Detection queries Reported campaign

GTG-1002 AI-orchestrated espionage via Claude Code

Anthropic reports that a state-sponsored group used Claude Code to orchestrate intrusion tasks. Human operators selected targets, and model-generated findings required validation.

What happened

Chinese state-sponsored GTG-1002 manipulated Claude Code and MCP tools as autonomous pentest orchestrators across recon, vuln discovery, exploitation, lateral movement, credential harvest, analysis, and exfil. Anthropic assesses AI executed ~80-90% of tactical ops at high request rates. Human operators selected targets and tasked agent groups. Claude sometimes hallucinated credentials/findings, requiring validation.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: attack.mitre.org

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Human operators choose targets

    Operators task agents against live organizations; exploit details are redacted.

    Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

    Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Claude Code orchestrates tactical work

    Coding agents and MCP tools support reconnaissance, discovery and exploitation.

    Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

    Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Intrusion steps progress

    The report describes credential harvesting, lateral movement, analysis and collection.

    Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

    A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Data is exfiltrated

    Anthropic reports a handful of validated intrusions and notes that model findings still required human validation.

    Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

    An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Human-selected targets; AI discovered and exploited vulnerabilities in live ops (details redacted in public report). Reported impact: Anthropic reports a handful of validated intrusions and notes that model findings still required human validation; reported targets include ~30 entities; validated handful of successful intrusions including major technology corporations and government agencies; technology, financial, chemical, government (MITRE C0062); using the named AI products does not by itself establish exposure.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Detect agentic coding CLI + MCP automation spikes; least-privilege MCP; raise cost of LOLBin/tool execution with app control

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 LOLSkills GTFOBins
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Human operators choose targetsProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft

Operators task agents against live organizations; exploit details are redacted.

What to look for

A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

Human target selection is provider/operator-side evidence. Redacted exploit details do not support a guessed endpoint rule.

Visibility: Provider / operator records

Required logs

  • Provider-owned account / request audit
  • Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
  • Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence

Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
  sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - model.request
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
  2. For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
02Claude Code orchestrates tactical workProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft

Coding agents and MCP tools support reconnaissance, discovery and exploitation.

What to look for

A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

Visibility: Provider / operator records

Required logs

  • Provider-owned account / request audit
  • Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
  • Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence

Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
  sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - model.request
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
  2. For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
03Intrusion steps progressWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft

The report describes credential harvesting, lateral movement, analysis and collection.

What to look for

Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
  • Server process and file events
  • Outbound DNS / proxy records

Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
  server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - web.exploit_candidate
      - web.upload
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
  2. Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
04Data is exfiltratedSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft

Anthropic reports a handful of validated intrusions and notes that model findings still required human validation.

What to look for

Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Sensitive resource access / DLP records
  • Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
  • Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs

Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - data.export
      - agent.external.send
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
  2. Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Initial access
Human-selected targets; AI discovered and exploited vulnerabilities in live ops (details redacted in public report)

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Claude Code
  • MCP tools
  • crafted prompts/personas to bypass guardrails

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
~30 entities; validated handful of successful intrusions including major technology corporations and government agencies; technology, financial, chemical, government (MITRE C0062)
Reported scale / exposure
~30 entities targeted; mid-Sep 2025 activity window; first documented largely autonomous AI cyberattack at scale per Anthropic
Target geography
Multiple regions

Global targeting is described without individual countries. China-nexus attribution concerns the actor, not victim location.

Reported attribution

GTG-1002; high confidence Chinese state-sponsored (Anthropic); MITRE Campaign C0062

Structured attribution

Actor
GTG-1002
Motivation
nation-state
Attribution confidence
high

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in GTG-1002 AI-orchestrated espionage via Claude Code. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Detect agentic coding CLI + MCP automation spikes; least-privilege MCP; raise cost of LOLBin/tool execution with app control

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

The operation obtains generative AI tooling for intrusion support. Source

AML.T0102Generate Malicious Commands

The model assists tactical command and tool generation. Source

Sources & research credit

2 sources

Research by Anthropic Threat Intelligence · Anthropic

  1. www-cdn.anthropic.com
  2. attack.mitre.org
Record & downloads
Source record name
GTG-1002 AI-orchestrated espionage via Claude Code
Entry ID
gtg-1002-anthropic-claude-code-espionage-2025-11
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed