GTIG/Mandiant: UNC7228 and other crews run ARTEX and PentAGI agent frameworks in live intrusions at machine speed
Google's incident responders have seen ARTEX and PentAGI agents run lateral movement, AD credential theft, webshell deployment and exfil prep on their own after operators hand them credentials, with…
What happened
Google's incident responders have seen ARTEX and PentAGI agents run lateral movement, AD credential theft, webshell deployment and exfil prep on their own after operators hand them credentials, with access-to-deep-access times as short as 15 minutes.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A summary diagram derived from the entry fields, not a verified detailed sequence. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Reported initial access
unknown
Source for step 1 - 02 · Reported activity
Google's incident responders have seen ARTEX and PentAGI agents run lateral movement, AD credential theft, webshell deployment and exfil prep on their own after operators hand them credentials, with access-to-deep-access times as short as 15 minutes.
Source for step 2 - 03 · AI involvement
ARTEX, PentAGI, Hexstrike, CAIRN agent frameworks · unnamed frontier and open-weight LLM APIs, LLM mixers and local models
Source for step 3
Why it matters
Reported impact: the cited report does not establish a confirmed victim outcome; reported targets include Government; Technology and AI companies; Critical infrastructure; Multiple sectors; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Prevention guidance has not been recorded for this entry. Review the original report for available mitigations.
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Technical detailsTooling, impact
Attack context
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Government; Technology and AI companies; Critical infrastructure; Multiple sectors
Target geography was not captured by the Notion feed. Actor attribution is not used as a victim location.
Reported attribution
UNC7228 (GTIG; overlaps Microsoft's Storm-0940); other unnamed financially motivated and suspected PRC-nexus clusters
Structured attribution
- Actor
- UNC7228 (GTIG; overlaps Microsoft's Storm-0940); other unnamed financially motivated and suspected PRC-nexus clusters
- Country
- China
- Motivation
- nation-state
- Attributed by
- Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant
- Attribution confidence
- medium
Detection rules
- Kerberoasting Activity - Initial QuerySIGMAView rule
Matched Kerberoasting with security-detections-mcp. GTIG says ARTEX ran Kerberoasting scripts to harvest service tickets.
- First Time Seen Account Performing DCSyncELASTICView rule
Matched DCSync with security-detections-mcp. GTIG says ARTEX followed Kerberoasting with DCSync scripts for the krbtgt key and domain-controller hashes.
- Potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) AttemptELASTICView rule
Matched Pass the Hash with security-detections-mcp. GTIG lists Pass-the-Hash among the lateral-movement scripts ARTEX attempted against domain controllers.
- Linux Webshell IndicatorsSIGMAView rule
Matched webshell with security-detections-mcp. GTIG describes JSP webshells written through MySQL general_log on a Linux Weaver OA server.
- Connection to Commonly Abused Web ServicesELASTICView rule
Matched webhook.site with security-detections-mcp. GTIG says a Windows database server used curl to post command results to rotating webhook.site URLs.
- MySQL general_log poisoning and artex-probe filenamesGUIDANCE
security-detections-mcp searches for jsp and webshell returned Linux webshell and SAP NetWeaver rules. None encode SET GLOBAL general_log_file writes of JSP content, the cl1217.jsp-style names, or artex-probe filenames. Hunt those strings in web and database logs.
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-08
- Last updated
- 2026-11-15
Updates
- 2026-10-30 — Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant
GTIG and Mandiant report ARTEX, PentAGI, Hexstrike, and CAIRN in incident-response engagements since late August 2026. UNC7228 overlaps Microsoft's PRC-nexus Storm-0940; other crews are financially motivated or suspected PRC-nexus.
- 2026-11-15 — OpenAttacks
Tagged ARTEX and PentAGI and backfilled attribution confidence, detections, and timeline from the cited GTIG report.
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by unknown · Google Threat Intelligence Group / Mandiant
Imported from the AI Threat Watch Notion feed (an automated daily scan); not yet editorially reviewed. Feed severity: High. Feed novelty: Evolution.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- GTIG/Mandiant: UNC7228 and other crews run ARTEX and PentAGI agent frameworks in live intrusions at machine speed
- Entry ID
- gtig-mandiant-unc7228-other-crews-run-2026-10
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed