BadByte - Backdoored ARTEX Docker images tomicdd/artex & congdonglinux/artex
After Autumn-27 closed ARTEX source on Oct 8, 2026, unknown operator controlling Docker Hub accounts tomicdd and congdonglinux (mirror) pushed backdoored ARTEX images while maintaining deleted GitHub bait…
What happened
After Autumn-27 closed ARTEX source on Oct 8, 2026, unknown operator controlling Docker Hub accounts tomicdd and congdonglinux (mirror) pushed backdoored ARTEX images while maintaining deleted GitHub bait repository trhhubsd/ARTEX (formerly ptasm) with swapped docker-compose.yml pulling backdoored tomicdd/artex. Prebuilt /app/artex binary adds verifyCaptcha function: unauthenticated POST to /api/auth/login with marked captcha field executes arbitrary sh -c commands as root before password verification, bypassing authentication entirely. Backdoor exposes ARTEX operator's LLM API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek), MCP server configurations, autonomous agent prompts, and credentials harvested from targets during offensive operations. BadByte analysis (Nov 4, 2026) confirmed /app/artex SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573, image index digest sha256:ce85d8369ccc1a85423f1f75d2f3afaa2fab759e580da37a6891af2f7392745e, UI build ID 3aC1db3gGU08O4UHbAt4J. Docker Hub removed tomicdd/artex on Nov 5, 2026. Backdoor demonstrates supply-chain risk in offensive AI agent tooling where operators' own credentials become attack surface.
Supply-chain backdoor injected into prebuilt Docker image of ARTEX autonomous offensive AI agent platform; operators deploying backdoored image expose their LLM API keys, MCP configurations, prompts, and harvested target credentials
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · ARTEX source closed Oct 8, 2026
ARTEX source closed Oct 8, 2026
Source for step 1 - 02 · Push backdoored tomicdd/artex to Docker Hub
Push backdoored tomicdd/artex to Docker Hub
Source for step 2 - 03 · trhhubsd/ARTEX swaps docker-compose.yml to pull tomicdd/artex
trhhubsd/ARTEX swaps docker-compose.yml to pull tomicdd/artex
Source for step 3 - 04 · ARTEX operators pull backdoored image
ARTEX operators pull backdoored image
Source for step 4 - 05 · Unauthenticated POST /api/auth/login executes sh -c as root
Unauthenticated POST /api/auth/login executes sh -c as root
Source for step 5 - 06 · Steal LLM API keys, MCP configs, prompts, target credentials
Steal LLM API keys, MCP configs, prompts, target credentials
Source for step 6
Why it matters
Reported entry point: ARTEX operators pull backdoored tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex Docker image via compromised docker-compose.yml in deleted trhhubsd/ARTEX repository. Reported impact: Steal LLM API keys, MCP configs, prompts, target credentials; reported targets include ARTEX operators conducting offensive security operations; exposed: operator LLM API keys, MCP configurations, autonomous agent prompts, harvested target credentials; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Verify Docker image integrity via official repository sources and signed images; audit docker-compose.yml for unexpected image sources; use Docker Content Trust / Notary v2 for image verification; scan container images for suspicious network listeners and authentication bypasses; monitor container logs for unauthenticated command execution attempts; never deploy offensive tooling images from unverified third-party Docker Hub accounts; build ARTEX from official source (github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) rather than pulling prebuilt images; implement network segmentation for offensive security infrastructure
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- Agent / MCP as target
- Initial access
- ARTEX operators pull backdoored tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex Docker image via compromised docker-compose.yml in deleted trhhubsd/ARTEX repository
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- ARTEX autonomous offensive agent (clean source at https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- Backdoored ARTEX Docker image (tomicdd/artex, congdonglinux/artex - now removed from Docker Hub)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
Other tooling
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- ARTEX operators conducting offensive security operations; exposed: operator LLM API keys, MCP configurations, autonomous agent prompts, harvested target credentials
- Reported scale / exposure
- tomicdd/artex available on Docker Hub Oct 8 - Nov 5, 2026; unknown number of pulls before takedown; backdoor active approximately 4 weeks
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Reported attribution
Unknown operator controlling Docker Hub tomicdd (primary) and congdonglinux (mirror) accounts; deleted GitHub repository trhhubsd/ARTEX (formerly ptasm); initially surfaced by Dan Tentler (Viss) on Nov 2, 2026; analyzed by BadByte
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Unknown (tomicdd/congdonglinux Docker Hub operator)
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- cybercrime
- Attributed by
- BadByte
- Attribution confidence
- low
Detection rules
- Antivirus - Web Shell Detection SignatureSIGMAView rule
General web shell detection; backdoored ARTEX /api/auth/login endpoint exhibits web shell characteristics (unauthenticated command execution)
- Container command execution monitoringGUIDANCE
Monitor Docker containers for unauthenticated API endpoints executing shell commands; alert on /api/auth/login POST requests with captcha fields invoking sh -c; audit docker-compose.yml for non-official ARTEX image sources (tomicdd/artex, congdonglinux/artex); verify ARTEX image digest against official builds; scan container filesystem for modified /app/artex binary (SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573); detect suspicious outbound connections from ARTEX containers to non-target infrastructure
- Docker image integrity validationGUIDANCE
Implement Docker Content Trust; verify image signatures before deployment; scan images with Trivy/Clair for malicious binaries; audit container network listeners for unexpected authentication bypasses; build offensive tooling from verified source repositories rather than pulling prebuilt images
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-10-08
- Last updated
- 2026-11-05
Updates
- 2026-10-08 — Unknown
Autumn-27 closes ARTEX source; tomicdd/artex backdoored image appears on Docker Hub
- 2026-11-02 — Dan Tentler (Viss)
Dan Tentler (Viss) publicly surfaces backdoored ARTEX Docker image
- 2026-11-04 — BadByte
BadByte publishes detailed analysis with hashes and backdoor mechanism
- 2026-11-05 — Docker Hub
Docker Hub removes tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex images
Source defensive notes
Verify Docker image integrity via official repository sources and signed images; audit docker-compose.yml for unexpected image sources; use Docker Content Trust / Notary v2 for image verification; scan container images for suspicious network listeners and authentication bypasses; monitor container logs for unauthenticated command execution attempts; never deploy offensive tooling images from unverified third-party Docker Hub accounts; build ARTEX from official source (github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) rather than pulling prebuilt images; implement network segmentation for offensive security infrastructure
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Supply-chain attack targeting AI offensive agent infrastructure; backdoor in ARTEX Docker image allows attacker to compromise operators' LLM API keys and MCP configurations Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
ips
hashes
d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573
urls
https://hub.docker.com/r/tomicdd/artex (removed Nov 5, 2026)https://hub.docker.com/r/congdonglinux/artex (mirror, removed)
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by Dan Tentler (Viss), analyzed by BadByte · BadByte
- Backdoored Docker Image for ARTEX AI Offensive Agent badbyte.io
- Backdoored Docker Image for ARTEX AI Offensive Agent Exposes Operators' Secrets thehackernews.com
BadByte analysis (Nov 4, 2026, updated Nov 5 on Docker Hub takedown) primary source; Dan Tentler (Viss) initial disclosure Nov 2, 2026; all hashes and IOCs verified from BadByte post: /app/artex SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573, image index digest sha256:ce85d8369ccc1a85423f1f75d2f3afaa2fab759e580da37a6891af2f7392745e, UI build ID 3aC1db3gGU08O4UHbAt4J
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- BadByte - Backdoored ARTEX Docker images tomicdd/artex & congdonglinux/artex
- Entry ID
- badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11
- Catalog review
- November 6, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed