Detection queries Not classified

Elastic REF3364 SANSAR takes over exposed Ray GPU hosts and hides utilization

Elastic Security Labs (Salim Bitam, Nov 12, 2026) tracks REF3364. The Ray dashboard was bound to loopback, but the job agent was reachable from the internet and accepted unauthenticated Jobs API…

What happened

Elastic Security Labs (Salim Bitam, Nov 12, 2026) tracks REF3364. The Ray dashboard was bound to loopback, but the job agent was reachable from the internet and accepted unauthenticated Jobs API submissions. External probes appeared in the Ray logs on October 22, 2026. On October 24 a submitted job ran nvidia-smi and sent the GPU inventory out. On October 25 a Python reverse-shell job connected to an external listener under the account that owned the Ray session. The actor added an SSH key to that account's authorized_keys, obtained root, and staged SANSAR under /opt/vadi_ on three GPU hosts. SANSAR is a Rust orchestrator (v0.1.3) with Tor/Arti command and control and Lyrebird obfs4/WebTunnel. It supervises XMRig, stored as kurt, and SRBMiner-MULTI, stored as tilki (https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig and https://github.com/doktor83/SRBMiner-Multi). A replaced libnvidia-ml.so.1 wraps the real NVML library and reports GPU use as 0 percent, randomizes temperature between 36 and 46 C and power between 100 and 200 W, and filters process lists, so nvidia-smi and other NVML clients lie. An ftrace rootkit, acpi_thermal_mgr.ko, is built with DKMS, loaded through the initramfs, and hides processes, files, and sockets. A systemd backdoor named netns reads its command-and-control address from an Ethereum smart contract and connects on TCP 8080. Elastic publishes YARA rules for SANSAR and netns. Link shadowray-2-0-hijacks-exposed-ray-2025-11.

The target is Ray, a distributed Python framework used for AI training and inference. The attacker is not described as using a model. The NVML wrapper is aimed at the GPU telemetry ML operators watch.

Read the original source

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Unauthenticated Ray job

    October 22 probes, then an October 24 job that runs nvidia-smi and sends the GPU inventory out.

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Python reverse shell

    On October 25 a Python reverse-shell job connects out as the Ray session account.

    Hunt: A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

    Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · SSH key and root

    An SSH key is added to authorized_keys. The actor then stages SANSAR under /opt/vadi_.

    Hunt: A shell or file utility modifies an SSH authorized_keys file and is followed by an SSH session or outbound tunnel that is not part of approved administration.

    Administrators and configuration-management tools legitimately rotate SSH keys. Process-only telemetry can miss direct file writes, and a matching command does not prove that the write succeeded.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · NVML wrapper and DKMS rootkit

    libnvidia-ml.so.1 reports 0 percent GPU use. acpi_thermal_mgr.ko is loaded through DKMS and the initramfs.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Unauthenticated Ray Jobs API on an internet-reachable job agent. Reported impact: An SSH key is added to authorized_keys. The actor then stages SANSAR under /opt/vadi_; reported targets include Three GPU hosts running Ray. Elastic did not name the organizations; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Do not expose the Ray job agent. Require authentication on the Jobs API. Alert on a Python reverse shell from the Ray account, a new authorized_keys entry, an out-of-tree kernel module, and a miner command line even when the binary is named kurt or tilki. Compare nvidia-smi with a second GPU telemetry source so a wrapped libnvidia-ml.so.1 cannot be the only reading.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Unauthenticated Ray jobUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

October 22 probes, then an October 24 job that runs nvidia-smi and sends the GPU inventory out.

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
02Python reverse shellLinux fileless or anonymous-file executionNative logs · Draft

On October 25 a Python reverse-shell job connects out as the Ray session account.

What to look for

A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

Visibility: Linux process and audit telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines
  • Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available
  • Network and persistence activity from the resulting process

Coverage limit. Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.

MCP reference matches: Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution
id: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66
status: experimental
description: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files
level: medium
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|contains:
      - /memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  selection_command:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  condition: 1 of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| where FolderPath has_any ("/memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where Processes.process IN ("*memfd:*", "*/proc/self/fd/*", "*/proc/thread-self/fd/*")
  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTime
Investigation steps
  1. Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.
  2. Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells.
03SSH key and rootLinux SSH authorized-key persistenceNative logs · Draft

An SSH key is added to authorized_keys. The actor then stages SANSAR under /opt/vadi_.

What to look for

A shell or file utility modifies an SSH authorized_keys file and is followed by an SSH session or outbound tunnel that is not part of approved administration.

Visibility: Linux endpoint and SSH logs where collected

Required logs

  • Linux process creation with complete command lines
  • File modification telemetry for user and root SSH directories
  • SSH authentication and network connection logs

Coverage limit. Administrators and configuration-management tools legitimately rotate SSH keys. Process-only telemetry can miss direct file writes, and a matching command does not prove that the write succeeded.

Linux process candidates that reference authorized_keys. The queries require process command lines; correlate with file and SSH telemetry before alerting.

MCP reference matches: Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification (Splunk Security Content). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux SSH Authorized Key Modification
id: ba847b8a-0dd7-4062-a6ba-bc923654f22a
status: experimental
description: Detects shell and file utilities referencing SSH authorized_keys files.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_ssh_authorized_keys_modification.yml
falsepositives:
  - Approved SSH key rotation and configuration management
level: medium
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|endswith:
      - /bash
      - /sh
      - /zsh
      - /cat
      - /tee
      - /sed
      - /cp
  selection_target:
    CommandLine|contains: authorized_keys
  condition: all of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "authorized_keys"
| where FileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "cat", "tee", "sed", "cp")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where Processes.process="*authorized_keys*"
  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTime
Investigation steps
  1. Recover the added key and identify the process, user, package, or script that changed the file.
  2. Correlate the change with new SSH sessions, reverse tunnels, and other persistence artifacts.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
Unauthenticated Ray Jobs API on an internet-reachable job agent

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Ray (https://github.com/ray-project/ray)

Other tooling

  • SANSAR orchestrator
  • XMRig, filename kurt (https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig)
  • SRBMiner-MULTI, filename tilki (https://github.com/doktor83/SRBMiner-Multi)
  • Lyrebird obfs4/WebTunnel
  • NVML wrapper libnvidia-ml.so.1

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Three GPU hosts running Ray. Elastic did not name the organizations.
Reported scale / exposure
Three GPU hosts. Activity from October 22 through October 25, 2026, from probe to persistent access.

Elastic did not name the countries of the GPU hosts.

Reported attribution

REF3364. Elastic does not attribute the activity to a named group or country.

Structured attribution

Actor
REF3364
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Elastic Security Labs
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Python Reverse Shell Execution Via PTY And Socket ModulesSIGMAView rule

    Linux process creation. python -c with import, pty, socket, spawn, and connect. Matches that common reverse-shell form. A job that is a script file without those strings on one command line will not match.

  • Linux SSH Authorized Keys ModificationSPLUNKView rule

    Linux endpoint. Modification of authorized_keys, which is how the actor kept access after the reverse shell.

  • Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe UtilitySPLUNKView rule

    Linux endpoint. modprobe loading a kernel module. DKMS loads acpi_thermal_mgr.ko this way.

  • Tainted Out-Of-Tree Kernel Module LoadELASTICView rule

    Linux endpoint. An out-of-tree module that taints the kernel. Fits the DKMS-built acpi_thermal_mgr.ko rootkit.

  • Linux Crypto Mining IndicatorsSIGMAView rule

    Linux process creation. Stratum URLs, --donate-level=0, and related miner flags. The binaries are renamed kurt and tilki, so a process-name rule for xmrig does not match. These command-line flags still can.

  • NVML wrapper and netns contractGUIDANCE

    No cited rule looks for a replaced libnvidia-ml.so.1, the path /opt/vadi_, or a systemd unit that reads an Ethereum contract. LD_PRELOAD rules do not match this library replacement.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-10-22
Last updated
2026-11-12

Updates

  • 2026-10-22 — Elastic Security Labs

    External probes appear in the Ray job logs.

  • 2026-10-24 — Elastic Security Labs

    A submitted job runs nvidia-smi and sends the GPU inventory to an external server.

  • 2026-10-25 — Elastic Security Labs

    A Python reverse-shell job connects out. The actor adds an SSH key, gains root, and stages SANSAR under /opt/vadi_.

  • 2026-11-12 — Elastic Security Labs

    Elastic publishes REF3364, the seven file hashes, the NVML wrapper, and the DKMS rootkit.

Source defensive notes

Do not expose the Ray job agent. Require authentication on the Jobs API. Alert on a Python reverse shell from the Ray account, a new authorized_keys entry, an out-of-tree kernel module, and a miner command line even when the binary is named kurt or tilki. Compare nvidia-smi with a second GPU telemetry source so a wrapped libnvidia-ml.so.1 cannot be the only reading.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing Application

The internet-reachable Ray Jobs API accepted unauthenticated job submissions. Source

AML.T0050Command and Scripting Interpreter

Submitted jobs ran nvidia-smi and a Python reverse shell. Source

AML.T0072Reverse Shell

The October 25 job was a Python reverse shell to an external listener. Source

AML.T0034Cost Harvesting

SANSAR mined on the stolen GPU capacity while reporting 0 percent utilization. Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

    ips

      hashes

      • 00c9ac44291f83c72d54302e99d155a3e26d02225a3e516764d5833a99657c9e
      • 96fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31b8797cb126f704976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad46
      • acc706afc9322a3eae1ef49049749e0a7c9f1a123895ac56dc8a289beb2fb5b7
      • cc1ad7f14777a098ccc91fd4e8f6143da14418c2b6fdf23b7f8f6b3d1b0b7f1d
      • 675c24728f87f7aa0fa07527027c95c24c246049c65eaef89270ab04ea50a180
      • 6ba1aa275e0e2826e8b48b36473539ca56cbdc41f429e539a45f8532b084d7a4
      • df8ab6fd699e6ae90e63e9696bae8f01342708bafc2ed88af414337e4f237194

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        1 source

        Research by Salim Bitam · Elastic Security Labs

        1. 0% GPU utilization: How SANSAR hides Linux cryptomining www.elastic.co

        Dates, paths, component names, and the seven SHA-256 hashes are from the Elastic Security Labs article. The miners are renamed, so a rule that requires the process name xmrig or srbminer will miss kurt and tilki. The NVML change is a replaced libnvidia-ml.so.1, not an LD_PRELOAD or ld.so.preload edit, so those rules are not cited.

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        Elastic REF3364 SANSAR takes over exposed Ray GPU hosts and hides utilization
        Entry ID
        elastic-sansar-ray-gpu-2026-11
        Catalog review
        November 15, 2026
        Category
        attacks-on-ai
        AI involvement confidence
        confirmed