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BadByte - Backdoored ARTEX Docker images tomicdd/artex & congdonglinux/artex

After Autumn-27 closed ARTEX source on Oct 8, 2026, unknown operator controlling Docker Hub accounts tomicdd and congdonglinux (mirror) pushed backdoored ARTEX images while maintaining deleted GitHub bait…

What happened

After Autumn-27 closed ARTEX source on Oct 8, 2026, unknown operator controlling Docker Hub accounts tomicdd and congdonglinux (mirror) pushed backdoored ARTEX images while maintaining deleted GitHub bait repository trhhubsd/ARTEX (formerly ptasm) with swapped docker-compose.yml pulling backdoored tomicdd/artex. Prebuilt /app/artex binary adds verifyCaptcha function: unauthenticated POST to /api/auth/login with marked captcha field executes arbitrary sh -c commands as root before password verification, bypassing authentication entirely. Backdoor exposes ARTEX operator's LLM API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek), MCP server configurations, autonomous agent prompts, and credentials harvested from targets during offensive operations. BadByte analysis (Nov 4, 2026) confirmed /app/artex SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573, image index digest sha256:ce85d8369ccc1a85423f1f75d2f3afaa2fab759e580da37a6891af2f7392745e, UI build ID 3aC1db3gGU08O4UHbAt4J. Docker Hub removed tomicdd/artex on Nov 5, 2026. Backdoor demonstrates supply-chain risk in offensive AI agent tooling where operators' own credentials become attack surface.

Supply-chain backdoor injected into prebuilt Docker image of ARTEX autonomous offensive AI agent platform; operators deploying backdoored image expose their LLM API keys, MCP configurations, prompts, and harvested target credentials

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Backdoored Docker Image for ARTEX AI Offensive Agent Exposes Operators' Secrets

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · ARTEX source closed Oct 8, 2026

    ARTEX source closed Oct 8, 2026

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Push backdoored tomicdd/artex to Docker Hub

    Push backdoored tomicdd/artex to Docker Hub

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · trhhubsd/ARTEX swaps docker-compose.yml to pull tomicdd/artex

    trhhubsd/ARTEX swaps docker-compose.yml to pull tomicdd/artex

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · ARTEX operators pull backdoored image

    ARTEX operators pull backdoored image

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Unauthenticated POST /api/auth/login executes sh -c as root

    Unauthenticated POST /api/auth/login executes sh -c as root

    Source for step 5
  6. 06 · Steal LLM API keys, MCP configs, prompts, target credentials

    Steal LLM API keys, MCP configs, prompts, target credentials

    Source for step 6

Why it matters

Reported entry point: ARTEX operators pull backdoored tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex Docker image via compromised docker-compose.yml in deleted trhhubsd/ARTEX repository. Reported impact: Steal LLM API keys, MCP configs, prompts, target credentials; reported targets include ARTEX operators conducting offensive security operations; exposed: operator LLM API keys, MCP configurations, autonomous agent prompts, harvested target credentials; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Verify Docker image integrity via official repository sources and signed images; audit docker-compose.yml for unexpected image sources; use Docker Content Trust / Notary v2 for image verification; scan container images for suspicious network listeners and authentication bypasses; monitor container logs for unauthenticated command execution attempts; never deploy offensive tooling images from unverified third-party Docker Hub accounts; build ARTEX from official source (github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) rather than pulling prebuilt images; implement network segmentation for offensive security infrastructure

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
ARTEX operators pull backdoored tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex Docker image via compromised docker-compose.yml in deleted trhhubsd/ARTEX repository

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • ARTEX autonomous offensive agent (clean source at https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
  • Backdoored ARTEX Docker image (tomicdd/artex, congdonglinux/artex - now removed from Docker Hub)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.

Other tooling

  • Docker / Docker Compose
  • Unauthenticated /api/auth/login backdoor endpoint

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
ARTEX operators conducting offensive security operations; exposed: operator LLM API keys, MCP configurations, autonomous agent prompts, harvested target credentials
Reported scale / exposure
tomicdd/artex available on Docker Hub Oct 8 - Nov 5, 2026; unknown number of pulls before takedown; backdoor active approximately 4 weeks
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Unknown operator controlling Docker Hub tomicdd (primary) and congdonglinux (mirror) accounts; deleted GitHub repository trhhubsd/ARTEX (formerly ptasm); initially surfaced by Dan Tentler (Viss) on Nov 2, 2026; analyzed by BadByte

Structured attribution

Actor
Unknown (tomicdd/congdonglinux Docker Hub operator)
Country
Unknown
Motivation
cybercrime
Attributed by
BadByte
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Antivirus - Web Shell Detection SignatureSIGMAView rule

    General web shell detection; backdoored ARTEX /api/auth/login endpoint exhibits web shell characteristics (unauthenticated command execution)

  • Container command execution monitoringGUIDANCE

    Monitor Docker containers for unauthenticated API endpoints executing shell commands; alert on /api/auth/login POST requests with captcha fields invoking sh -c; audit docker-compose.yml for non-official ARTEX image sources (tomicdd/artex, congdonglinux/artex); verify ARTEX image digest against official builds; scan container filesystem for modified /app/artex binary (SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573); detect suspicious outbound connections from ARTEX containers to non-target infrastructure

  • Docker image integrity validationGUIDANCE

    Implement Docker Content Trust; verify image signatures before deployment; scan images with Trivy/Clair for malicious binaries; audit container network listeners for unexpected authentication bypasses; build offensive tooling from verified source repositories rather than pulling prebuilt images

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-10-08
Last updated
2026-11-05

Updates

  • 2026-10-08 — Unknown

    Autumn-27 closes ARTEX source; tomicdd/artex backdoored image appears on Docker Hub

  • 2026-11-02 — Dan Tentler (Viss)

    Dan Tentler (Viss) publicly surfaces backdoored ARTEX Docker image

  • 2026-11-04 — BadByte

    BadByte publishes detailed analysis with hashes and backdoor mechanism

  • 2026-11-05 — Docker Hub

    Docker Hub removes tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex images

Source defensive notes

Verify Docker image integrity via official repository sources and signed images; audit docker-compose.yml for unexpected image sources; use Docker Content Trust / Notary v2 for image verification; scan container images for suspicious network listeners and authentication bypasses; monitor container logs for unauthenticated command execution attempts; never deploy offensive tooling images from unverified third-party Docker Hub accounts; build ARTEX from official source (github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) rather than pulling prebuilt images; implement network segmentation for offensive security infrastructure

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0000Search Open Technical Databases

Supply-chain attack targeting AI offensive agent infrastructure; backdoor in ARTEX Docker image allows attacker to compromise operators' LLM API keys and MCP configurations Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

    ips

      hashes

      • d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573

      urls

      • https://hub.docker.com/r/tomicdd/artex (removed Nov 5, 2026)
      • https://hub.docker.com/r/congdonglinux/artex (mirror, removed)

      Sources & research credit

      2 sources

      Research by Dan Tentler (Viss), analyzed by BadByte · BadByte

      1. Backdoored Docker Image for ARTEX AI Offensive Agent badbyte.io
      2. Backdoored Docker Image for ARTEX AI Offensive Agent Exposes Operators' Secrets thehackernews.com

      BadByte analysis (Nov 4, 2026, updated Nov 5 on Docker Hub takedown) primary source; Dan Tentler (Viss) initial disclosure Nov 2, 2026; all hashes and IOCs verified from BadByte post: /app/artex SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573, image index digest sha256:ce85d8369ccc1a85423f1f75d2f3afaa2fab759e580da37a6891af2f7392745e, UI build ID 3aC1db3gGU08O4UHbAt4J

      Record & downloads
      Source record name
      BadByte - Backdoored ARTEX Docker images tomicdd/artex & congdonglinux/artex
      Entry ID
      badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11
      Catalog review
      November 6, 2026
      Category
      attacks-on-ai
      AI involvement confidence
      confirmed