Compromised Cline CLI npm release installs malicious OpenClaw
Feb 17, 2026: cline-cli@2.8.1 npm package published with malicious postinstall script (GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7). Cline is AI coding assistant CLI (github.com/cline/cline). Compromised version installs rogue…
What happened
Feb 17, 2026: cline-cli@2.8.1 npm package published with malicious postinstall script (GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7). Cline is AI coding assistant CLI (github.com/cline/cline). Compromised version installs rogue OpenClaw skill 'cline-helper' to ~/.openclaw/skills/ that runs on OpenClaw startup. Skill harvests: Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, VS Code settings (including API keys), filesystem access tokens. Exfiltrates to hxxps://cline-telemetry[.]io/api/collect. Package removed within 6 hours; ~1,200 downloads during window. Part of broader Feb 2026 wave targeting AI CLI tools. Detection: check npm audit for GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7; review ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected skills; monitor cline-telemetry[.]io egress; scan npm postinstall scripts for skill installation logic.
Compromised Cline CLI npm package (cline-cli) installs malicious OpenClaw skill that harvests AI service credentials
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Publish malicious cline-cli
Attacker compromised cline-cli npm package and published version 2.8.1 with malicious postinstall script
Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Install rogue OpenClaw skill
Postinstall script creates ~/.openclaw/skills/cline-helper/ with malicious skill code; skill auto-loads on next OpenClaw/Cline startup
Hunt: A package-manager install or lifecycle script launches a shell, downloader, or script interpreter that retrieves or executes an unexpected second stage.
Build and install scripts commonly invoke shells and download dependencies. Require package provenance and destination context; this hunt does not by itself prove supply-chain compromise.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Harvest credentials on startup
Malicious skill executes on OpenClaw startup; harvests Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, VS Code settings with API keys; reads filesystem access tokens
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Exfiltrate to C2
POSTs harvested credentials to hxxps://cline-telemetry[.]io/api/collect; ~1,200 affected installations in 6-hour window
Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: npm install cline-cli@2.8.1 (compromised version, available ~6 hours on Feb 17, 2026). Reported impact: POSTs harvested credentials to hxxps://cline-telemetry[.]io/api/collect; ~1,200 affected installations in 6-hour window; reported targets include ~1,200 downloads in 6-hour window; AI developers using Cline CLI; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Use npm package lock files; verify package integrity; review postinstall scripts; monitor ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected additions; use npm audit to check for GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7; rotate credentials after suspected exposure; implement SCA tools
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Publish malicious cline-cliDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft
Attacker compromised cline-cli npm package and published version 2.8.1 with malicious postinstall script
What to look for
A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Package-manager and CI job logs
- Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
- Runner process trees, secret access and egress
Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- package.install
- ci.workflow.change
- package.lifecycle.exec
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
- Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
02Install rogue OpenClaw skillPackage installation spawns a shell or downloaderNative logs · Draft
Postinstall script creates ~/.openclaw/skills/cline-helper/ with malicious skill code; skill auto-loads on next OpenClaw/Cline startup
What to look for
A package-manager install or lifecycle script launches a shell, downloader, or script interpreter that retrieves or executes an unexpected second stage.
Visibility: Endpoint process telemetry where collected
Required logs
- Process creation with ancestry and complete command lines
- Package-manager, CI, and installation logs
- Download, file creation, signature, and network telemetry
Coverage limit. Build and install scripts commonly invoke shells and download dependencies. Require package provenance and destination context; this hunt does not by itself prove supply-chain compromise.
Process candidates with package-manager ancestry that launch shells or downloaders. Tune known build tooling and correlate with network/file telemetry.
MCP reference matches: Curl Download Activity from npm Package Install (Elastic detection-rules), Suspicious PowerShell from npm Package Install (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Shell or Downloader Spawned by Package Installation
id: c83f22aa-d07c-4f3c-a67f-6d5512818133
status: experimental
description: Detects package-manager processes spawning common shells, interpreters, or downloaders.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_curl_download_from_npm_install.toml
falsepositives:
- Legitimate package build and installation scripts
level: medium
logsource:
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentCommandLine|contains:
- npm-cli.js
- npx-cli.js
- yarn
- pnpm
- pip install
- python -m pip
- gem install
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- /sh
- /bash
- /zsh
- /curl
- /wget
- /python
- /node
condition: all of selection_*
KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("npm-cli.js", "npx-cli.js", "yarn", "pnpm",
"pip install", "python -m pip", "gem install")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "curl", "wget", "python", "node")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.parent_process IN ("*npm-cli.js*", "*npx-cli.js*", "*yarn*", "*pnpm*",
"*pip install*", "*python -m pip*", "*gem install*")
Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "curl", "wget", "python", "node")
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTimeInvestigation steps
- Identify the package, version, publisher, lifecycle hook, resolved source, and parent process.
- Recover downloaded content and correlate credential access, persistence, or outbound traffic.
03Harvest credentials on startupSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
Malicious skill executes on OpenClaw startup; harvests Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, VS Code settings with API keys; reads filesystem access tokens
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
04Exfiltrate to C2Sensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft
POSTs harvested credentials to hxxps://cline-telemetry[.]io/api/collect; ~1,200 affected installations in 6-hour window
What to look for
Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Sensitive resource access / DLP records
- Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
- Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- data.export
- agent.external.send
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI credential theft
- Additional role
- AI tool as lure
- Initial access
- npm install cline-cli@2.8.1 (compromised version, available ~6 hours on Feb 17, 2026)
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Cline AI coding assistant
- OpenClaw skill framework
- Anthropic Claude API
- OpenAI API
Other tooling
- npm supply chain attack
- Malicious OpenClaw skill
- cline-telemetry[.]io C2
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- ~1,200 downloads in 6-hour window; AI developers using Cline CLI
- Reported scale / exposure
- ~1,200 downloads in 6-hour exposure window; package removed Feb 17, 2026
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Reported attribution
Unknown actor; part of Feb 2026 wave targeting AI CLI tools and skill frameworks
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Unknown
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- GitHub/Cline
- Attribution confidence
- high
Detection rules
- Supply chain monitoringGUIDANCE
Monitor package installations, verify publisher authenticity, scan for malicious code patterns
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-02-17
- Last updated
- 2026-11-04
Updates
- 2026-02-17 — GitHub/Cline
Initial discovery and analysis
Source defensive notes
Use npm package lock files; verify package integrity; review postinstall scripts; monitor ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected additions; use npm audit to check for GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7; rotate credentials after suspected exposure; implement SCA tools
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Supply chain compromise of AI CLI tool to install malicious skill framework extension stealing credentials Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
cline-telemetry.io
ips
hashes
urls
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by GitHub Security Advisory, Cline maintainers · GitHub, Cline
- GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7: Malicious code in cline-cli npm package github.com
- Cline - AI coding assistant CLI github.com
GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7; Cline GitHub github.com/cline/cline. Related to ClawHavoc and other malicious OpenClaw skill campaigns. Detection: alert on npm packages with postinstall scripts installing to ~/.openclaw/skills/, check for cline-telemetry[.]io domain, monitor AI credential file access from unexpected processes.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Compromised Cline CLI npm release installs malicious OpenClaw
- Entry ID
- cline-cli-openclaw-compromise-2026-02
- Catalog review
- November 4, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed