering consultancy) Hong Kong finance staff
- Reported scale / exposure
- ~US$25.6 million loss
- Target geography
- Hong Kong
The affected finance staff were in Hong Kong. The United Kingdom refers to the parent organization and executive impersonation, not a separately confirmed victim location.
Detection rules
- Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE
Monitor for the techniques described in Arup Hong Kong deepfake video-conference $25M fraud. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.
Source defensive notes
Out-of-band payment verification; dual control; challenge deepfake meetings
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Synthetic video and audio impersonate executives. Source
The payment request relies on executive impersonation. Source
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by Arup / Hong Kong Police (press) · Arup (victim disclosure via press)
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Arup Hong Kong deepfake video-conference $25M fraud
- Entry ID
- arup-deepfake-video-fraud-2024-01
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed