Detection queries Reported campaignWindows

Plus 5.6: fake ChatGPT assistant delivers a Windows RAT

A malicious Custom GPT directs users to a ClickFix page. The pasted command launches a Windows payload chain with DLL sideloading and persistence.

What happened

Attacker Custom GPT 'Plus 5.6' on chatgpt.com (Google Ads) directs users to Google Sites ClickFix; paste runs PowerShell → MSI → DLL sideload via Canon COTFileReadApp.exe / ceiinfolog.dll / rdCore.dll (later Stardock DeElevate64). Dual persistence Run key + scheduled task. Multi-stage obfuscated RAT.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Custom GPT attracts a user

    Ads promote an attacker-controlled Plus 5.6 GPT hosted on ChatGPT.

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Chat directs the user to ClickFix

    The GPT points to a Google Sites page that requests a pasted command.

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · PowerShell launches the payload chain

    The command retrieves an MSI and triggers DLL sideloading.

    Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.

    Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.

    MagicSword policy opportunity · The Windows script and installer execution boundary. Separate allow rules for required software can leave parts of this chain reachable.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · RAT establishes persistence

    The chain adds Run-key and scheduled-task persistence.

    Hunt: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.

    Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Custom GPT social engineering → ClickFix paste → MSI. Reported impact: The chain adds Run-key and scheduled-task persistence; reported targets include 40+ Huntress incidents; 2 confirmed via Custom GPT; ongoing as of 2026-10-14.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

ChatGPTWindows

A malicious Custom GPT directs the user to a ClickFix page and a Windows payload chain.

Conditions to check
  • The user must encounter the malicious Custom GPT / page and execute the pasted command.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Review Custom GPT links and pasted commands; investigate unusual script and installer process chains.

Prevent signed binaries from user folders; HijackLibs entries for ceiinfolog/DeElevator64; hunt COTFileReadApp/DeElevate64 under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance HijackLibs
Explore scoped MagicSword policy options

Requires an enforced Windows policy covering the actual executable. Audit mode records events without blocking.

Restrict script / execution utilities

Use MagicSword to review and enforce a policy restricting unneeded Windows script hosts, shells or installer utilities identified in this branch.

Applies to: The Windows script and installer execution boundary. Separate allow rules for required software can leave parts of this chain reachable.

Policy opportunity, not tested incident coverage. Requires enrolled Windows devices, a policy covering the actual executable, and enforcement. Audit mode records decisions without blocking; allowed tools and in-process / cloud actions can remain reachable.

Explore the policy control View mapped attack stage
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Custom GPT attracts a userLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

Ads promote an attacker-controlled Plus 5.6 GPT hosted on ChatGPT.

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Correlate ads and the custom GPT referral with the reported external delivery workflow; ordinary ChatGPT use is not a signal.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02Chat directs the user to ClickFixLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

The GPT points to a Google Sites page that requests a pasted command.

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03PowerShell launches the payload chainSuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft

The command retrieves an MSI and triggers DLL sideloading.

What to look for

A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
  • PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
  • Download / network and installer events

Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.

Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
      - \mshta.exe
      - \wscript.exe
      - \cscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - -enc
      - http
      - FromBase64String
      - "javascript:"
      - "vbscript:"
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
  2. Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
04RAT establishes persistenceNew persistence → recurring executionCustom schema · Draft

The chain adds Run-key and scheduled-task persistence.

What to look for

A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes
  • Process creation and file provenance
  • User / administrative change records

Coverage limit. Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - New persistence → recurring execution
id: 6154ff56-2978-45fa-aecd-86d91557f32e
status: experimental
description: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is
  changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - persistence.create
      - persistence.modify
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("persistence.create", "persistence.modify")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("persistence.create", "persistence.modify")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.
  2. Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
Custom GPT social engineering → ClickFix paste → MSI

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • Google Sites / gptverification.com
  • PowerShell
  • msiexec
  • Canon CaptureOnTouch sideload
  • Stardock DeElevate64 sideload
  • GOMCam follow-on

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
40+ Huntress incidents; 2 confirmed via Custom GPT; ongoing as of 2026-10-14
Reported scale / exposure
40+ related incidents; OpenAI took down first GPT ~2026-09-25; replacement appeared 09-27

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in Plus 5.6 Custom GPT ClickFix RAT. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Prevent signed binaries from user folders; HijackLibs entries for ceiinfolog/DeElevator64; hunt COTFileReadApp/DeElevate64 under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0073Impersonation

An AI-branded Custom GPT provides a social-engineering pretext. Source

AML.T0052Phishing

The GPT directs the user into a ClickFix delivery flow. Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by Mark O'Halloran, Jonathan Semon (et al.) · Huntress

  1. huntress.com
Record & downloads
Source record name
Plus 5.6 Custom GPT ClickFix RAT
Entry ID
huntress-plus56-custom-gpt-clickfix-2026-09
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed